

LAND USE POLICY IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES
A POLITICAL SCIENCE ANALYSIS

By

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LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

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There are many explanations of the policy process at the local government level. The most adequate approach is to explore the interrelationships between the political process and economic interests which affect the adoption and use of policies. The richest policy area that exemplifies the interrelation of political and economic interactions is development. Policies that affect the development and growth of a community typify the political economy approach to understanding urban politics.

In this research, it is suggested that interest groups such as the business groups and residential developers compete for the attention of government in order to affect local land use and planning policies. The question of growth in urban areas is supported through an aggregate, comparative study of urban cities and counties in the state of Florida.

Data were obtained through a non-random survey created by the author of public officials and representatives of major private interests.

The results of this research lead us to conclude that communities most often adopt traditional developmental land use policies, and only in situations of interest group competition do communities adopt more politically risky policies. Interest group competition, influence, and predispositions towards the proper role of government affect the land use policies adopted by a community. Communities dominated by business/pro-growth interests, less conflict, and a desire to have government take a pro-market approach prefer than a regulatory approach only an traditional land use policies and do not use innovative policies which tend to be more restrictive of growth.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS

The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development

Land is a commodity that has definable economic value. Its current and future uses are affected by the policies contained in the city comprehensive plan and related ordinances. These policies in turn affect the value of the land. The use of land is an economically motivated process and a government regulated process. Ordinances, land use planning regulations, and long term comprehensive plans affect the economic value of land. Beginning in 1904 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., local government established the legal right to regulate the use of land.¹ Since then, economic and political interests interact and are dependent upon each other. The relationship between these interests is reflected in land use policy. The best method to examine this phenomenon may be through the political economy approach. "the systematic interaction between economic and political processes" (Grossman, 1981, p. 18).

The public, individuals and land-based interest groups, have much at stake in the development of land use policies. The way in which land is used affects city population size

and location, the socio-economic character of the community, and the city's rate of economic growth. These factors influence the demands placed on government and consequently affect policies themselves. Land-based interests affect government's ability to respond to the physical demands of growth.

Political Economy and Policy

The growth of a city in terms of population and economy is significantly affected by economic forces and government interventions. Traditional economic theory suggests that demands from and needs of the population will determine the economic sector's growth and that competition will bring more economic development and another round of population growth. This traditional explanation for economic development is the "central place theory".² This and similar theories of economic and population growth and city hierarchies, do not include the government sector in their models.³

Economic interests, however, must have certain public functions available in order to affect the local economy. "Intervention," government actions supporting business, (Stein, 1971) has been an important feature of urban policy making since the industrial development of the early 1800s (Feld, 1994). The modern experience of urban renewal illustrates how economic interests and government work together in the name of urban growth (Pollack, 1983).

Government assistance in developing a good business climate increases the attractiveness of the city to investors and subsequent economic development (Rothlich and Legish, 1984). Pro-growth coalitions (Rollinskopf, 1983), the growth machine (Sclarick, 1984), and the new convergence of power (Gallagher, 1984) have become significant additions to the literature in urban politics.

The urban area as a political economy of place concerns the actions of the growth machine--based interest groups "which collude to achieve a common land-use/development scheme" (Sclarick, 1984, p. 112). Sclarick's explanation of modern urban growth builds on our understanding that the local political coalition is a dominant force in urban politics. From the early urban reform/city official movement, Hunter's (1980) research with structure of Atlanta, to Friedland's (1983) theory of economic tradeoffs and conflicts we expect to find business interests involved in local decision making.

The business and economic sector actors may be considered as an interest group in the process, but we must explore the depth of the role which the economic sector plays in the process in order to fully understand the nature of the local political economy and how it may affect land use policy making.

There are a variety of points in the spectrum of political economy which may be useful in understanding the

relationships between the political and economic sectors. A pluralist explanation may suggest business interests as one of many interest groups in the process, although, as one with greater access to the process than other groups (Dodd, 1981; 1982), business interests may be viewed as having a "privileged" position in the process, thus dominating policy making while government responds to its needs (Kiddie, 1979; 1981). This view may be expanded a step further as a neo-Marxist explanation by expecting government to be responsive only to the needs of capital holders and producers (O'Connor, 1972; Friedland, 1981). A more expanded view may be the political economy of the left (Linschey, 1981) denouncing an government's attempts to provide for society through redistributinal policies.⁸

Other explanations of urban politics also integrate the political and economic systems and suggest that the business sector's contribution to policy making is positive. For example, public choice theories are representative of the "political economy of the right" (Linschey, 1982). Market solutions are seen as efficient and effective solutions to urban problems (Rish and Collins, 1978). Policies should represent the public's interests through policies and systems that maximize opportunities for homogeneous communities where similar preferences may be optimized (Friedson, 1984). Government's role should be as the agent of these preferences, which may include business interests.

To make sense of these many views of the integration of politics and economics we return to Lindblom (1980). He suggests that the business sector enjoys a unique position of influence in the policy making process. Other interests will operate within a limited "zone of policy making" (Lindblom, 1980, p. 115): local government depends on local business interests to create a positive economic condition in the city. Government can provide incentives and regulate business in order to manage their role in the local process. The degree of flexibility within which business operates can be treated as a "market variable" in social science research (Lindblom, 1980, p. 116). In the case of this research, the interests which make up the growth machine are the actors that have business interests that are land based. The anti-growth conditions are the residential and environmental interests that are also land based but have different expectations of land use than the growth machine. These two groups of political interests affect the permeability of business influence and the pluralistic zone of policy making. Land use policies represent the subject of their political influence.

The economic market should be considered as a variable and not a constant (Lindblom, 1980). What we say first is that there are several distinct actors which make up the local "political economy" such as the local government, the business interests, and the anti-business/public interests.

This research may reveal any of the combinations of political influences presented above. Ultimately, we want to distinguish between various political interests and identify the patterns of interests that contribute to different policy outputs.


Which Cities Grow and Which Don't--The Role of Land Use Policy

Capital investment is a major factor considered by scholars when examining the determinants of urban growth. The role of the production function is important to our understanding of urban development (O'Connor, 1973; Feinstein and Feinstein, 1981; Friedland, 1981; Smith, 1982; Swenson, 1986). Included in this is the effect of city attractiveness on private urban investment (Holcomb and Logan, 1944). Competition among cities for private investment may influence the adoption by government of incentive policies such as industrial revenue bonds, tax increment financing, and enterprise zones (Criscione, 1984; Hagopian, 1981).

An issue that has not received the same attention in the literature is whether patterns of urban influence and needs have a similar effect on the adoption of land use policies for economic development and growth of urban areas. Policies which accommodate increased land use should be expected to be of pivotal interest to those who promote growth. Thus the focus of this research centers on the following questions:

1) Can we explain why Florida cities adopt and use different land use policies? Is one this explanation be attributed to the distinctions between cities in terms of the political influence of land based interests in the business/mercantile sector, the individual sector, and the governmental sector (Figure 2-11)?

The development and application of land use policy can be a highly politicized process (Gottschalk, 1988; Schaller, 1988; Kachewich, 1988). Several states, including Florida in 1978, have passed legislation requiring localities to prepare comprehensive plans and follow state directed planning processes. In the case of Florida, localities had five years to implement the state requirements and to prepare several plan elements including a future land use element. The regulations implementing the Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1978 state it very easy for cities and counties to amend their plans. The frequency with which many Florida cities have amended their plans suggests that comprehensive planning is open to political influence and that Lindblom (1985) refers to as disjointed incrementalism. In addition, localities assert local development and land use ordinances and adopt various development regulations which may be separate from the comprehensive planning process. These tools are used to implement the comprehensive plan, but may not be integrated with the original plan, leaving the process



System Model

Figure 1-6

vulnerability to specified external influences (domestic and foreign, etc.).⁵

Two policy processes then may exist in the land use planning policy process: One is the development and adoption of the original plan--the goals. The second process is the development and adoption of implementation policy.

Boekwisch (1981) suggests that the stabilizing, no-change forces will dominate the short process, while the development interests will dominate the second. He may find that the comprehensive plan stage may be static and the implementation policy stage may be dynamic, as the influence of the land-based growth conditions fluctuate.

The investment value and development of land is primarily tied to the land use designations which government places on property. Interrelationships exist between land value, economic investment, and government land use policy. Thus the following propositions can be made.

Proposition 1: the greater the pressure for a city of conditions governing growth machine participation, the stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that adopted land use policies will be flexible and accommodating to growth and development.

The alternative to those interested in promoting growth are the actors who are interested in slowing or stopping growth. Once growth has begun, we can expect a point of

disequilibrating between dysfunctions in the environment such as pollution, overcrowding, and congestion will threaten the existing character of the community and will motivate demand for removing the dysfunctions as well as the perceived source of those dysfunctions - growth itself. This interest group is the antithesis of the pro-growth coalition. Melnick (1978) appropriately uses the label anti-growth coalition to represent land based interests whose lifestyle is threatened by uncurbed development of land and population increases in the urban area.

Homeowners aggregate into neighborhood groups and represent this alternative force (Peterson, 1981; Rich, 1979; Melnick, 1978). Their ideology for action is identical to the pro-growth force, although their actions are different. The anti-growth coalition seek to use the local government policy making process to adopt policies which slow or stop growth in order to preserve a lifestyle and personal real estate investment rather than to increase a business' economic profit potential.

Figure 11: The greater the pressure in a city of conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation, the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coalition in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be adopted.

The anti-growth forces are expected to rely on regulatory policy as a means to overcome the market forces which stimulate growth (Lapan, 1974b; Mills, 1974; Johnston, 1980). Government regulation is necessary to secure benefits to the public even if regulations create costs for the private sector (Ethrall, 1980; Lapan, 1974a; Williams, 1981). It is expected that anti-growth forces will prefer flexible land use policies in order to take advantage of dynamic market forces (Ginsburgh et al., 1976; Mills, 1978; Davis et al., 1977; Barrow, 1979; Johnston et al., 1978). Land use policies which are adaptable to current economic conditions will allow the property to be used at its maximum economic potential (Williams, 1981). Pro-growth forces are economically motivated by the potential earning power and value of their land (McLach, 1979; McLach and Lapan, 1980; Rosenbom, 1981). The adoption of land use policies which allow for market fluctuations will be beneficial to them (McLachupf, 1980; Mills, 1978; Ginsburgh, 1980).

Proposition 1a: The greater the investment which the growth machine has in the community the more proactively they have to participate in the policy making process, and the more likely it is that land use policies will reflect market needs.

Proposition 1b: The greater the investment which the anti-growth forces have in the community the more proactively they have to participate in the policy making process, and

the more likely is it that government will regulate land use and adopt policies which restrict market forces and benefit existing community residents.

Economic investments may be a stimulus for intense participation and pressure on government to respond with protectionist policies. The more regulatory sources available to local government from broader levels of authority, the greater the opportunity for local government to be an influential participant in the growth process and less subject to policy manipulation. In addition, as alternative revenue sources for local government increase, the financial options available to local government increase, thus reducing dependency on local revenues such as the property tax. This decreasing dependency on local revenues and regulatory assistance from state or regional governments may give local government greater autonomy and/or flexibility in land use policy making affecting growth decisions.

Proposition 3. The greater the availability of alternative regulatory power and revenue sources, the less dependent local government is on local revenue contributions and the more autonomous local government is, allowing government to be a partner or decider in the local growth process.

Classification of Policy

Classification of land use policy should be two-fold: based on the empirical evidence available on the impact of the policy itself (encourages or excludes growth) and based

as the propensity of the policy impact (flexible--intended to change over time or regulatory--intended not to change over time) (Scott, 1974).

An American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) report (Hansen et al., 1974) has developed a continuum for specific land use techniques based on the predictability of such policy to allow the market to determine land use as well as government to regulate land use (Hansen et al., 1974). In addition, various authors have suggested that specific policies have an impact on the rate of growth (Gordon, 1974). Growth can be discouraged from occurring by using discretionary policies such as restricting lot size, mandated population limits, growth passing commissions, (1964), or unregulated zoning (Copen, 1976). Cities also may exert control over anti-growth intentions through less flexible policies such as holding maps, planned development, use options (Holcomb, 1974), cabled restrictions, and density restrictions (Wheat, 1980).

An analysis of regulatory versus "pacing" (market-driven) policies as growth management tools concludes that regulatory procedures are a more effective means to minimize growth inequity (et al., 1973). Other land use policies such as flexible to regulate zoning and transportation practices do not allow cities and provide more development options and do not necessarily limit growth. Specialized policies such as transfer of development rights (TDR),

subsidies were, and the investment financing one were oriented to the needs of the land sector (Korten et al., 1971).

Land Policy Making Process

The land use policy process is influenced by land based interests, market oriented pro-growth conditions, and public-good-oriented, anti-growth conditions. Government planners and administrators also affect the process by recommending the adoption of specific land use policies. We must explore the longer policy process in order to understand the important role of land use policy adoption.

Policy making in nation governments can take on many characteristics. Weber (1977) suggests that the process may range from being rational—few actors, low controversy, no incremental, to heuristic—many actors, high controversy. The level of consensus or conflict may be stimulated by the nature of the policy itself or by the decision making process such as routine, bureaucratic decision making or non-routine, politicized decision making (Weber, 1977; Ayon and Boujmaa, 1982):

Land use regulations distribute benefits. The question of 'who gets what' land use benefits is decided by planning policies. Hovdey (1984) suggests four different competing benefit distribution approaches in growth management policy: 1) utilitarian—maximize benefits to the entire community; 2) equal shares—benefits distributed equally to each group

without regard to any existing inequalities; b) equalization-benefits distributed to minimize existing inequalities; and c) development-benefits to the least advantaged group. These theories examine policy outcomes and may help us to understand why different land use policies are adopted and which political, social, and/or economic conditions affect policy selection.

If government distributes benefits through policy, then we can improve our understanding of the process by assessing government's role in policy development and policy implementation. We would expect cities in which anti-growth coalitions are very active to favor regulatory policies which increase government's influence on land use. We would expect cities in which a growth machine is very active to favor flexible policies which limit government's influence on land use. Therefore, in order for these expectations to be researched, we must examine who is involved in the policy process and how they are involved, and how much influence they have on policy adoption (Mollenkopf, 1983; Clavel, 1989; Lyon et al., 1991; Molotch, 1979; Jodit, 1991).

In addition to the private sector, city administrators are another actor group which deserves attention. Planners and managers may play an active role in conceptualizing the goals and framework of the comprehensive land use plan. We can characterize administrators as neutral technicians, producing one type of policy, and as value-order

administrators, developing other types of policies. The degree to which policies and administrations are separate within a city may influence policy decisions.

The role of planners is especially important. Davis and Spe (1978) suggest that supply side and demand side planning roles may be identified. Supply side planners lean more toward controlling growth by affecting supply through regulation. Demand side planners lean more towards controlling growth by copying on market factors to affect demand for land. Determining the position of planners and administrators in each city may shed some light on policy outcomes and growth policies.

We may gain additional insights into growth policies by examining the strength of presence or influence level of each interest group and local government itself on the policy process (Hansen, 1977; Nash, 1979). If any interest group is firmly established as a single or elite policy actor, then we would expect a rational, consensual, low conflict policy making process. However, if no interest group is firmly established as a major policy actor, providing a pluralistic process, then we would expect an incremental, high conflict, policy making process.

We may also find alternative policy adoption mechanisms and policy outputs depending on the role that government itself plays. Government may be a filter for influence (growth policies theory (Russett, 1988)), or a compromise

or manager role (policy planning city theory Coleman, 1971).

Proposition 8: the more consensus in the policy process, the more rational is the policy development, and thus the more evident the pattern of land use policy in response to growth or anti-growth interests.

Proposition 9: the more conflict in the policy process, the more instrumental is the policy development-- and thus the less evident the pattern of land use policy in response to growth and anti-growth interests.

Proposition 10: the greater the diversity of interests in the policy process, the greater the role for government in policy development, and thus the greater the input and direction by government in the interest of land use policy in response to growth and anti-growth interests.

The propositions of growth politics are based on how the policy process works in response to various actors. The degree of influence on the process by one or more groups and the degree of independence of government are the factors which distinguish growth politics in the local political environment (Figure 3-2).

The consensus process (4a) assumes that there are dominant interests which will influence the policy process and the output-- this may be an elite dominated process (Russett, 1968; Rosenthal, 1974) or it may be a public interest maintenance process where common public utilities are

conflict

Time Press

Long TimeShort TimeLow Tension

Consensus
(allies)

Compromise
(Government
Director)

High Tension

Compromise
(Government Director)

Conflict
(opponents)

Land Use Policy Process

Figure 3-3

optimized (Fishbein, 1953). The process is characterized by a commitment to a particular set of policies reflecting a "vision" for the city that suggests a rational process without conflict; the government may act as a facilitator of these interests.

The second process (18) is pluralistic or dominated by inherent group politics (Gard, 1953). As one group has control of the process and policy subjects are not necessarily consistent in purpose. There may be a lack of consensus among the policy actors as their vision of the community differs. The process would be incremental. Government may act as a mediator of these interests.

The third process (40) represents dialectical alternatives to the first two characterizations. Growth politics or social control theories suggest that the government take some measure of control of the direction of policy as demands on the process are divided. The government is in a position to make a divided vision of the city. Competing interests may force the process to be reactive, but may also create an opportunity for government to be a partner or manager (Innovation, 1955; Seidig, 1979; Cloward, 1980; Kishino, 1981).

The government can expand its role as a major actor based on the broad public good. Institutionalized approaches to growth politics will create opportunities for rational, government advocated policy approaches to growth problems.

Politics also may be compromised that are directed by the managerial role of government (Schelling, 1971; Schuman, 1971).

There may be overlaps between these processes in any given city, but an understanding of the patterns of influence and city policy processes will contribute to our understanding of why land use policies are adopted.

Research Methods

This is a comparative study of urban land use policy making. The dependent variables are land use policies. This research will attempt to determine why different land use policies are adopted by cities. The independent variables center on cities and their influence, policy approaches of growth policies, and environmental (social and economic) conditions. By using a comparative study approach, we can attempt to isolate various factors which have a relationship to certain land use policies. This information will contribute to our understanding of the impact of land use policies, the significance of the planning process, and whether certain types of growth policies as experienced by cities are likely to promote the adoption of particular land use policies and not others. This information will be of use to policy makers as it will help to identify the potential range of policy options that are most likely to be sought for a particular type of city and what obstacles to policy adoption may be present.

TABLE 1.1. p. 1180 provides a useful framework for comparative urban policy study based on "positive theory" (rather than normative theory) of urban policy:

1. Identify variations in policy from city to city
2. Identify the determinants of variations in urban policies
3. estimate the direction and magnitude of the consequences of policy diversities
4. Formulate the logical (theoretical) basis for the empirical relations identified or which might be identified
5. identify and analyze those determinants and consequences of policy diversity which are subject to stabilization analysis/deliberate change

Piled cautions, however, that urban policy studies are limited at any overall theories. Therefore, the framework should not be mistaken for a theoretical construct and should be used as an analytical framework. Because of the diversity of available political theories, we have selected one substantive area, political economy, to provide theoretical guides for this research.

U.S. Census metropolitan area (MSA) control cities in Florida are used as the research cases. We use data collected over a ten-year period, from 1975 (the year Florida instituted the comprehensive plan program) to 1984 (the year prior to Florida's adoption of the growth

uncoordinated planning process. The comprehensive planning process represents a uniform set of planning rules which all cities were to use. While cities implemented these rules unevenly by degree and time, the rules framework was available and of potential use as a reference in land use policy development. Cities had a five year implementation deadline (by 1980). Greater cities were chosen over smaller cities because socio-economic data is more readily available and participation in an ongoing planning process over the one period of time was more likely.

The Available Operationalized Variables section (Appendix B) lists each proposition and the possible array of relative variables from the systems model in figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3. Not all of these will be used in the analysis, but the lists represent the use of these variables in the relevant literature as they pertain to their propositions. The variables are arranged in an eclectic pattern (Friedl, 1975, p. 128) by broad classifications--government, economic factors, policy actions, and environment. These are classifications which identify rather than indicate the purpose of the variables. One of the objects of this research will be to determine if any greater theoretical understanding can be derived from these variables including a purposive classification or development of political patterns which might be based on need for action, resources

affecting action, and disposition to act (Fried, 1978, pp. 318-4).

Appropriate socio-economic data and survey data are used to indicate the major independent variables, drivers, indicators, conflict, and process approaches in the policy making process. The socio-economic data (readily available) is used to indicate conditions which will affect the probability that any one interest group or pattern of growth politics will dominate the land use process. It also represents the long term economic investments likely to activate the growth machine and the anti-growth conditions. This data is used to measure each group's proximity towards participation.

The survey data are used to verify and measure the presence of the growth actors in the process, their participation, and their influence in the policy making process. Surveys were sent to city and county managers and planning directors, chamber of commerce executives, developer organizations, and environmental and neighborhood groups. Information from planning officials was sought to help identify active neighborhood advisory boards and groups for inclusion on the survey list.

Finally, the role of local government should be an actor in the process is measured by its ability to be flexible and autonomous from the possible investment driven pressures of each group. The reliance on regional or

statewide planning regulations contributes to government autonomy. Also assessed are alternative revenue sources, influence on property tax, and government debt for infrastructure and compared to possible influences on governments' role in the land use process. Survey data was collected concerning the values and concerns of administrators (planners and engineers), and their perceptions of political influence on the land use policy process.

The dependent variable is assessed by survey response as a substitute for content analysis. Planning directors were asked whether or not a particular land use policy is used in their city to evaluate its importance to the extent of their comprehensive plan goals.

Organization

The rest of the chapters expand on the growth issue in the context of urban politics. Chapter two is a discussion of land use politics and the role of interest groups and actors in the process. Chapter three presents three examples through the case study of land use politics in the state of Florida as a prelude to the research on growth politics in Florida urban areas. Chapter four presents the study method by converting the perceptions through the operationalizing of the independent and dependent variables. Chapter five presents the data results and Chapter six interprets the

data in terms of political economy and address some
conclusions from the research about land use policies.

This research is an attempt to gain some perspective on
the issues of interest group politics, local policy making,
and the impact of urban growth, all within a framework of
political economy. The survey data and socio-economic data
provide an environment from which to discuss land use policy
making and the impact of growth on local communities. By
using a comparative method we can gain cross-sectioned
insights that heretofore have not been available on the
subject of land use policies.

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(1978).
5. For a discussion of symbolic and distributional policies
see Wheaton, 1978, p. 113.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICS IN THE LOCAL GOV. POLICY PROCESS

Interest Groups and the Policy Process

What factors affect policy making in urban areas? The policy making process in local government can be influenced by any number of interests such as elected officials, administrators, and interest groups. The degree to which participants are affected by legislation both directly and indirectly influences the role that each interest group plays in local policy making. The desires of individuals and groups affect policy demands made on government. In turn, community needs and desires are reflected in the policies enacted by local government. Influence on government represents a means to success or fulfillment of participating and community interests within the policy process (Cramer, 1981):

The groups which represent the various interests in the urban area are a political force within the policy process. This is a form of influence which is potentially more powerful than the public's ability to influence policy making via voting. "The mobilization of elites" is interest groups influencing the policy outputs of the political process (Behrman/Schneider, 1984). The degree of consensus or

conflict among various interests affects the ability of the policy process to operate. Low conflict and high consensus reflects a homogeneous demand process, whereas high conflict and low consensus reflects a heterogeneous demand process (Moss, 1971).

The variety of demands on the system reflects the degree of similarity of group interests within a city; this in turn affects the degree to which policy outputs are coherent and desirable. A wide array of interests and demands will elicit a wide variety of political policy responses.

Policy Process Explanations

Various explanations of the motivations and influences on the policy process are found in the urban process literature. Some attempts to analyze urban policy making processes and outputs suggest that the process is policy dependent. For instance, hyperpluralistic decision making contributes to the unaccountable city (Crotts, 1971). Different issues will yield different decision making processes such as rational, incremental, and reactive. Or the city government may exhibit a self-interested behavior patterning a reliance on regressive policies (Crotts, 1971; Tiebout, 1956).

In each case the influence of different interest groups will depend on the policy area being considered, for distribution, developmental, allocative, and redistribution policies (Khan, 1975). In development situations, the

city may act as a facilitator and/or arbiter in conflicts between the producers (mobile developers) and the victims (disabled citizens) (Feinstein et al., 1981). This function forces the city to constantly make tradeoffs in policy and the delivery of services to these competing interests. There also may be an institutional bias present in the policy making process which favors the business class interests (Hesse, 1980). In such a case, development policies may be even more identified in guiding the local decision making process.

To best understand the influence of actors on local policies we can examine the variety of interests and demands on the process. Through the identification of the actors and their interests we can estimate the actors' influence, participation, and impact on the process. Then by measuring their values, participation levels, and success level we can gain insights on what motivates their level and direction of participation. Finally, we can identify their impact on the process by measuring the level of conflict and consensus in the process and the overall perception by the policy actors of the local political power structure (Gillmore, 1988, p. 218).

Participation and influence

Interest group (power) structures can bring themselves in any number of configurations. Who has influence and who doesn't has been the subject of debate in the community

power literature for more than thirty years.¹ Elites and pluralistic systems represent opposite explanations of political influence. A close, small number of influentials exhibiting a pyramidal structure reflects the elite perspective (Meehoff, 1978; Elites, 1980; Austin, 1981) and a competitive group structure reflects the pluralistic perspective (Meehoff, 1982; Keyser, 1981; Feinberg, 1981). From these well-debated theories, other configurations have been developed. Our expectations of the local use policy process will be refined with insights from these later studies of the urban process.

Urban planning and development policy processes have been described as a four-point continuous distiguishable by the roles of the policy actors (Rakusen, 1989). The points identified are 1) the cohesive/ monopolistic elite decision making system, 2) the associative clustered/public and private leadership-shared, elite decision making system, 3) the competitive/pluralistic interest group competition for leadership and policy-institute decision system, and 4) the fragmented/no visible leadership group, perhaps hyperpluralistic decision system. The major distinctions on the continuum are the level of conflict or challenge for policy leadership, and the variety of issues level of competing interests and issues entering the decision process—"integration vs fragmentation" (Rakusen, 1989, p. 78).

According to this policy process analysis, planning policy is affected by the local distribution of power. More importantly, professional planners can adapt and work within these various decision making processes on their cities. Public actors' ability to "read" the local dispersion of influence is important to the success of policy, within the confines of each city's unique political process. As the administrators increase their understanding of various influences, the chances for the adoption and implementation of effective policies increases. Government will be successful as it learns to anticipate or manage the process in light of the dispersion of influence.

Another important explanation of the policy process focuses using a power analysis approach and centers focuses on which issues are under consideration (Tetne, 1977). The impact of the issues themselves will influence the operation of the process. Each issue under consideration creates a particular decision making response pattern based on the pattern of support or opposition to it. A "highly sensitive" and increasingly contentious (without focus) policy process is likely to emerge as the number of competing issues increases (Tetne, 1977, p. 110). As the number of policy issues competing for policy makers' attention increases, the less likely is it that the process will be rational. It is difficult to achieve and maintain an incremental process through bargaining and equilibrium in the rapidly changing

urban environment. Tieten suggests that the urban policy process is forced to be disjointed, even isolated, without any coordinating control or power structure and thus it is "unmanageable." Public sector action is an unmanageable (unpredictable) urban system are forced to grapple to balance and demands which interest groups bring to their attention. This puts government into the role of facilitator.

A final contribution to this discussion on the nature of the policy process is that there is no single process but a number of stages to the process that evolve over time. Schmitz (1986) suggests that a city goes through various stages of policy outcomes which reflect the demands of a changing population. The process goes through transitions which are modeled after Williams' (1971) conception of community stage and government roles which are caretaker, initiator, growth, and arbiter. Transitions of stage are essential for the changing nature of interest group demands. Five transition stages are identified as 1) city as caretaker to growth/primitive city, 2) summary matters and the poor who challenge growth, 3) city as arbiter of conflicts, and either the final stage as 4) bourgeoisie/policy city or 5) return to the private development city. By combining the interest group demands as the motivation for the process with the economic underpinnings of the quest for political power, Schmitz's transitions facilitate the use of political strategy in analyzing the policy process.

Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process

The majority of the community power literature and policy process analysis is insufficient for a modern explanation of urban politics. The discussions of pluralism, elitism, and the policy process are insufficient for analysis of modern urban policy processes. The community power advocates disagree about the influential power of any one interest group over another.² Further confusion provides a clear conclusion as to whether or not the process is issue dependent. Dahl (1955) described the process in New Haven as influential which can be identified as exclusive interest groups, but that there is no basis for a principle of interest--leading us to inquire when the importance of an issue might be as a determining factor in how the process operates. Likewise the elite view suggests that one dominant group of urban will be influential almost regardless of issues by virtue of class and/or business position.

Follow-up studies of urban policy relate to urban power and introduce the importance of economic actions on the competition for influence. Reinowitz (1969) studied a major developmental policy area, taxes (1975) explains the inability of the local process to cope with economic needs that conflict, and Schaller (1980) combines the competition of the economic benefits of urban growth with policy influence patterns over time.

Urban political economy, however, is an analytical approach which provides the means to integrate the role of government with an explanation of power and group influence. Political economy has the potential to attribute a more directive role to public actors in the policy process, which will provide a benefit outcome not just a single beneficiary.

Political Economy

The political economy approach to urban politics is used in several different ways but focuses on the motivations and roles of economic interests and the public actors that participate in urban growth issues. Current trends in urban analysis go beyond the classic definition of political economy--"the systematic interaction between economic and political processes" and are moving towards a growth politics framework of analysis (Manaster, 1985, p. 12).⁵ These recent discussions in the literature are extending analysis beyond examinations of urban industrialism and are more fully integrating the theories of community power, the importance of economic influences, and the role of government itself in the local political decision making arena.

Current literature contributions identify developmental policies as the dominant issue in local politics and as such indicate the influence and power structures in the policy process. Identification of a key set of issues increases our

ability to understand the policy outputs of the political process. For instance, land based interests, such as the developers, bankers, and redevelopment-economic development actors use the political process to further their own interests (Molotch, 1970). By pressing for favorable developmental policies such as transportation, infrastructure, redevelopment or economic development, they increase their opportunities to realize economic benefits. Indeed, the urban based growth industry of services and infrastructure is of vital importance to the economic well being of the "growth machine" (Molotch, 1970). Economic and developmental policies offer the highest policy area in which the dynamics of urban politics are exemplified. The growth and development of the city will influence the rest of the policy making agenda. We must direct our attention to the political treatment of economic issues in order to understand the urban policy process.

Most disagreements about the more recent views of urban political process are the various expectations of the role which government will play in the process. The government as an actor with its own motivations and as the promoter of the collective interest that the market function cannot supply. The different perspectives in the literature vary in their expectation of the degree to which government can act as a facilitator of marketplace demands or a director of the process and its outputs. Quite possibly, these different

roles for government may indicate stages of development in the growth of an urban area.⁴ A review of the literature concerning the role of government in urban policy process will increase our insights into the nature of the interaction between market and government in the policy process.

Government as Actor in the Policy Process

An integrated perspective of the new urban political economy is Putnam's (1977) adaptation of Tiebout's (1956) classic urban location theory. He suggests that financial prosperity is the city's primary goal and this motivates the city to pursue economic development and to attract property owners; therefore, the process and the policies generated will reflect these internal concerns. Tiebout's theory, that the city acts as a firm with identifiable interests, translates into a modern urban theory in which economic interests dominate the political process. But Putnam's assessment of the city process is limited. It is driven by economic theory and has limited power to explain changing political demands and conflicts in the distribution of economic benefits.

Additional studies of cities provide stronger explanations of the urban process where government may act as a facilitator, mediator, partner, or manager. There are several stages of growth politics that can be identified, each reflecting the different roles which government can

step. After a discussion of these stages, the individual components--actors, the policy process, and individual policy options will be examined.

Conservative Growth Policies--Government as Facilitator

Conservative growth policies is a stage which may be characterized by the role of government as facilitator. Kolm (1984) establishes the basic point of this role by suggesting that in the policy process the government acts as a booster for the economic development interests of the growth machine. Adopted policies reflect the desires of the economic interests and establish a supportive business climate for economic development. This portrayal of government complements the description of "conservative growth policies" in the IFIM literature. 1985) Government action will facilitate growth and development through selective policy adoption because they assume that the public will benefit from the subsequent expansion of the local economy. In this characterization of the policy process the market forces are the dominant interest group in which government responds.

This heuristic view, however, is two-dimensional and represents a zero-sum game. The more potential for growth, the more government responds to development demands. The expected opposite reaction is that as more growth occurs, the greater is the likelihood that the residential community, the anti-growth coalition will finish additional

development. Its members are motivated by their experiences with the dysfunctionality of rapid growth which threatens their existing identity. Melitz contends that government is a natural advocate of growth and he leaves little room for any alternate government position. Instead, government's role is reduced to facilitation of interests as they dominate the process.

Liberal Growth Politics--Government as Facilitator

In other stages government may have an expanded role as an actor in the process. Government can be a filter through which growth interests must pass (Owenston, 1983). The policy process in this explanation is dominated by growth interests, specifically the political and economic sectors, but considers a more active rather than reactive role for government. For example, in Cleveland the policy process progressed from conservative growth politics. government as facilitator, to liberal growth politics, what might be perceived as government as facilitator, through the Spanish administration (Owenston, 1983).

In general, liberal growth politics flourished in the 1980's when federal grants for redevelopment and urban programs were politically beneficial to liberal mayors and administrators. Minority and business coalitions were likely to expand when revitalization, especially downtown development, was the goal. The good intentions of the liberal approach to economic development were subject to capture by the

conservative growth machine for use to their own advantage (Hamerton, 1981). In addition to Cleveland, Boston and San Francisco had similar experiences with liberal growth policies. The basis of their liberal growth policies was rooted in the interests and influence of post-war boom realtors (Mollenkopf, 1984).

In all these cities it is evident that the pressures for growth were accompanied by a decline of the city's middle class population. Without a solid revenue base the only counter-interest to the growth machine were groups and projects dependent on federal funds. Once the federal process was captured by the growth machine for its own purposes or withdrawn as a source of funding, then liberal growth policies lost its momentum as an opportunity for government to actively satisfy interests other than the growth machine. Government would be left to assume its role as policy facilitator.

Populist Growth Policies--Government as Facilitator

The British administration in Cleveland managed to extend the city role from facilitator to satisfier by gaining a combination of political interests emerged to support an expanded role for government. Consumer oriented advocacy planning (Hamidoff, 1985) and already single community organizing contributed to the public's rejection of market demands for public resources without a return of profits to the residents. This change is the position of

growth allowed the balance of political power and forged a populist reform approach. Government planners were especially important to the success of engineering the populist coalition. Government's role in populist politics is one of a partner with the public in providing community-wide benefits rather than benefits for individuals or narrow interests.

In Cleveland, "equity planning" promoted the interests of the city's existing residents, instead of the interests of the business of suburban residents (Clevel., 1984). Later, Mayor Rustinik was unable to completely manage the growth machine interests, but he was able to challenge them with a more active and directed role by government (Benjamin, 1985). The interests of the growth machine had to go through the government. Government with the help of broad based coalitions did not have to acquiesce to demands nor did it automatically adopt growth goals as their own. Although Rustinik lost his position as Mayor at the hands of the fashionable developer and business coalition in Cleveland, he succeeded in establishing an alternative role for government in the urban policy process.

Populist growth politics contains the two-dimensional deliberative role common in conservative growth politics and has the potential for greater long-term success than does liberal growth politics. There is, however, another

progression of growth policies which provides an even greater degree of independence for government action.

Progressive Growth Policies--Government as Manager

Other cities were able to effectively use a populist political coalition and to enlarge the role of government from partner in growth to manager of growth. This additional dimension suggests that government can constructively engage the interests and active participation of citizens and neighborhood groups as an effective contribution to growth machine interests.

Citizen participation, facilitated by government, is the foundation of the populist movement and provides a means to insure that benefits accrue to residents rather than to narrow development interests. In Progressive politics, however, government expands its role to a position that can challenge the dominance of conservative growth policies in interest group competition, and also advances the role of government to the status of manager of the growth process. In this role government can begin to direct a multi-dimensional range of community benefits. Neilson and Davis list the following as examples of the successful use of "progressive growth policies" (Gilbert, 1988):

Planners play an important role by directing the attention of citizens to potential benefits and the administrators and elected officials to any excessive benefits (realization of the development interests that can

and should be redirected to the benefit of the community. Progressive politics is also a stage where government pursues benefit equity by insuring that the costs of economic development and growth are proportionately borne by the growth machine which will profit from city growth policies. In turn, a range of benefits from growth can be directed, perhaps by regulatory parameters, to the existing and future residents of the city.

A directed policy process is not a consensus approach where the growth machine receives a disproportionate benefit or pluralistic interest group competition biases the outcome. Instead, progressive politics requires a directive role by government and an active role by all the interest groups and the public to direct the benefits outcome. For example, Hartford was successful in becoming a partner and a director of downtown development. The city directed new development as an equal partner in the process, eventually becoming a co-developer on several major projects. Development continued and profits were shared with existing residents. Santa Barbara successfully implemented rent and development controls to benefit citizens and at the same time was able to cooperate in a positive manner with developers (Hoyal, 1986). This process differs from the use of sanctions or growth management regulations because government is acting to integrate the citizenry and their interests into the process. Sanctions and regulations

produce a decentralized marketplace while not necessarily directly benefiting the collection good.

Growth Politics in the Southwest

Many cities that are experiencing populist and progressive stages of growth politics also have faced declines in both population and economic activity. They have experienced a change in their population demographics from white middle class to minority lower income class as the dominant resident group. Might we expect a different economic and policy process in the rapidly growing cities of the southwest and southeast? Their economic and population conditions are very different from the declining frontier cities. Evidence suggests that these rapid growth cities are experiencing a different pattern in their evolution of growth politics.

Rapidly developing cities of the southwest have experienced "progrowth politics" (Hollenkopf, 1983). This rapid growth and stage of growth politics is attributed to a "favorable political climate" characterized by small government size, a private sector orientation, low political conflict, and a conservative political culture (Hollenkopf, 1983, p. 342). Cities in a progrowth political climate enact policies such as low taxes, small budgets, and flexible rather than regulatory development policies. These are policies designed to foster economic interests. A professional government administrator who has the backing of

level business like is likely to be found in a growing political city.

Essentially, southeast cities may be experiencing the same conservative growth politics that their northeast counterparts experienced. Although, Holmbecht attributes political conservative growth politics of the southeast to the proliferation of federal defense monies and a conservative national political orientation which filtered down to the local level,¹ limited pro-business governments, Holmbecht suggests, preceded and perhaps precepted a liberal growth politics in southeast cities because there was not a significant blue collar class and minorities were restricted to a minimal political role. Further there was an absence of populism or progressive politics in these cities because the "intensity competition enforced a strict discipline ... " that eventually would also spread to the older northeast cities, forcing an abandonment of overly progressive politics (Holmbecht, 1981, pp. 280-281).

The possibility remains that the nature of the growth machine will be challenged in the north as they were in southern cities. The neighborhood movement, as the movement to populism, is discussed by Holmbecht (1981, p. 181) as a southern strategy because it is "an incomplete alternative" to the pressures of national political interests that are pervasive in the new growth cities.

How can urban elites make the transition from conservatism or pre-growth politics to a form of progressive growth politics? Milkenfeld suggests that the inability of urban middle elites to make the transition to liberal or progressive growth politics can be mitigated by the development of a "new social contract" where

progressive national political entrepreneurs must take the risk of mobilizing such consciousness in the suburbs and inner cities as well as within the city. They must also seek to control the competitive framework that private entrepreneurs have exploited to undermine redistributional politics in the past. But they must offer the private sector some guidelines if serious, debilitating conflict is to be avoided (Milkenfeld, 1981, pp. 247).

This call for a new urban political process suggests that another dimension of growth politics is necessary to define in order to understand how rapidly growing cities have been able to some extent to overcome the market's resistance to development regulation, moving them closer to a partner or manager role for government. I suggest that this other dimension to the developmental policy process is growth management.

Growth Management--Growth Politics

Growth management, as a dimension of progressive growth politics or even a stage itself, is based on government's authority to institutionalize city regulatory and planning powers and to encourage citizen participation as in progressive and populist cities. In fact, Glazer (1984) identifies three administrative and participatory components

as mechanisms. He fails to fully explore, however, how the natural tension between government and citizens can be used in order to produce a long-term community-wide benefit outcome. Through growth management, however, the administrative power of a city can be reinforced by regional or statewide institutionalized land use requirements. This type of broader authority can help local government to equitably focus the competition of local growth policies and promote long-term uniformity in government's approach to development and growth. This approach would satisfy the gold rule for which Mollenkopf calls. This additional dimension of government influence gives local government a sustaining power to manage the benefits and costs of growth, not just exercise local regulatory power over the growth activities a regulatory power which eventually would be challenged by the local power structure.

The role of local government can be defined further as diarist or "traffic cop" (Stuenkel, 1986). Government can use its legislative power to institutionalize their own set of development rules, rather than rely on regulatory development under the normal political process--competition, bargaining and influence group pressures. Government has the option to regulate the process by controlling the economic forces of the market, or government can direct the process by an equitable management of the decision making arena within its own parameters. At the same time, government

takes the responsibility of protecting the interests of residents and other disadvantaged actors in the local process.

Government ought to make sure that the process has some equity in its responsiveness to all the major interests that represent a wide range of values. Growth management can be an equitable process without being reduced to short-term political inflexibility. The experience, however, with growth management reveals that it used to both reject and promote growth for single interests. Growth management is more often the result of interest group influence than an approach to the role of government in the process.

Implementation of Growth Policies

Developmental policies are the focus of local policy making in growth cities. And it is the selection and implementation of land use policies that we expect to be specifically affected by the patterns of influence in the community because of the economic basis of these policies (Kilbourne, 1980, p. 88). Therefore, we are investigating the implementation of growth policies in urban areas by assessing the overall levels of interest group influence in the process. This can be done by gauging the levels of conflict over policy, community perceptions of the sources of influence, and the levels of participation and consensus in affecting the local land use policy process.

This research will attempt to provide evidence of the links between community power, the policy process framework, and land use policy selection in the implementation of growth policies. The different scenarios that have been suggested, conservative, liberal, populist, pragmatic, and growth management are comprised of various policy approaches, and specific land use policy outputs. The individual heads of these components will be reviewed and in later chapters they will be evaluated explicitly as indicators of the several stages of growth policies that Florida cities have experienced.

Access to the Process

The literature suggests that there is a set of actors who are expected to have a greater influence in this policy making area than do any others. This influence is reflected by the relationship between power in these actors' communities and the policy-making process.

We expect that specific growth policies actors, growth machine interests and anti-growth interests, will be highly involved in the policy process; Molotch (1974) contends that "land based interests"--those who have an economic investment tied to land--will up the growth machine. Land use policies in turn, have a major influence on the local economic condition of any city, especially in a growth state such as Florida.

Private sector actors

The growth machine coalition is expected to exhibit, for the most part, characteristics of conservative growth politics in their attempt to dominate the policy making process and secure passage and implementation of economically beneficial growth policies. The political process and the economic system become integrally linked. For example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit bond project in San Francisco was successful despite an initial split of support by the Business Alliance in that city. (Boltz, 1988) They eventually coalesced to provide solid support for the bond issue and its passage. On this important developmental issue the growth interests directed their attention to the success for long-run benefits. This suggests that the support for the BART project represents a dialectic condition between the interests of government and business in the growth politics process.

We expect the pro-growth interests to support pro-development policies in order to secure economic benefits. But in order to gain insight into this group of actors it is necessary to understand not only their policy preferences but also what their value perspectives are towards land use policies. Specifically, does their support of market principles carry over to support for a particular role for government in the land use development process?

In a study of planning board members, support for various land use policies by board votes were classified as conservative--most frequently supporting resolutions for higher densities, and liberal--least frequently supporting such rezoning requests (Kilensworth, 1988). The results showed that the more conservative members "felt that planning should be used to facilitate if not encourage growth and development . . . and tended to focus on the concept that planning be used to control or regulate community expansion" (Kilensworth, 1988, p. 89). Finally we expected to derive as a policy mechanism to reflect market demands; liberals were more likely to expect the planning function to be a restrictive device providing a "positive role--as an independent force designed to guide, direct, and control" (Kilensworth, 1988, p. 89). These results direct our expectations of actors' growth positions which can be determined by examining their opinions on the purposes of land use policies.

A traditional power elite explanation (Sawyer, 1958; Sobchoff, 1979) of the growth machine would define its membership by regionalized or political power. The results would identify a membership reflecting the wishes of conservative growth positions; but the nature of developmental land use policies is that there are other interest groups who also can benefit from growth. For example, in cities experiencing liberal and progressive

growth politics, minority leaders have worked with urban redevelopment in order to direct some of the economic benefits of growth to minorities (Hammer, 1988; Givens, 1988).

This suggests the possibility of a new alignment of growth interests especially in areas other than declining cities. For example, in Montgomery county, Maryland, blue-collar whites and blacks, civil rights groups, farmers, and developers opposed large lot zoning policies which they perceived to be exclusionary and restrictive to growth (although for different reasons). Those in favor of the policies were professional and middle class whites, wealthy property owners, and environmentalists (Kilbourne, 1988). These coalitions represent an alteration of sorts of the liberal and progressive growth politics alignments. Previously, while liberals and minorities were united to redress urban redevelopment which traditionally displaced urban residents. Today, however, the liberal support is split between the economic needs of minorities which may be satisfied with growth, and an environmental sensitivity to the size of the dysfunctions of growth.

In an Iowa study, skilled blue collar citizens were unexpectedly found to oppose growth (Lubrich, Poltore, and Reiberg, 1988). As expected, however, lower business respondents were less opposed to growth and upper income groups were very opposed to growth. The critical difference

in the first study is in the measurement of "growth." Four questions were asked which focused on the environment and capacity of the land to withstand growth. Therefore, the lack of blue collar support for growth may be more of an indication of a pro-environment position and does not seem to be conclusive of an anti-growth bias by blue collar persons. The Maryland and Iowa data indicate that as we suspected, the Melnick two-dimensional view of growth politics is not necessarily complete.

Turning to the other end of what should be viewed as a growth politics continuum, the anti-growth coalition is expected to replace the growth machine if the dysfunction of growth (urban problems) reach a point of severity (Melnick, 1978). This coalition will prompt the public to resist additional growth and any policies which promote growth. The coalition is expected to be made up of middle- and upper income, activist types concerned about aesthetic improvements such as environmental protection, single family residential needs, and historic preservation. They are struggling to preserve their image of a quality life.

Their conflict with the growth machine, however, is unlike the opposition to liberal growth politics by the minority and poor residents who opposed urban redevelopment displacement. We would expect this activist coalition to be made up of residential property owners who have an economic investment to protect. This economic incentive motivates

them to actively oppose policies which might increase growth problems and which may negatively affect their long-term housing investments. Similar to the pro-growth machine, influence in the land use process by these actors protects their economic position.

The anti-growth coalition may have more than just an interest in land use regulation. Regulatory reform in the sense of a more specific and, just as the growth machine is not monolithic, but made up of business, developers, minority and other interests, so is the anti-growth coalition made up of social liberals, environmentalists, neighborhood suburbanites, and statewide environmentalists.

It is a coalition of interests that has different reasons for political association--they are not necessarily motivated by market forces acting as a unifying stimulus. While there may be a split liberalism within this group of environmentalists, minority supporters, and homeowners, there is a common theme in their expectations about the role that government should play in affecting land use--we expect the anti-growth interests to support government's regulatory function to control the use of land. I would suggest, however, that there are several motivations and subsequent approaches that this support of government regulation may take.

Regulatory support may be based on an antiquated notion to protect personal investment (Dye, 1984) and to

institutionalize their interests through strong development controls over zoning, use, and structure (Allmonworth, 1988). Secondly, support may come from an environmentalist interest focussing on limiting the required and architectural dysfunctions of growth (Bellevue-Smith, 1987). Finally, support may be found in a statewide based environmental interest which seeks to institutionalize a long-term, rational land-use process by which developers can abide (O'Brien, 1986).

The voluntary interests with government to regulate exclusively limit the use of land and in effect who uses the land. Zoning restrictions can be used to restrict the use of land in a way that benefits a select group of land users despite its effect on use of valuable space. Zoning let alone and architectural criteria can exclude non-affluent households and renters from a particular market location. In addition, homeowners may fear that the dysfunctions of rapid growth will threaten the suburban quality of life and their residential environment. Restrictions zoning is one way of insulating existing residential areas from change. The intent to exclude certain types of development and in the process exclude people, can be institutionalized through zoning and land use policies (Ogo, 1988). Regulations can preserve residents' social and political interests by preserving the status quo (Allmonworth, 1988, p. 128).⁸

The other two well-growth segments are represented by environmentalists. These groups share a concern for personal quality of life like the environmental segment. Their primary motivation, however, may be broader, extending beyond their immediate well-being and to a concern for ensuring well-being. Traditionally, environmentalists have been interested in preserving the original environment. A Florida study, however, suggests that concern over the impacts of growth and development of the physical environment are important as well (McInerney-Smith, 1987). Upper and middle income persons as well as the highly educated show a sensitivity to the impact of development on the natural environment as well as the aesthetic quality of development. This group exhibits a willingness and desire for government to impose land use regulations to remedy negative development impacts.

The other environmental coalition is made up of interests that are statewide in scope (Gochena, 1988). In some cases developers and homebuilder organizations have joined the traditional environmentalists in an effort to persuade state government to regulate additions to the built environment. Although it seems contradictory, the developer/builder interests in California, Oregon, and Florida have realized that regulations instituted at the state level are more predictable in their enforcement and pace/extent. A state program of land use regulation will be less reactionary and politically volatile than when

regulation is at the discretion of each local government (Kutner, 1994, pp. 195-6). We might expect to find progressive growth politics in this situation allowing for a diversity of interests engaged by government processes.

Once again, we can find different actors at different periods of time, each with a different perspective towards growth. The document actors define which type of growth politics is occurring and more importantly, what type of land use policies are being adopted and used in similar cities:

Public sector actors

The focal group of actors to consider are first the public sector--the city itself, and its components the planners and administrators. The city may act according to a self-interest by concentrating on the production of a strong revenue base and pursuing a pro-growth strategy through certain policies; it is the planners and administrators, however, who can provide the political insight to the public sector interests.

Planners and administrators have a responsibility to pursue a neutral representation of all community interests in their plans and policies. But often they do not. The planner, his plans, and the administration at whose pleasure they serve, can serve a particular interest. For instance, Minneapolis planners played a decisive role in the conservative growth politics of that city (Kutcher,

1983). The planners tried to integrate community problems, the needs of the economic interests, and the political situation with their professional judgment on what was the best rational, technical planning proposal. This master plan approach was generally resisted by economic interests and influenced government. For the very reason that planners endorsed it. Master or rational planning is not susceptible to political pressures, pressures which the local power structure is adept at manipulating and which the citizens participate cannot easily use to their advantage. Strong politics can politicians land use planning even when planners want to be neutral. But it is questionable whether planners desire to act in a neutral capacity.

The results of a national study suggest that planners admit that they are susceptible to bias in their recommendations and planning efforts (Pain, 1979). Planners may be more likely to embrace the direction of advocacy planning. Advocacy planning ignores the bias and preferences of planners and administrators (Davidoff, 1985). It encourages the planning process to support the least advantaged community interests as expressed during liberal growth politics; this approach puts the planning process on high moral ground but ambiguous political ground. Ideally, government is supposed to represent all interests in the community. But advocacy planning is easier to justify

increase its influence across the political process instead of restricting it.

Does this justify viewing a particular instrument through the planner's lens? Kainchiller (1985, p. 188) insisted that Minneapolis planners were expected to produce policies which would protect the investment of the property owners and so "make investment less risky." Davidson (1986) and practitioners such as the equity planners in Cleveland tried to represent the housing residents, not the middle class interests that the pro-growth machine wanted to lure back to the city. These experiences suggest that planners and administrators, similar to the private sector, may develop and recommend different land use policies and behaviors according to the type of growth policies being experienced in the city.

Similarly, Robinson (1988) outlines four types of planners, each of which can be effective within a different political climate. She suggests that planners should be flexible and adapt to these planning scenarios in order to maximize their effectiveness in the policy process. The technocratic role is suggested to be most suitable in a substantive, integrated political climate and the elite dominated executive-dominated system. The broker role would be more effective in a competitive political process. The mediator may be most successful in a more fragmented,

power-vested system where he can exercise policy guidance by being a leader.

Planners as a group, however, have similarities in their approaches to government's role in planning that seems to cross over the various growth positions. Again, the results of the nationwide study suggest that a majority of planners are neutral (not opposed) to their expectations of the political process, but split evenly as to whether or not a single public interest exists which planners serve. Furthermore, most planners felt that they did not succeed in serving the public interest in a neutral capacity and that citizens participation groups were not needed in their projects.

The results strongly suggest a high political awareness and also towards a value-laden rather than neutral planning process. This may reinforce a public perception that planners are a tool to be used by either side of increasingly polarized local growth politics.

Just as Hellebrecht (1981) called for a guiding line for settling development conflicts between business and residents, Yoon (1979, p. 199) calls for a normative set of planning principles which "would not seek to avoid values, but rather would stipulate them in as a priori fashion." Again, I would suggest that a growth management process would serve as a vehicle to solve the dilemma of values and demands in the planning process. An organic, flexible docu-

of planning can be pragmatic and technically suitable (Stanford, 1941; Altshuler, 1965).⁴

Planning processes can be biased. Conservative growth policies take a utilitarian stance, serving the current economic interests and exporting eventual benefits in waves to all residents. Liberal growth policies, on the other hand, take a Rawlsian stance, serving the least advantaged first to bring them to parity before addressing the interests of those who are better off (Sawley, 1994). These two approaches contribute to conflict, because neither can be capable of simultaneous satisfaction of competing interests. It is growth management planning and progressive growth policies that come closest to the original ideal, serving the interests of the residents but with consideration given to economic conditions.

We have to keep in mind, however, that progressive planning is not capable of overcoming local political parochialism for extended periods of time, especially in a competitive political system. Again, a state or regional planning directive could ease the tension at the larger public good fighting with the need for economic growth. Florida's comprehensive plan and growth management approaches allow a definition of the public interest through broad goals and the flexibility to accommodate changing conditions through land use policies and local plans. These

which directives can help to reduce, at least in theory, the tensions between competing local interests.

CHALLENGES TO THE POLICY PROCESS

The main hypothesis of this study is that the selection of land use policies is influenced by actor participation which is influenced by the level of conflict (tension) among interests group in the city. This in turn not only affects the policy ends, but also the policy process means. The nature of the conflict within the political process, the number of interests and nature of compatibilities, will affect the policy response.

Cities try to achieve a low conflict status by means of economic prosperity or regulated exclusion of conflicting interests. Cities can preserve their fiscal health and self-interest using a revenue strategy of limiting property taxes and encouraging economic development (Borrows, 1978). This is a long term approach which seeks to minimize or maintain low conflict in order to enhance the city's prosperity. This would be easy to achieve in a perfect world where homogeneity is created by ability curves (Tishout, 1956). In the real world, however, long-term land use regulations (including exclusionary policies) may be a necessary addition to maintain and accommodate homogeneity (Reichelder and Logan, 1983).

The result of low conflict may be that government enforces a facilitated role. This insures long-term stability of economic investments and can complement the long run nature of comprehensive planning. However, the central forms of comprehensive planning is traded off for the political need to distribute benefits.

Short-term policies may be politically necessary in cities with greater conflict in order to temporarily satisfy competing demands (Friedland, 1981). Accommodation of long-term interests in a high tension city are politically difficult to achieve. Land use policies will reflect incremental approaches to development (Cyert, 1982). The long-term payoff, however, will eventually reflect the dominant growth politics issue, either the business-producer interests or the underprivileged in society. Policies and outcomes reflect values, even if those values within the community are in conflict. A progressive code for government can help to achieve the elusive middle ground.

Long-range rational planning is a difficult task because demands change over time. The viable alternative is long-range adaptive planning and the use of an ecological role for government (Cyert, 1982a). With an organic approach to planning--flexible but directed, not a rational approach--fixed, or a reactionary approach--political. It is possible to develop a realistic long-term approach in a diverse city experiencing high levels of interest group tension. A

directed policy process (ecological discipline of power and flexible planning) can serve to balance short-term political necessities without abandoning government's responsibility as ecological manager. Thus the technical proficiency of the professional planner can be used to develop plans but not to the point of inflexibility. Flexibility contributes to the durability of plans because they can shift when necessary but not simply at political whim and for political profit.

Policy Design of the Growth Policies Process

The urban literature suggests that the policies which are most important to urban areas are developmental policies such as roads, transportation, and utilities among others. All things being equal, urban areas where growth is one of the most important issues are expected to be dominated by economic interests and to adopt land use policies which benefit those interests. But we have that is not always the case. There are differences in land use policy outputs across "growth" cities which result in policies that produce very favorable to very restrictive growth climates. By growth climate we mean the facilitation of development by diminishing and regulating land use in the city. If a business climate facilitates economic development, then the growth climate facilitates business and population growth.

Policies that facilitate growth may include flexible development standards that allow developers to take maximum advantage of unused acres, laxest environmental standards,

no restrictions or limits on construction, willingness by government to fund local plans, and on many permitting process. These represent policies the city can use to foster a growth climate.

Developmental policies act as more than just an important economic issue which facilitates the collaboration of business and government. Planning policies have done that for years (Rahmanian, 1978; Albersheim, 1978; Albersheim, 1988). High land use policies and other development policies also have an impact on allocative policies (Foster, 1979). These traditional service policies benefit the growth machine because they act as an important support system. They provide the anti-growth forces and facilitate the growth climate. For instance, community amenities such as recreation, public safety, and culture can act to maintain and facilitate demand for residential location and promote development.

Secondly, providing amenities through allocational policies contributes to the residential character of the area. This acts as an inducement which increases the population of the area. But it also may lead to the resistance of future growth by the very residents it attracted in the first place. Once a residential character is established, there may be a threshold beyond which further growth is resisted. Restricting our study of growth policies to developmental policies may obscure additional

political factors. But we can not expect to study every policy. Thus we would have not established any position theory. The aim of this study is to establish the importance of developmental policies as land matters in the city and that options in other policy areas will respond.

Some cities, however, may not need to adopt policies which directly facilitate a growth climate. They may be natural economic centers or have a physical environment that attracts people. But as is the case with development subsidies, cities may be forced to be boosters for growth as systematically gain political benefits and because developers expect cities to provide supportive policies. Such cities do not want to give the appearance that they do not support growth. If demand to locate in the city is great (increased by strong economic development pressures and population increases) we expect that a growth climate and appropriate land use policies will be in evidence.

Therefore, one of the hypotheses in this research is that the city's ability and propensity to regulate land use of prime importance to the success of the land based interests. Their ability to influence, facilitate, and direct the policy making process can yield land use policies that support their position.

But the balance of political influence between the growth and anti-growth forces in the political process varies from city to city, yielding a variety of land use policy outputs.

different stages of growth policies may yield different privileged positions.

Specifically, this research hypothesizes that certain policies are regulatory in nature such as greenbelts and moratoriums. These policies do not improve the economic position of the land based actors (growth machines), but rather seek to a portion of their potential profit. At the other extreme are policies which are less restrictive and which maximize the market position and the economic benefits of the growth machines. Finally, landuses of development rights (DLR), enterprise zones, and tax incentives may be indicative of this. Somewhere in between may be performance related policy options such as planned unit development (PUD) and flexible zoning. These policies may dilute the externalities (dysfunctions) of growth by making development conditional, but do not necessarily restrict growth.

An examination of the business and residential investments in the city along with the business climate and the level of dysfunctions associated with growth will give us a picture of the balance of power and the state of policy making in the area of developmental policy. We expect that policies adopted may reflect these economic and political conditions which make up the stages of growth policies.

Conclusion

What factors affect policy making? That was our original question. To summarize the points of this chapter,

one major influence on policy making is the make-up of the policy process itself. We have suggested that the components, actors, policy approaches, and policy outputs vary by the particular stage of growth politics ongoing in a city. Evidence of components make up these growth politics stages. There is no one stage of growth politics that adequately explains all urban political experiments. But the underlying elements such as economic and political motivations can be organized in identifiable patterns of influence, conflict, and policy outputs. These patterns, the stages of growth politics will provide a better explanation of urban policy making in the broadest context.

Notes

1. The literature on planning theory is vast. The most significant pieces develop the various approaches to understanding the subject. Hunter (1988) used the reputational method to define elite systems. Dahl (1981) used the decisional method to define the pluralistic system. Ayres, Goldrich, and Swanson (1972) combined methods to establish a relationship between power and policy in a comparative study. Dunoff (1978) combined the elite theory of power to the national level and suggested that power was attributed to position as well as person. Later authors continued the elite-pluralism debate on methods and conclusions. Most notably, Polsky (1980) supported the pluralist conclusion. Richards and Curtis as well as Dunoff challenged the developed approach to pluralistic conclusions through their work on non-designated agency and agenda building. Finally Ayres and Swanson (1981), among others sought to test and draw conclusions from these debates and to move us to new dimensions of the quest for understanding influence and the urban policy process.

2. Pluralism see Dahl, 1981; Polsky, 1980, and elites see Dunoff, 1978, and Hunter, 1988, 1989.

3. See also Brown, 1980, 1984; Hollander, 1973; Hunsicker, 1985; Johnson, 1979, 1980; Jones, 1980; Melosh, 1979, and Susskind, 1984.

4. Stiglitz (1985) suggests that "political economy" is not a theory but an agenda of ideas and approaches to understand the policy process. He reminds that "economics" is a deterministic set of theories whose guidance is an extension of economic assumptions. "Institutions" is a positive theory that describes the process within which economic is a player. One is not superior to the other, but one can define explicitly which one comes first. Therefore, political economy is an agenda of relationships between the economic and political processes that create the policy environment.

5. Government also can regulate exclusion communities. Higher property taxes can ensure that amenities will continue to be provided and at the same time, economically restrict less desirable developments and less affluent residents. (Oye, 1988, pp. 33-4) This type of economic based exclusion affects the metropolitan area as well. By restricting growth through exclusion, new growth goes elsewhere, perhaps to cities with fewer resources to cope with growth. (Oye, 1988) This is the same strategy that declining cities have when wealth exits the central cities to suburbs who do not wish to be the costs of redevelopment. It is difficult, however, to do such work like speculate on the motives behind tax rates and land use regulation.

6. Medieval towns took advantage of natural resource to organize a development plan. But these plans were mediated by both the needs of the people and the constraints presented by attention to economic competitiveness. Medieval organic planning seems as attuned to the needs of the community while retaining professional standards.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PLANNING EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLICY

The Role of the State in Land Use Planning

An important activity which is affected by developmental policy is land use. The use of land, the prime component in urban area development, is central to economic interest groups. Their success is tied to their ability to control the use of the land by development, construction, planning and obtaining government subsidies.

The type of land use policies adopted and the regulation process critically affect our understanding of urban influence patterns and decision-making systems. Land use decisions have significant costs and benefits which may alter the land decision-making process. Past efforts to understand either land use issues or decision-making systems have not fully integrated these two phenomena. Planning and economic inquiries have focused on the technical aspects of land use and the rational approach to planning (Frederick, 1972) as well as the decision-making aspects of location (Alonso, 1964; Wheaton, 1977). Political scientists have studied land-related decisions but only within the broader context of land power (Clark, 1971; Dahl, 1957).

Salisbury's (1976) theory of a growth machine is a sophisticated interdisciplinary approach which combines the economic motivations of industrial actors associated with land development and government's facilitation of these interests through the policy process. But we need to go beyond government's role as a facilitator of a business climate and examine whether or not government can control the economic program for development, the political economy agenda, land use regulations are the rules of the land use game and are a reflection of community influence and power structures (Lang, 1988).

Table II--Government's Permissible Affect Political Influence

We have already suggested several different places through which growth policies pass--conservative, liberal, and progressive--Now we need to put them in perspective in terms of practical political experiences in the area of land use. To do this we can use a framework to analyze the political relationship between the decision-making process of government and the development and implementation of the land use regulation process.

Democracies face many dilemmas in defining their scope of political and policy control (Oshel, 1992). Similarly, state governments face the same dilemma in defining their scope of control as authority over local governments. The development and implementation of local land use regulations may be significantly affected by this scope of control. The

approaches by each level of government in these authority dilemmas ultimately affect the goals and means of the growth policies pursued.

There are three dilemmas useful in our understanding of the politics of the land use process. They provide a framework for analyzing the possible political impacts of a state-centered or a local-centered land use regulation process (Isaki, 1982, pp. 24-287):

1. uniformity versus dissimilarity--the degree of discretion in the development and implementation process afforded by the state to local government;
2. centralization versus decentralization--the degree of control in development and implementation process that the state maintains;
3. rights versus utility--the distribution of benefits and costs to various interests through the regulation process.

Florida, for example, has enacted landmark legislation creating a process for land use regulation. Florida's process has evolved in such a way as to present an interesting case study of the transition of land to state power. More importantly, however, is that by tracing the land use process in Florida we also trace the transitions of growth politics in a volatile state. Examples of state and local legislation in Florida depict political changes from conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics. Florida's transition may be representative of other fast growing volatile states, but is somewhat different from the growth politics experiences of urban football cities.

Over a fifteen-year period (1970-85) Florida has moved from a totally unregulated state situation, to the use of state-guided regional land use development decisions, through state guidelines and requirements for local comprehensive planning, and to state control over growth management by means of a state-regional-level decision-making process. Tracking the evolution of the state's approach to growth policies will contribute to our understanding of various urban approaches to growth policies in Florida cities.

Table XI--Economic Effects of Growth Policies

Economic determinants of growth also can contribute to our understanding of growth policies. We need to establish a link between the costs and benefits of growth which accrue to various interest groups and the nature of growth policies in the city. The data may show that the land use policies adopted by a city reflect the combination of these economic and political interests.

The control over land use is critical to Florida and other sunbelt states for several economic reasons. First, population growth is important to the development of a sunbelt state's economy. Population increases allow economic diversification and development of a competitive business environment (Schlesinger, 1993). Historically, Florida has diversified from agriculture and tourism to high tech and service industries to support continued economic development.

and a stronger state revenue base. Florida continues to lead the nation in most new jobs produced (Koenig, 1987). Over the 1981-86 period Florida added 818,800 new jobs, a 19% increase, and personal income rose over 50% with per capita income over \$14,800 (Koenig, 1987, p. 48).

Local areas as well are diversifying their economies. An annual survey of Florida business leaders reveals strong optimism for continued strong economic growth throughout the state (Koenig, 1987): in 1987, trade and service sectors make up over 50% of the total employment in the state (Koenig, 1987, p. 47). This type of continued, strong economic development is expected to reflect a continued interest by a conservative growth machine to dominate the land use process.

Secondly, to be economically successful a population increase must be diversified and not limited to unskilled or non-working groups. Even though the influx of retirees to Florida in the early years created a strong housing demand, it is not the type of housing industry which will sustain a strong local economy. But as the state's service sector boomed, a migration of families and young professionals stimulated a long-term housing demand. Employment overall rose 21% from 1980-86 in the state. The 25-44 year old age group is 27% of the total state population making it the largest segment of the state population ("Florida Population Clocks to No. 5", 1987, p. 34).

As the population diversifies and the participation in the business community diversifies, we also may expect to see more political conflict. This may increase the tendency of the formation of an anti-growth coalition. As we will see, however, in Florida the anti-growth coalition manifesting itself in a suburban, residential interest as Melnick (1976) might have predicted and not an internal growth politics suggested by Melnick (1981).

Thirdly, the housing construction and development industry may be the major economic thrust in Florida urban areas. As consumers of undeveloped land and rapid population growth can sustain a city's economic base. This type of economic development has been the impetus for many Florida cities to attract greater economic diversification and to create and sustain additional cities. Housing starts increased 34.3% from 1961-66 ("Florida Population Climate to No. 5", 1967, p. 63). The southeast portion of the state has experienced the greatest surge, a 140% increase over five years followed by the central regions with about 80% increase. The southeast spear, long the engine of the greatest growth trailed central Florida in actual housing starts (central 37,734 starts, southeast 34,133 starts), but represents the second highest number of starts in the state ("Florida Population Climate to No. 5", 1967, p. 63). The rate of change in starts, though, was outdistanced by the central and northern areas by 18%. These regions appear to be

growing faster. Growth remains a significant issue around the state and impacts local political power and policy.

State Socioeconomic and Political Influences Affect Policy Making

Decision making concerning the use of land is a politically volatile policy area. Specifically, the type of growth and the purpose for the land affects the distribution of political power. For instance, residential growth may heighten the political power of neighborhood groups. Economic development oriented growth may produce different political results such as an elite or business dominated power structure. In theoretical terms, Petermann's (1977) unitary explanation of city development may be more suitable to a residential community and structured, elite power theories (Hans, 1988; Goshoff, 1987) may be more suitable to larger, more diversified urban areas.

Florida and other sunbelt states, however, may contain (see Hollingsworth (1981) studies to) of multi-modal urban areas with mixed commercial and residential development. Hollingsworth suggests that this pattern leads to unchallenged conservative growth policies. Not some Florida cities check unbridled growth and control it. This leads us to believe that sunbelt cities, especially in Florida, will experience additional stages of growth policies.

Florida land use policy significantly influences economic development. The state's land use regulations represent more than just an example of a state's regulatory

authority concerning the desires of local interests. We know that a broader authority and higher level of government can implement controversial regulations that limit the benefits of potential interests more successfully than can local governments (Gardner, 1971; Long, 1984; Sweeney, 1984). Land use and development regulations certainly fit that description. Florida, however, is an example of how state government can influence not only the direction of the local use of land but also the nature of the benefits which may be available to growth interests.

The level of government that directs the land use process has a significant impact on the distribution of the benefits of land development and growth. The state, by constitutionalizing its processes in this high-stakes policy arena and by centralizing the decision-making authority can guide land development while at the same time maintain a particular growth agenda. In Florida's case we will see how the state's efforts to centralize and create a uniform process influenced the transition at the state level from conservative to liberal to progressive growth policies. These state actions also improved the opportunities for growth policies transitions to occur at the local level.

Florida's history of transitions in decision-making and growth policies contributes to our understanding of the policy process, and the implications for inter-governmental relations. Most importantly it contributes to our

understanding of institutional power, its relation to the operation of interest group and community power (in terms of goals and interests), and the policies adopted by governments in each type of political process.

Florida Growth Policies

Constrained Growth Policies

Constrained growth policies as we have discussed previously, is an unrestrained growth machine approach to development and is most likely to be associated with the government dilemma of uniformity or diversity of the policy process. In Florida this dilemma centers on the land use process that the state makes available to local governments for devising and implementing growth-management policies. Uniformity represents the degree to which growth management is regulated and guided by the state through a decision framework implemented at the local level but required by the state. Diversity represents the degree of local discretion given to local government by the state in interpreting or implementing their own approach to growth management and land use.

State mandates are an example of uniformity. Revell and Tobin (1981) suggest that state mandates reduce the decision-making discretion of local governments. State demands for uniformity may also increase the fiscal dependency of local governments that cannot afford to implement the state-mandated policies (Revell, 1981).

State-mandate parameters may be viewed negatively, but Melt (1985, p. 95) suggests that mandates, by producing an additive effect, can increase local governments' ability to address policy problems. State mandates may act as a "prescription" to shape the local "decision space," but this does not have to produce a burden or negative impact on local government (the zero-sum view). Instead it may simply provide a framework for local decision-making to take advantage of a suggestive policy opportunity.

Local conservative growth policies, however, might be more successful in a locally dominated land use process that operates independently of the state's influence. State-wide policy uniformity, such as compacts with a wider group of interests and may not provide as supportive a pro-growth climate as might locally dominated decision making processes.

Prior to 1972, the state government in Florida played a minor role in stimulating local land use and directing urban growth. During this time, the state was supportive and state urban growth leader (Carter, 1974).¹ The state began to open development by allowing drainage and dredging in wetlands, especially south of Lake Okechobee through the Everglades. This opened previously undevelopable land in southeast and southwest Florida near the town of the century (DeGrove, 1984). The St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Miami canals made development possible in southeast Florida and drainage in

The Big Cypress area created development opportunities in the southern part of the state. By the 1940s, over-drainage for agriculture and over-development forced the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to step in and implement a flood control program which designated 1.3 million acres as a water conservation area and left 600,000 acres for agriculture (McNamee, 1988).

The state's conservative political climate, however, maintained a strong development environment. In the state the state-federal waters to create the Cross-Florida Barge canal created a heated controversy between legislators and environmentalists. Initially, there were conflicts over the need for water in the urban areas and in the Everglades Park. The most pronounced battle for water occurred over the Big Cypress Airport site in the Everglades which, if built, would have lowered the water flow necessary to sustain wetlands (McNamee, 1988).

Florida cities and counties also embraced development and supported wholeheartedly the growth machine interests. The city of Miami was an example of the developer interests dominating city and county land use policy. There was minimal regulation and direction from local government allowing developers to run the growth game. The South county real estate explosion in the 1940s and 1950s left both Miami-Dade and the various cities vulnerable to the influence of the growth machine. Miami-Dade had zoning authority for the

citizen and citizen, but did not use it (Clarke, 1974, p. 154). The 1965 Master Plan encouraged development goals over other goals for agriculture and conservation (Clarke, 1974, pp. 155,156). Even into the early 1970s Reitzel-Rude made its land use decisions on an "ad-hoc case-by-case basis" providing benefits to developers at the cost of long-term planning goals (Clarke, 1974, pp. 167).

Many developers in the 1950s and 1960s were speculators taking advantage of the demand of out-of-state land buyers and retirees who were eager to relocate to Florida. Many new developments were self-contained and did provide many limited infrastructures, limited relying on wells and septic tanks. There was political pressure at the state and local levels for short-term development and very little consistent implementation of long-term planning (Clarke, 1974, p. 156). This put Florida cities on a path of politically favoring short-term economic benefits by authorizing quick development and profit. It also marked the beginning of assessing long-term costs to the environment for which government would have to pay later.

The Ft. Pierceburg, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami areas experienced the most growth in the post war years (Table 3-1). This time period was marked by aggressive development and rapid driven growth. The state government continued to make policy contributions to spur growth. In 1941 the state designated Brevard county, south of Jacksonville, as

Table 3-1. Selected Population Growth Rates 1940-80

Location	Change in Population (%)			
	1940-50	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80
Bald county	88.70	88.86	35.58	18.28
Blount	44.78	17.80	14.80	3.38
Blount	207.12	243.97	92.97	42.77
Broward				
County	125.80	283.87	42.87	42.77
FL. International	121.88	131.28	48.87	3.88
Broward				
County	41.87	58.48	52.90	65.28
Broward	77.28	481.71	1222.87	82.28
Broward				
County	64.88	122.28	10.84	18.78
Broward				
County	22.12	128.18	18.82	18.28
Broward				
County	88.71	58.18	22.84	21.88
Broward				
County	64.47	48.78	18.12	2.88
Broward				
County	208.28	87.28	12.18	24.18

Source: Figures generated from the Florida Statistical Abstract, 1981, 1981, 1991, and 2001.

"industrial country." Polluting waterways was allowed as a necessary function for industry (Stoner, 1974, p. 46). Industrial paper companies discovered an exceptionally beneficial growth climate available to them. The data supports the development of a growth profile that potentially benefits the growth machine through conservative growth policies.

Problems in paradise

Growth was encouraged by the lack of development controls and the state efforts to encourage growth through economic incentives for land development. Statewide zoning existing was not established until the constitutional revision of 1985 (Primmall, 1977:1) but this approach had a high cost associated with it.

Natural disasters and natural use of sensitive lands brought attention to the dysfunctions of growth. Major ecological and environmental problems resulted from the short-sighted approach to driving land through a market-driven process. The competition for space and water between development interests and environmentalists crystallized the political problems facing Florida legislators as they grappled with land use legislation. These problems forced a change in statewide growth policies from conservative to a more liberal growth policies. While conservative growth policies at the state level was declining, at the local level growth policies remained relatively unchanged. The

State's involvement in the attempt to restrict growth in the first shift towards a more unitary approach to land use development in Florida. Liberal growth positions called on this type of regulatory assistance from a broader level of government.

From the late 1960s onward, the state instituted a number of conservative reforms which eventually led to land use reform. The 1969-70 administration of Governor Rick paid serious attention to the sensitive environmental problems of the Everglades and other critical areas. Conservation groups were institutionalized within the administration and their concerns were supported by the Governor's staff. Eventually this led to the formation of the Governor's Natural Resources Council, an influential group which proposed significant environmental legislation. Water quality, beach development, septic backup, and development permitting were among the policy areas affected by the state's attention to ecological problems.

The 1970-72 administration of Governor Rehn continued the state's conservation efforts and a mission in land use planning. Severe environmental problems, including a crippling north Florida drought in 1971 brought about a number of significant policy responses. Governor Rehn organized the Governor's Conference on Water Management in South Florida in 1971 to address the chronic battle between development and environmental needs. The first large which

emailed from that conference recommended that a plan be developed to limit growth in order to conserve water. This signalled a major shift in statewide politics (McGuire, 1988). The governor called for new legislation to be proposed addressing these conflicts.

A crucial policy dilemma was considered at this juncture. The Governor's study committee considering the various policy options had a major choice to make. Under consideration were two models for land use regulation. The Fowell model was a comprehensive, unitary policy model giving most of the directive powers over land use to the state. The alternative was the RLI Model (see Fowell, 1982). It left decisions about local development directions to local governments and gave directive power to the state only in critical areas or for significant scale developments (Oster, 1974, pp. 118,119). The Fowell option could have been perceived as a severe constraint on local growth machines. The RLI option left the local political process open to interest group competition. Florida was not ready to embrace a fully unitary approach.

There was quite a lot of controversy surrounding the proposed legislation. Supporting a strong state presence in land use regulation were the environmental groups, the League of Women Voters, the American Institute of Architects, and many local newspapers around the state. Opposed to the legislation were the Homebuilders Association

and assisted developers (with the notable exception of the Arvida Corporation) (Buckner, 1984).

Despite the controversy, in 1972 the state enacted four significant pieces of land use legislation which would pave the way for a more liberalized, unitary policy approach to land use. The most significant legislation passed was the Land Management Act (H.B. Chapter 345) which contained the provisions to designate Areas of Critical State Concern and the Development of Regional Impact (DRI). The other significant legislation included the Water Resources Act of 1972, the Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972 (state plan), and the Land Conservation Act of 1972 (Buckner, 1984).

The state's objective was not to stop growth but to minimize the problems which resulted from a growth pattern fueled by unrestricted market pressures. The state could not ignore the costs of this type of growth and the state political process had to develop some parameters to curb local conservative growth policies. The legislation had three significant features which aided in its passage. The legislation maintained a primary role for local government in the land use process, the state had limited and defined areas in which it could intervene, and the legislation had significant legal and institutional strength which insulated it from challenge (Buckner, 1984).

Transition to liberal growth policies

The Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 contained several key provisions such as the promise to designate areas of critical state concern and methods to direct development of regional impact.⁸ These policies indicated that the state was ready to make a change in the costs and benefits of growth policies. Large scale developments and development in environmentally sensitive areas would now be influenced by as controlled by the state government. The state would overrule local conservative growth policies. This reduced the economic benefits available to developers. But in return it provided a way to reduce the high costs of the problems of unchecked development for which government paid.

With the 1972 legislation passed, Florida began to institutionalize land use development policy. The Cabinet, State Executive, and the state's Regional Planning Councils were responsible for deciding and monitoring major developments and environmental concerns. Local governments slipped into a decision making state of command, altering the business as usual approach to land use which limited the local growth machine interests. This new legislation would by no means stop growth or control it in all ways, but it did present a significant change in political attitudes toward increased government involvement in the use

of land, a critical factor in the transition of growth politics.

Two political phenomena were emerging. One was an increased authority role for the state via 1971 legislation. Secondly, environmentalists were becoming an influential political group, most prominently as a state-wide coalition. Their strength came from both the national ecology movement and the increasingly urban progressive make-up of the Florida legislature which occurred after legislative reapportionment in 1967. Florida's environmentalists were a stark force on the previously unconstrained growth machine (Beltrone, 1984).

In Florida, these political factors contributed to a form of liberal growth politics. But unlike this stage of growth politics in northern states, Florida's limited response to the growth machine was restricted on the environmental issue, and less on issues of racial or income equity. As Hollenhorst (1983) points out, there are few inner city areas in the state. Thus the anti-growth coalition does not exist in the traditional sense of displaced urban residents. Subsequently, he concludes that urban elites miss the liberal growth politics experience except through the nationally stimulated community action and neighborhood movement. But Florida eventually would enter a defined liberal growth politics period. The 1973 legislation represented the first major legislative transition.

The liberal environmental position entered into growth politics, received favorable responses from the governor and other legislative leaders, and began to see a shift to unchecked, unplanned growth in the state. Some developers, most notably the Arvida Corporation, were in agreement with the environmental approach. They had concerns about the long-term impacts of overdevelopment of the land and development in excess of infrastructure capacity. They in fact supported the increased government involvement, favoring a long term strategy, rather than short term political incrementalism (Apper and Landers, 1987; Cortes, 1974, pp. 130,135). The ability to predict land use policy directions to the long-term allowed developers to plan for economic investment and forecast profit potential. As long as the state policy was not too immediately restrictive, large, multi-city developers could benefit from a unitary state approach.

For all the environmental political victories, however, other groups had different agendas within the new land use legislation framework. People perceived a decline in the quality of life as "a lifestyle as we once knew" that had been greatly reduced as the need for controlled growth, the "new growth" campaign in late 1970s, became in other areas a campaign to curtail growth (Cortes, 1974). Liberal growth politics suggests that respect growth is resisted because of its sensitivity to existing residents, most notably in the

inner city. But liberal growth policies can also be represented by the interests of the anti-growth coalition as described by Minkin. These existing residential interests may want to stop growth because it is changing the style and quality of life to which they have become accustomed.

This approach to growth management is the "last one in the boat" philosophy (Igo, 1986): the "I have mine, so get yours elsewhere" approach. The strategy may be to keep the character of the city predominantly residential and low density. Most notably, in 1982 the upper-income, exclusively developed community of Boca Raton passed a population cap ordinance. St. Petersburg threatened to enact similar legislation, but never followed through. Their cap would have been lower than the existing population, forcing out some residents.

Growth increases political diversity and challenges the status quo. Liberal growth policies aim to protect the diversity of interests by promoting the equity concern. In Florida, the anti-growth, residential interests were seeking political and policy protection from growth in the same manner as the environmental interests.

The environmentalists and the residential exclusivists used the same political methods, but for different anti-interests. This split within the anti-growth coalition may be part of the underlying explanation for why Florida cities approach growth very differently in some cases. Growth can

consistent with the environment if guidelines are set and imposed by the state. But that would require a degree of uniformity for which not all Florida cities and counties were politically ready. An essentially decentralized approach to land use planning and development was maintained, specifically to maintain the political integrity of local residential interests.

This continuing decentralized approach could have left conservative growth policies to dominate local policies, but residential anti-growth coalitions were able to use the political process to their own ends just as the growth machine had done in the conservative growth policy phase. This observation is intended to be explanatory and not judgmental. After all, the decision making arena and its outputs are shaped by political power. But the next segment of significant state legislation had an even greater potential to affect local political power than the 1972 policies.

Liberal Growth Policies

In 1975 Florida enacted its first comprehensive planning requirement for cities and counties through the State Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (SCCPA) (F.S. 149.21-149.23). This legislation solidified the unitary approach to the planning process throughout the state. At this time the state was faced with its second major dilemma, whether to centralize or decentralize policy authorities.

while the LCRA did not completely centralize land use regulation decision making, it did significantly institutionalize the process and lay the groundwork for centralized implementation at a later time. This increase in state involvement altered the local growth policies process and forced shifts in the benefits available to and costs extracted from land use interest groups. At the same time it provided opportunities for greater participation in the process.

The LCRA was in part a response to the problems anticipated by implementing the 1973 legislation. Adjustments were necessary that the existing legislation could not sustain. The Environmental Land Management (ELM) committee recommended local planning legislation in order to give the impetus in the per process. If no local land use regulations were in place, development could occur without restriction and a per could not be denied (Bartov, 1984).

The LCRA delineated uniform parameters within which local governments were to develop comprehensive plans for growth. The intent of the act is broad, but deserves our attention in order to appreciate the changes occurring in the approach to land use regulation in the state.

It is the intent of this act that its adoption is necessary so that local governments can promote and enhance general advancement; encourage the most appropriate use of land, water, and resources, consistent with the public interest; overcome present handicaps; and deal effectively with future problems that may result from the use and development of land within their jurisdictions. Through the process of comprehensive planning, it is intended that units of local government can promote, promote, protect, and improve the public health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, law enforcement and fire protection, and general welfare; prevent the overcrowding of land and avoid undue concentration of population; facilitate the adequate and efficient provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, recreational facilities, housing, and other requirements and services, and conserve, develop, utilize, and protect natural resources within their jurisdictions (P.L. 84-234) (1915).

State review powers were to be used only to insure local compliance with comprehensive planning requirements. The contents of the plan and the specifics of its implementation were left to local government discretion and not subject to state approval. Through a conscious decision to shape uniformly the local decision-making process, the state began to institutionalize its own land use regulation process. Every plan was to have a coordinated set of nine elements addressing the various aspects of growth. The nine elements in the LDCR were to be planned in coordination with each other. The elements were 1) future land use, 2) traffic circulation 3) sanitary sewer 4) conservation 5) recreation-open space 6) housing 7) non governmental coordination 8) utilities and 9) coastal zone (if a coastal

lowland) Elements addressing airports and water ports were required for cities with those facilities (F.R. 183.0075).

The future land use element was the central feature of the legislative requirements for local planning. The 1975A represents a move to the unitary approach to the land use process in order to make a concentrated impact on the increasing dysfunctions of growth. But it remained a 'bottom-up' planning process (Baker and Jorgensen, 1980). Local governments could use the plan as a growth management tool or they could amend it in reaction to development situations and essentially defeat the impact of the plan.

The major change in growth politics in 1975, however, is the emergence of the planning function as an influential political force. The 1975A required over 400 city and county plans to be prepared. These plans were developed by local government planners, city and county clerks and managers, and on many cases by consultant contract either with the regional planning councils' staffs or with private planning firms. A national planning process was mandated by the state; local governments made the attempt towards at least preliminary compliance. Local plans were required to be evaluated and updated every five years. But the planning requirements were approached in a variety of ways. Some cities took the responsibility seriously while others

Ignored it. This became the heart of the change in statewide and local growth policies.

The state was moving in a direction to regulate development and planning for future growth. The 1979 SCRA was intended to initiate a shift towards liberal and even a populist political stance. Requirements for integrated planning through the nine elements, public hearings, formal amendments process for change, compliance with statewide regulations, and a required evaluation process all contributed to a larger role for state government to define parameters and allow local government the opportunity to engage dynamically in the growth and development of their city and county. Not cities, being a variety of political plans, used the comprehensive planning process to further the growth policies which suited their own political environment the best. Thus the wide variance in results of the use of the planning process (University of Florida, 1994). It is these results—the different planning policies and approaches used in each city—which this research examines.

Implementing the 1979 SCRA was not easy. There was confusion and duplication with the 1979 series of legislation (S. Council, 1979). There was relatively little funding available, a lack of coordination with existing regional bodies such as the Water Management Districts, and

a clash between regional and local decisional jurisdictions (Joshi, 1994).

It is difficult to portray comprehensive planning in black and white, either or none, in the way that some authors such as Michels have suggested. In general we can portray local politics as "transient" between growth machine interests and anti-growth interests (Schnitzer, 1992). The distinctions are much less clear when we specifically analyze local politics and the plans which result from that process. At best we can identify some directions in which comprehensive plan goals and policies may lean. For example, goals and policies may indicate economic approaches to planning which favor growth or a stable neighborhood approach designed to contain growth. In addition, cities and counties use a wide variety of strategies in developing growth plans. Some plans reflect that several scenarios for growth were considered, in other cases a single growth interest is reflected by the policy approach selected. More often than not, plans reflect a very general non-directed approach to growth. This non-commitment to strategy probably represents a short-term incremental political and planning process rather than a long-term strategy and rational political and planning process.

It may be instructive of the various approaches to land use planning to survey examples from comprehensive plans from several of the cities included in this study. First,

many plans have very nebulous goals and objectives. The vision of community growth seems to be quite often undefined. For example the first goal in one city's plan is:

to establish a land use pattern that will promote the health, safety, and welfare of the residents ... while being in harmony with the adopted development plan and elements of the 1985 Comprehensive Plan Jacksonville Area Planning Board, 1980).

That type of goal can temper political conflict by its broad scope which can include many positions on land use.

A greater specificity in goals reflects a greater consensus around land use policies at least as far as it is an indication of an ability to influence policy decisions.

An example of a more specific goal might be

A more diversified and intensely developed Core Area completing the Central Business District 1980 and the adjacent residential, commercial, and industrial areas (Growth Management Plan Vol 3 Part 3, Orlando, 1980).

More specific goals are goals and objectives which specify numerical development targets to accommodate projected growth such as the

Accommodation of a projected population of 260,000 people within the urban area. This accommodation will require construction of 26,000 new housing units between 1980 and 2000 ... (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 3, Orlando, 1980).

A number of cities project the amount of acreage devoted to each category of use such as residential, commercial, or industrial. The Polk County plan goes as far as to project the percentage of residential land that will be needed for

each category of housing unit density (City of Chicago South Comprehensive Plan Element Four) and the Plan, 1973).

There is a technical difference between goals and objectives as to specificity. Goals are supposed to be broad and objectives more concrete. But for some cities it may not be politically possible to achieve the level of specifying which will render their plan as a useful document. Conflict affects the nature of local power which contributes to the final plan product. It is the nature of these conflicts which the data will explore.

But for the plans themselves, it is evident that some goals and objectives pertain to anti-growth or residential protection objectives. For example a goal addressing residential plans is to

Maintain and encourage the continued existence and viability of low density single family areas through the adoption and use of a land use plan and land use control regulations and by making improvements in public facilities, such as streets, parks, and police/fire protection (The Comprehensive Plan City of Dallas City, 1974).

Another city in its effort to preserve a neighborhood character coordinated its residential goals with its economic development goals.

Living Environment: Provide for a group of residential densities which will blend together without causing competition or dilution.

Economic Development: Encourage the development of financial, professional, and retail services which are conventionally located in order to meet the needs of the residents (Iand Use Plan Melbourne, 1978).

Finally, a truly comprehensive approach to growth goals is exemplified in the following city's plan which acknowledges growth but within very limited parameters.

Growth Control: A growth management system which phases the rate of growth, spatial distribution, and intensity of development through time as a means of enhancing the quality of life.

Residential Density: Safe, stable, and attractive residential areas which have adequate amenities, individual character, a generally low density and intensity of development and which provide a variety of housing opportunities.

Industrial Development: A variety of non-hazardous and relatively quiet light industrial and research uses which provide a wide range of employment opportunities and a broad-based tax base.

Community Appearance: An urban environment having high aesthetic quality and having proper siting and landscape maintenance (Comprehensive Plan New Britain, 1978).

Obviously, there are several examples of comprehensive plans which take a decidedly pro-growth attitude and business climate sentiment. These examples portray conservative growth positions through the role of government as facilitator of a good business environment or growth climate. For instance one city states that the intent of the land use plan is to

... facilitates operation of the economic forces which determine land use ...
 Comprehensive Plan Document Madison County,
 1978)

In addition, that some give specifically states that land development should not be "unduly hindered by unnecessary laws, restrictions, or practices" that interfere with market activities in conjunction with land use (Merion County, 1978)...

Several plans give an endorsement of conservative growth policies in their framework statements. One study asserts that a growth process should have regulations which reflect that

An enlightened public policy is required which recognizes that it is not merely a matter of limiting growth, but rather developing policies to reasonably accommodate it ... residents feel threatened at the prospect of ... vanishing open space ... land here consigned into what has been termed a "no-growth" ethic ... Not all growth is bad (Orange County Growth Management Policy, 1971)

A city within that study exhibited a similar approach when it stated that

... growth has a good side, while there will be more people ... there will be more money, too. As fast, average incomes will increase. There will be more people and more businesses to sustain the services and facilities which contribute to the good life ... Growth management follows from the perception that the basic causes of growth cannot be directly controlled by local or non-state government ... (Growth Management Plan Vol 1 Part 1 Bristol 1971).

Three examples represent the various approaches to growth and land use planning by cities and counties during the same time period. Even though the state was shifting political gears by increasing the uniformity of the development process, the local level expressed a variety of political approaches to the process. The process allowed the manifestation of conservative and liberal growth positions depending on the local political situation. This period of time provides a great deal of instructive data about the operation of local growth policies under a common planning framework. The state objective was to reduce the dysfunction of growth and encourage local governments to plan for growth and accommodate it in the most successful way possible (University of Florida, 1984).

Consistency in Liberal Growth Policies--The Uniformity Struggle

Uniformity in the land use regulation process and growth-management may not always be a positive force or be able to overcome local political conflict. Approaching this dilemma by mandating uniformity in the planning process may not necessarily be a negative prospect for local government's ability to control its own destiny. The uniform approach to the Florida land use process can produce an additive or positive benefit at the local level. Local government along with local economic interests from all businesses not just land-based interests, may profit from state directives which help to create what Bolotch (1984)

with a "good business climate" uniformity, directed by the state, can help local government overcome short-term parochial resistance to growth and achieve the long-term benefits of economic development (Allmonorath, 1985).

The state of Florida realized over time that a necessarily uniform approach through the MOPA did not produce a uniform quality of results. This was due in part to the different local growth policies approaches and local resistance by growth interests to planning restrictions on land use. Several state commissions reported that the quality of local plans was not adequate in many cases because they were amended frequently rendering them useless as long-term planning tools. The plans were often ignored as a growth management policy. For the most part the various reports on the MOPA confirmed and concluded that the act's bottom-up planning process itself was not successful in preparing local governments for growth or adequately facilitating growth in terms of land use, environmental protection, or capital facility development (Growth Management Advisory Committee, 1988; Florida House of Representatives, 1985).

There are other reasons why plans were unequal in quality. Some cities could not afford the time to prepare in-depth plans. They did not have in-house expertise, and/or did not have adequate funds to prepare quality plans. There was a lack of funding from the state to help local

governments prosper and implement the planning process (O'Donnell, 1977). But why did the process fail to achieve the state's desired level of uniform growth management? The explanation, in part, resides on the nature of the regulations of the process and in part on the regional nature of growth and development.

The LCRA had several regulatory shortcomings. One problem is the lack of clear state guidance on growth management. Fully, the purpose of the LCRA was to allow local governments to design their own individual approaches to growth management. There was no significant preparation or implementation of a state-wide comprehensive plan. Without any state parameters, the local plans did not have a framework to guide them or to provide any consistency. But the distributions of growth do not adhere necessarily to political boundaries of cities and counties. Many problems are regional and we must require regional direction and solutions that are integrated (Florida Atlantic University, 1988, p. 81).

A second problem is that plans and policies did not necessarily match. What local governments planned, they were legally required to implement, but not necessarily in conjunction with their day-to-day services and operations (Florida Atlantic University, 1988, p. 81). Political incrementalism superseded coordinated and consistent plan implementation.

a third problem is that the state had no endorsement powers under the DCEPA. The state only reviewed for compliance, not for content quality. Therefore, it is essential to realize that the contents of comprehensive plans do not attempt the same objectives for all cities and counties. Some policies and goals are more necessary than others depending on local and regional circumstances. Economic needs and political forces combine to implement some policies more aggressively than others. These are problems which our data analysis will address.

Local problems in comprehensive planning also include the legality of the plans themselves. For instance, in Jacksonville the comprehensive plan was adopted by the city council by resolution and not by ordinance. This led to an ad-hoc development process in Jacksonville that did not complement growth management (Jacksonville Community Council, Inc., 1984, p. 7). Secondly, the broadness of the goals of the Jacksonville plan contributed to the inability of the city to effectively direct growth and development (Jacksonville Community Council, Inc., 1984, p. 17). This led to a political basis for growth and zoning decisions by city council regarding the plans. Other local governments no doubt experienced similar implementation problems.

From 1975-1983, Florida followed a moderate program to shape local decision-making across various universities. The price that the state paid for allowing local discussion

within state guidelines was less prone to inadequate preparation for and dealing with the problems of rapid growth. The state needed to pursue a stronger, more coordinated approach in order to overcome the conflicts at local growth politics whether conservative or liberal, that were inhibiting the effectiveness of growth management...

Reconciling Growth Policies

The deliberations of the LGMA turned the state's attention to the dilemma of centralization/decentralization of policy authority and direction by posing the question, which level of government should have the authority to make policy decisions? Centralization places the decision-making power over land use regulation at the state level. Decentralization places decision-making at the local level. Centralization infers decision-making against, not just a uniform shaping of the local decision space. By concentrating authority at the state level, there is a greater ability to establish long-term approaches to growth throughout the state. Decentralization, on the other hand, may be a more patchwork approach and concerned with the short-term gains rather than long-term solutions to land use problems, similar to the "diversity" dilemma approach.

Centralization denotes a tradeoff of the possibility of local decision making efficiency for broader long-term comprehensive solutions. If decisions are made centrally, then any local demands will not be met since, through compromise,

then creating less local decision efficiency. Centralization, however, may make it easier to satisfy larger equity concerns that can only be seen with a state-wide view, yet does not insure that this will happen (Gordon and Libecap, 1984). Narrow interests may be able to dominate the state level policy process and may benefit from centralization at the expense of a broader state-wide benefit.

But the broader level of authority in Florida through the transition to a development of liberal growth politics, was already bringing different interest groups into the decision making process and reflecting their concerns in legislation. Florida in essence, would attempt to project this process to the local level.

A greater role for government, through the extended use of the NACA and changes to that legislation, reflects Florida's transition to progressive growth politics. As we discussed earlier, progressive growth politics establishes a more active role for government in the land use/development process. Florida, through gradual institutionalization of the rules of the land use game has improved the potential effectiveness of government as a participant in land use politics.

In 1985 after ten years of "bottom-up" land use planning in Florida, the legislature enacted a new policy approach. The Growth Management Act of 1985 (GMA)

centralized comprehensive planning at the state level which created a "top-down" decision process (Gordon and Jorgensen, 1988). Although our study is confined to the 1975-85 ADPA legislative period, it will help our understanding of the results if we briefly examine this replacement land use legislation.

Under the ADPA all local governments are required to develop new comprehensive plans including a future land use element and capital improvements plan, the contents of which were subject to approval by the state. In addition, all local plans are to be prepared under advisement with neighboring jurisdictions. Finally, all local plans are required to be in compliance with (or not present any significant contraries to) the regional and state plans, thus establishing a clear line of required plan consistency from the state to the local levels.

The 1985 ADP and its subsequent 1988 companion legislation, represent a major change in Florida's approach to growth management and land use regulation. In essence a result of the unsatisfactory results achieved under the previous local comprehensive planning process. The state is taking a stronger pro-active role, through progressive growth policies in order to protect the larger public good. Previous land use regulations were ineffective in controlling potential local growth increases. Subsequently, the costs of growth had been borne by governments without the proper

beneficial according to the public. Local governmental approaches to solve the problems of growth should little concern for the intergovernmental impacts of their planning decisions, let alone concern for any state-wide impacts. A transition to prescriptive growth policies at the state level increases the privilegatory role of government.

The approach to the centralization/decentralization dilemma through the GMA, goes beyond setting uniform rules of the game. It sets the desired outcome of the game as well. This fundamentally alters the economic costs and benefits structure established at the local level. This centralized approach puts the state in a position to facilitate growth at the local level. The state's own comprehensive plan firmly establishes growth as a goal. It states that "Florida must regulate in ways that encourage enterprise, capital investment, and balanced economic growth ..." but is "an environmentally compatible manner" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 32). Growth within the confines of growth-management is the line of consistency with which local governments must now comply,⁸ but through this process, Florida will have a greater opportunity to overcome the problems of the uniformity/diversity dilemma while at the same time negating the existence of the centralization/decentralization dilemma.

One of the long-term impacts of a statewide centralized process is that Florida may become a captive of mobile economic landowner interests. The benefits of centralized development planning may have the effect of increasing the profit potential of land use. Institutionalizing constraints over the land use process at the state level may benefit these mobile wealth interests because their investments are spread across many cities. Large developers, even multi-state developers, will find it more efficient to have one set of process definitions than one for each of the cities where they are investing. The scope of growth policies has the potential to be appropriated at the state level. This effect may not be detrimental. In fact it may be positive since it contributes to a focused land use process and procedures. The benefits to economic interests may be incidental and have no effect on the development of progressive growth policies.

For local growth policies, however, it is important to realize that a common state-wide land use parameter may reduce the opportunity for diversity at the local level. The success of interest groups in affecting local policy decisions under increased institutionalization of the land use process is affected by what Stone (1984) refers to as the difference between government's "power over"—power that is realized such as regulatory authority—and "power to"—a more subtle less aggressive approach such as a partnership

approach to policy decisions. (There was also recognized as a phenomenon in the Community Action era (Black, 1979).)

Local governments may be most successful in progressive growth policies if they can assume an ecological role, one of manager not regulator (Howe, 1984). This may produce more satisfactory results in the attempt to manage growth without eliminating it. Those who direct and control the rules of the game, are dealing from a position of strength and are better equipped to effect the volume and the distribution of benefits, than those who are simply reacting to regulations.

Ultimately, institutionalizing the land use process is important in increasing government's ability to direct the distribution of benefits of the process. The distribution of benefits and costs should be considered in the context of a major policy change. The final dilemma addresses this concern.

Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy

We started this chapter with a discussion of how economic influences are related to growth in a general sense. We have examined the political factors which affect land use policy; Now we should examine the economic factors which specifically affect land use policies through costs and benefits as they relate to the utility/rights dilemma.

This dilemma is concerned with the costs in the land use process and the impact which the approach to regulation

but on them in terms of benefits and costs. Thus is probably the most difficult of the dilemmas to confront in the political arena between the distribution of benefits versus losses as well as winners. Government is better equipped to make decisions on the political-the focus of the first two dilemmas. Distributional choices cannot be made as easily and are often left to be decided by the outcome of political bargaining and incrementalism. This dilemma focuses on the needs of individuals (individual rights) and the greater public good (utilitarian benefits).

Flexibility and incrementalism, two standard features of local government policies, usually are effective in attuning the policy rules of the government to order to benefit (accommodate) different interests. For example, zoning designations are often amended or changed through variances for businesses and developers. Residents and environmentalists, on the other hand, challenge and resist individual changes that contribute to continued growth. Florida local governments, even with the LDCRA, continued to operate a zoning-driven planning process. Plans were incrementally amended to reflect zoning changes and placative interests (deBorja-Smith, 1984). Local governments continued in the role of facilitator and not necessarily as regulator or progressive partner.

Not in the institutionalization of the land use process. In essence, placation and incrementalism may have a

diminished capacity to effect the process. Centralization limits local government's ability react to these political forces and ultimately reforms localismism by changing the scope of politics to the state's parameters. Thus, institutionalization of the land use process increases the possibility of diverting the distribution of spatial benefits. The distribution of local spatial benefits may be diverted by the state.

In Florida, the state is promoting growth as a state-wide benefit. In some cases this is resisted by local interests. The state's ability to intervene is especially important in Florida because the environment is a public good (resource) for the state. Tourism and business relocation are attracted to expansive beaches, clear waterways, and lush tropical foliage. The overdevelopment of the state would damage these resources and the state's economy. Growth should be well planned and timed so as not to overload the environment or the service structure (infrastructure).

Thus in Florida, "growth management" is a growth propulsive measure rather than a growth restriction measure designed to achieve a public good. As the land use process is institutionalized within government on a statewide basis, growth management is not necessarily a threat to development but can encourage it. The state legitimizes the goal of growth, but in the context of quality growth which has some

means for quality of life standards. This becomes the new context for bargaining in the pluralistic sense. Any decision conflicts come down to "how managed will growth be?" not "will growth be stopped?"

Growth management policies are vehicles by which the state distributes benefits to both individuals and groups... whose rights should be served, whether homeowners or property developers, and should it be at the expense of the larger good of the entire population? In considering who should (or will) benefit from land use policies, several principles can be applied such as utilitarian, egalitarian, and distributive (Bevly, 1984; Davis, 1973). These approaches to the distribution of benefits may serve the public good, the pluralistic good, and the individual interests respectively, which interests represent which benefit may differ by perspective.

Land-based interests may justify their desire for benefits on utilitarian grounds. Economic and residential development benefits everyone eventually even though extensive development may yield windfall profits without regard to the future consequences of growth. The economic potential is attractive to local government because it is a source of revenues which will protect the city's ability to survive (Batterson, 1980). Therefore, land use policies which stimulate housing and economic demand could be characterized as a public good. This could go so far as to let the market

drive development in order to maximize the long-term strength of the economy.

Anti-growth interests also may believe that they hold a utilitarian position. Protecting the environment and the quality of life represents long-term benefits and the dysfunction of growth represents long-term costs. Thus they can take the view that their position also benefits the good of the whole. Therefore, land use policies should diminish the dysfunction of growth and perhaps restrict growth in order to protect the long-term interests of the public.

It should be noted that a private rights or individual benefits viewpoint exists for both groups as well. The Business/Development interests want to make an economic gain from their land investment over the long-term. Similarly, the economic incentive of residential property owners affects their outlook too. Growth problems can affect homeowners' long-term investments and provides incentives to them to enhance their ability to influence the land use process. These viewpoints represent the existence of the conflict of political interest groups and the competing benefits and costs. Progressive growth policies may be the vehicle by which governments can strike a long-term balance of interests.

The state can lay the foundation for public acceptance of policy approaches and the distribution of benefits. The SOCPA and the stronger DMR are important steps towards this

and. The state also has presented the use of impact fees by Florida cities to finance the infrastructure needed to accommodate growth (Stevenson, 1985). Impact fees offer an alternative to increasing the rate of traditional revenue sources such as property taxes. They aim to spur growth "pay for itself" by shifting the burden of the cost of new growth to new residents from existing ones. Impact fees serve the political purpose of giving government a means to balance costs and benefits.

A major report prepared by the State Comprehensive Plan Committee urged the DHT legislature that impact fees will not solve all growth problems in the state. The state must fulfill its responsibility to provide adequate resource standards. The report, widely circulated as a major position paper, outlines the requirements that Florida must "attract quality growth ... in an increasingly competitive world" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 10). This will lead to a continued diversification of the economy. Furthermore, the future of the state's economy is dependent on the success of the state's growth plan. Financing growth beyond impact fees will reduce the need for regulation that "hinders private enterprise, stifles initiative and innovation, and diminishes the quality of life" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 2). While this seems to contradict the impact fee vehicle, it merely broadens the scope of discussion over how to spur

with growth. It promotes growth as a desirable and necessary to Florida and sets up the long-term strategies for achieving it, strategies that include government as a progressive partner and manager.

Centralization

Traditionally the Americans favor states in intergovernmental relations with their cities under control. The degree to which policies are centralized or decentralized and how that affects the balance of power in a pluralistic society but in a world of ecological power (Strom, 1986) the degree to which controls or policy parameters are institutionalized may be more crucial. In a sense, if the state determines the parameters then it is essentially a centralized process. In the case of land use controls, if the process is decentralized then the battle over growth or no-growth is defined by the state. Developers will have a long-term framework within which they can evaluate local conflicting interests that do not subordinate to growth. The state can direct land use without the fear that the growth-management mechanism will be used by local government to restrict growth unfairly.

Government is not just a dog of interest groups nor is it merely a facilitator of the business climate for the growth machine. Florida has tried to guide development at the local level through the LDCRA, a more centralized control through the CRA ought to provide greater state-wide

continuity in approaching growth management. But the state is not a neutral agent. It can have its own interests that centrally and/or uniformly distributed benefits to interested groups in the land use policies arena. Other outside states may benefit from an examination of Florida's experiences before adopting as their own growth-management programs.

NOTES

1. For a full history of land use and development in Florida see Carter (1974) and between 1984

2. See Carter (1974), DeGroot (1984), Starnes (1978) report for full discussion of this and other significant periods of the 1970 legislation series.

3. The 1985 Act centralized the position of the state and severely constrained the decision-making space of local governments. Many local governments were understandably concerned about the centralization of authority over growth management at the state level. In 1986 a "Growth Bill" was enacted which struck a more moderate balance between centralization and decentralization in the development and implementation of growth management plans. Specifically, the level of service standards requirement was modified and the requirement for local plan compliance with the state-sponsored regional plan was relaxed.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROPOSITIONS BEING--HOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE

Policy adoption is affected by many factors within the local political setting: personal attitudes, power relationships, and the potential impacts of those issues and policies enter into the policy-maker's decision calculus. Policies reflect the interplay of interests in the political arena. The purpose of this research is to uncover the interplay of that interplay and whether there is a relationship in the selection of policy. To that end, a survey was used to gather information and insights from local participants in the land use policy making process in Florida cities and counties.

This is a comparative analysis of urban areas operating under the same land use regulation conditions. A comparative study is defined as "the study of numerous cases along the same lines, with a view to reporting and summarizing numerous instances on the same variables of different 'individuals'" (Robinson, 1973, p. 40). The use of a comparative approach allows generalizations across cities that a case study would not afford. Case studies afford a greater richness of data, but a comparative study gives the opportunity for greater breadth of research. A comparative

study contributes to theory in the form of "statements of regularity about the structure, behavior, and interaction of phenomena" (Robinson, 1978, p. 84). Case studies are abundant in the field of community power and urban policy. Comparative cases, however, are limited. In the area of developmental policies and land use there are no systematic, large scale comparative studies addressing policy output. This research then makes an original contribution to the field.

This research builds from a systems model of the interaction of elements of the policy making process and applies them over the city and county cases.¹ At that level, the unit of analysis is the community-city or county. The dependent variables, land use policies, and independent variables, sociological data, are measured at the community level and assigned to each case (the survey respondents). To make a case for the utility of the input variables (in terms of their impact on the through decision making mechanisms and output policies) the survey data uses the individual participant cases as the unit of analysis. The research then works on two levels. It is a comprehensive aggregate study of interest group activities, beliefs, and perceptions with the data relevant at the community case level.

Policy Process Operation

The process of creating and adopting urban policy is complicated and dynamic. Several aspects of the process that

contribute to our understanding are the definition of policy, the policy environment, the actors and their influence, and the community image or character. Policy may be defined as 'a governing body's 'standing decision' by which it regulates, controls, promotes, suppresses, and otherwise influences the community's collective life' (Eales and Frewitt, 1973, p. 402). The development of policy, however, is not necessarily a rational, controlled process because policy is a product of both the influences in the community and the purposes to which the community is committed. This combination of factors that influence policy development creates the opportunity for policy to be both a reaction to the environment and an action of purpose (Eales and Frewitt, 1973, Ansdfield, 1983).

We would elect to understand each community policy as individual outputs of the process. But because policies are negotiated and shaped within the constraints of the environment and community purpose, we may gain more insight by studying policy groups. In this study we have elected to study land use policies as a set of policies which represents an approach to the use of land. This method of policy analysis allows us to use the boundaries that are common to a set of policies as a means to classify policy groups. This can be done on the basis of use and quality which are shaped by the policy environment. Eales and Frewitt (1973, p. 404) refer to this as a "holistic" rather

then "idealistic" approach which might be be "theoretically more revealing." We expect it to elucidate the impact of the policy environment--conditions and actors--on policy issues which characterizes the role of government in addressing land use policy issues.

The process of policy development may have a number of components. Boley and Frowitt (1981) suggest that the process is like a "policy mix" made up of the range or character of the city, the diversity of problems recognized within the community, and the consensus of position that is achieved by the policy actors. Benfield (1981) similarly contends that the process is reflected by the distribution of authority between participating groups, the distribution of power and the structure of control, and the private versus public regarding values expressed within the system.

For the purposes of this study we take a two track approach within a systems model. Factors considered are 1) the policy process actors--their conflicts, power, and ideologies and 2) the policy environment conditions--growth, economy, and government profiles. The actors are most important to our model. Their interactions are expected to directly affect policy selection. The individual characterization of policy actors also contributes to the selection of policy as defined by their expectations of the role of government. The role of government is expressed as a normative ideology of actors about policies and their

purpose. The environmental conditions play a secondary role by constraining or expanding opportunities for the various actors to effect policy selection.

Study Method

This research employed a non-random survey of policy actors in 24 cities and 12 counties in the state of Florida. A total of 195 usable survey responses were obtained out of a possible 199 valid survey attempts yielding a response rate of 78.4%. Partial information from two additional cases are included in the results as well. Table 4-1 shows a breakdown of attempts, responses and rates by respondent group.

Selected cities of metropolitan statistical areas in Florida as of the 1980 Census were included in the study along with the county in which each of these cities are located. (There were 28 available central cities as the 18 Florida Cities as of 1980.) Central cities and their counties were chosen because they would be the competitive area likely to be experiencing the issues surrounding land use policies. Also they would have a significant population size for which specific socio-economic census data is available.

Eight respondent groups were selected to build the mailing list for the survey. These groups are city planners, county planners, city managers, county administrators, directors of home builder associations, directors of chambers of commerce, environmental groups, and neighborhood

Table 4-2 Survey Response

Respondent Group	Atlanta	Response	Rate
City Planner	24	22	91.6%
County Planner	18* (17)	17	100%
City Manager	24	17	70.8%
County Administrator	18**	18	100%
Home Builders Assoc.	24	24	100%
Chamber of Commerce	24	21	87.5%
Environmentalists	13	10	76.9%
Neighborhood Groups	24	22	91.6%

Notes: * Two counties do their planning jointly through the major city in each of those counties, thereby reducing the universe to 17 possible county planners.

** One county is consolidated with its city and does not have a county administrator.

and citizens groups. They were selected because they represent the main actor categories identified in growth politics—government, business/developers, and residents.

Survey Instrument and Method

The survey instrument was constructed by following the "Total Design Method" (TDM) (Milliken, 1978). Its use is recommended because of its track record of producing very high response rates. To do this the method suggests the construction of questions according to the information needed, the best structure to elicit that information, and the choice of words to convey the question. Question design also was aided by examining other surveys that have been done in the field of land use politics and community power.²

The majority of the survey questions are closed-ended to maximize the efficiency of response information. A variety of question styles were selected per TDM to make the instrument less repetitious and to improve the potential response level. Both multiple and single response questions were provided. For instance the questions to government officials concerning interest group and actor activities allowed for multiple responses instead of limiting responses to "the most" or "the best." This type of question does not force arbitrary selection of actors which could provide false feedback especially concerning influence and success. Some questions were partially closed and provided an opportunity for the respondent to fill in his/her own answer

if the existing answer did not fit the particular situation. The listing of "others" with a blank to fill, however, generated very few responses.

Two series of questions, focusing on ideology and land use policies, requested affect style responses, i.e., strongly agree to strongly disagree, a "don't know" response was also provided. Wording and length of questions followed the Villaseca method's suggestions using simple but accurate phrasing; attention also was given to bias, technical accuracy, and double queries in questions. Several questions, especially to planners concerning planning activity, follow a series pattern to break out separate initiatives or events. The pre-tests conducted on practitioners in the field identified ambiguous and biased questions which were revised for the final instrument.

Five different versions of the survey instrument were used. Different wording was selected for different respondent groups, eg., the use of "city" for city planners and managers and "county" for county planners and administrators. City planners were asked technical questions about policies used, intent and meaning of goals and objectives, and size of the planning department. Government respondents were asked a series of questions about their perceptions of land-use group activities in the land use process. Land-use groups were asked to evaluate only their own initiatives. All other questions were given to each

respondent group is the new forest. The planners were asked the same questions, 28. Interview groups were asked 30 questions.

A final branch of the survey was projected among a number of potential respondents. These test respondents included faculty in the urban planning and political science departments at the University of Florida, a Chamber of Commerce staff person in Gainesville, and practicing urban planners in Alachua county and friends. modifications were made based on their written comments and interviews with them.

Due to time and resource limitations, only two contacts were scheduled for each potential respondent. Each was sent a letter outlining the study and the need for their participation, a survey and a return self-addressed, stamped envelope. (See Appendix C for examples of letters and surveys.) Each survey was coded with a number to use as a response check system. Only those who had not responded within the first month were sent a follow-up postage. All letters and mailing envelopes were individually addressed. For TCR, no computer labels or generic addresses (e.g., Planning Director) were used. Names and official titles were used to personalize the process.

Mailing lists were developed from a number of sources. Planners and administrators in cities and counties were taken from the most recent editions of the statewide

directories of Florida Municipal Officials and County Officials, the Florida Chamber of Commerce provided the original state-wide list for selection of Chamber directors. Either the single Chamber serving the same city or the largest or both, depending on which Chamber serving the same city were was selected; builder respondents were selected from a statewide list provided by the Florida Home Builders Association in Tallahassee. Builder Association Directors were selected for participation by the city their association represented. The first mailing list consisted of a total of 145 potential respondents.

One month after the initial mailing a second letter and survey package were sent as part of the second wave. At this time the mailing list was increased by 54 potential respondents due to initial difficulties in identifying neighborhood and environmentalist representatives. The total number of potential respondents increased to 199.

Originally names of environmentalists, scientists, environmentalists, and neighborhood contact persons were solicited by an open-ended question on planners' surveys. The poor response rate to this question required additional measures be taken to locate various groups active in the area of land use. Environmental groups were sought first, but not enough organized groups were identified to adequately cover the same areas. Lists of contacts were obtained and used, however, from Florida chapters of the

Department, Inc., the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, the Environmental Information Center of the Florida Conservation Foundation, and telephone listings for environmental groups in selected cities. Lists and addresses were not always complete or current. Several survey letters were undeliverable.

In the second month of the project it was decided to add organized neighborhood groups to the mailing list. Departments of Community Development or similar agency were contacted by phone in each study city. Lists of neighborhood contact persons, officers of homeowner or subdivision groups, and other organized neighborhood groups were obtained and added to the potential respondent mailing list. The lists of neighborhood groups varied in quantity and quality. Some cities had as many as 40 to 50 groups on their lists. Only one group from each zip code was selected. If there was more than one group per zip code then the list was first restricted to those groups with an individual contact name listed and then selected at random. In similar cities with single or fewer zip codes, no more than a dozen potential respondents were selected at random with alternates selected if a resident person was not listed. The method of selection was not entirely unbiased nor idealistic, but we attempted to avoid massive oversampling from highly organized cities.

The limitation of selecting both environmental and neighborhood groups is that some cities did not have a potential respondent. There was no environmental group addressing issues in that city, there was no organized neighborhood program, and no contact persons could be identified. Identification of these groups was very difficult. Without intensive knowledge or contact with a knowledgeable person the quality of information about existing groups was constrained by the city staff persons contacted. Eventually all but five (8) cities were represented by a valid neighborhood and/or environmental group response. There were eleven (11) cities which were represented by only one valid group response. Over-sampling occurred for several cities which potentially biases the citizen group response as a respondent group.

The final mailing list contained 299 potential respondents. Response from the initial contact with respondents resulted in 101 valid returns. The second contact resulted in 90 additional valid returns. Phone calls resulted in 3 more partial returns for a total of 194 usable responses. (A total of 8 unusable surveys were returned.) The final usable response was received in the mail four months after the project began.

The remainder of this chapter will outline the propositions and the independent variables which are created to test them and a discussion of the dependent variable--the

land use policies--as system outputs and their classifications.


Propositions

The system model displays the elements of the local land use process. The stages of the model include input--the environmental factors, the support and success of participants, the thrust--which contains the conflict, power, and ideology factors and the output--the dependent land use policies (Figure 8-1). The independent and dependent variables are introduced and discussed briefly under each of the proposition and conceptual headings below. Detailed descriptions of how the variables are operationalized and measured are included in the next chapter.

Proposition One

The refinement of Proposition One states that there are conditions in a community which generate group or individual participation in the policy process. This participation contributes to participant influence over policy decision making. The final land use policy product is determined, at least in part by the making of the participants and the political influence generated by them, conflicts between them, and their attitudes about planning and the role of government.

These three factors, power, ideology, and conflict combine not only to affect policy outputs, but also to shape



Policy process

Figure 4-1

and influence government's role in the process of controlling land use. By understanding the political influence or power of each of the groups and their attitudes, we may be able to build insights about why certain policies are adopted and others are not.

Orientations about the role of government are identified through attitudes about land use responsibilities. The power to implement these orientations affects the adoption and use of policies governing land use and the direction which government takes in its land use role.

Power

Sources of political power and the use of it in the land use process can be approached by a number of different dimensions. These range in order from participation in the planning process—a subject potential for power—to interventions such as activity level, content, responsiveness to groups, requests by groups, and actions by influencing the process to achieve a desired policy output—a reflection of some power. Each group was asked to answer questions about their own activities and influence activities in the land use planning process. Planners and administrators were asked to indicate their perceptions of these groups' past efforts to participate in and influence the land use process.

Power and influence are concepts which are difficult to prove because they are often based on perceptions.

Information on participation activity and content as well as perceptions of their success by both the public and the government service will build a base of information on community power. This information represents the potential ability to influence the land use process.

Several variables are created to represent these concepts. WBI and CBI represent the perceptions (as nonfunctional) of government respondents about the success of business and citizen groups respectively in influencing the land use process. These two variables are summative scores of the evaluations received by groups which are perceived to have the greatest success in influencing the land use process in a particular community. Higher scores reflect a higher number of endorsements by respondents. WBI represents the endorsements of politicians, chamber of commerce, and realtors/developers. CBI represents the endorsements of environmentalists and neighborhood groups. These variables are constructed from question 4 in the government respondents' questionnaire:

A more general question is posed about which sectors have influence or power in the broader policy process. Again, this measure of community power is based on perceptions. These perceptions are expected to affect the way in which participants approach the decision making process and thus contribute to the policy selection process. These central categories of power are identified in

the responses on the public sector, business sector, and group/individuals. The variable FORMS operates 37 in government respondents' questionnaire) represents the appropriate responses.

Ideologies and the role of government

The second participant characteristic is the values and ideologies of the actors. Two series of attitude questions are designed to identify individual orientations about the role of land and government's role in that process.

Ideology can be defined as "a cluster of beliefs that is elaborate, integrated, and relatively coherent and that connects thought with a program of action" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 7). Or it can be viewed as "a constellation of beliefs and preferences about the nature of the constituent elements in social or community life ... (Jagers, Gaidrich and Swanson, 1972, p. 12)." Ideologies also can be a method of "perceiving and reacting to the political system" and answer the question "what role should the government play in allocating the resources produced in the economy, the society, and the governmental institutions themselves (Jagers et al., 1972, p. 3-10)." Ideology can be method as well as belief system (Schattschneider, 1960).

We can view political ideology in terms of the preferred role of government as conservative, liberal, or progressive.³ Thus we can view it as a preferred method to achieve an interest, for example in government regulation

determining land use, market forces directing land use, and public benefits directing land use.

Policies used by local government can be classified by the role of government as a reflection of ideology of method and arrived at through the influence of interest groups. For instance policies which allow the market to direct land use may indicate a facilitator role for government. Policies which require a regulatory action by government to direct land use may indicate a stabilizer role. Finally, incentive policies which try to capture surpluses of profit (rental) or provide incentives to use the land in a particular fashion may indicate a progressive role for government.

Role of Government

<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Method</u>	<u>Role of Govt.</u>	<u>Interest</u>	<u>Policy</u>
Conservative	Market	Facilitator	Self	Flexible
Liberal	Regulation	Stabilizer	Community	Regulatory
Progressive	Growth by Encouragement	Industry/ Developer	Government/ Community	Incentive

Table 4-1

Different policies reflect the nature of power and avenues for influence in the community--institutionalizing the role of government via policy produces different avenues for influence. For instance, regulatory policy creates an avenue for government power over land use and those whose interest is to constrain growth. Flexible policies reduce the power of government and institutionalize and open

avenues for power to market interests which want to promote growth for self gain. Incentive policies may be a compromise power position--the new community power as outlined by Stone (1981). There may institutionalize growth, but allow government to retain some regulatory power.

Growth management is sometimes considered to be a compromise approach to land use, falling within the innovative category. It should be considered, however, as an alternative approach. Growth management is not a fallback position between either growth or restriction of growth. Instead it can be used to advance a variety of interests; it can be a means to manage, direct, or accommodate growth, each of which may have different interest group support and impact on the use and development of land. Therefore, the use of growth management should indicate a government derived permission to the development of land, but capable of supporting a variety of land based interests.

In this study we compare the attitudes (or orientations to the role of government) of individuals to policies within communities in order to find a relationship between the presence of particular attitudes and particular policies in their communities. Additionally, we can compare the influence of particular interest groups to the presence of certain policies. While individual attitudes and interest group influence cannot be presented for as the same, there

are more pertinent to policy adoption and use than may be able to be drawn.

Three aggregate variables are created to represent three ideologies. LIB, CONSV, and PROGR represent scales created from the ideology survey questions that measure agreement with liberal and conservative implementation of the land use process, and progressive roles for government in the land use process respectively. On each of these variables, a higher score represents agreement with the ideology. LIB is made up of questions 16-1, 16-4, 16-6, and 16-8 in the planners' questionnaire (question 15 in the groups' questionnaire and question 8 in the administrators' questionnaire). Likewise, CONSV is made up of questions 16-2, 16-4, and 16-8. All respondents were asked these questions. PROGR is made up of questions 17-2, 17-3, and 17-4 in the planner's questionnaire (question 18 in the groups' questionnaire) The question was not asked of administrators.

Conflict

Conflict, as it pertains to the adoption of local policy, can be located at the individual level--conflict between actors--and at the city level--within the policy adoption process. Conflict between various actors is addressed through survey questions concerning actor groups' (business and citizens) positions on the growth issue.

AGRI and CTRI represent the cumulative scores of community actors' position towards growth in the community as rated by all survey respondents. Higher scores represent a perception of support of growth by those respondents, lower scores represent a perception that the group opposes growth. AGRI is created from questions 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 in the planners' questionnaire (question 14 in the groups' questionnaire and question 1 in the administrators' questionnaire).

Another series of questions is asked about actual conflict within the adoption of land use policy and around issues that pertain to land use in order to get a sense of the issue content of conflict. CONFLICT levels indicate the ease with which desired land use policies are likely to be achieved. CONFLICT, therefore, can be a parameter on the use of political power. The variable CONPR represents a cumulative score of issues where higher scores represent perceptions of greater conflict. CONFL is constructed from questions 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, and 11-4 in the planners' questionnaire (question 12 in the groups' and question 14 in the administrators' questionnaire). One issue, adoption of impact fees, is used independently as PFI (question 15--planners' questionnaire).

Propositions Two and Three

Propositions two and three suggest that ecological factors will directly affect or contribute to the degree to which policy conflicts erupt and the need to wield political

influence or power. Whereas proposition one is mainly concerned with the characteristics of individuals, propositions two and three use the environmental condition of the city as the main unit of analysis. Proposition two centers on the likelihood that differences in the economic characteristics of the city itself will affect policy decisions. Proposition three pertains to the impact of government characteristics.

The policy environment is comprised of input variables which are expected to be important in shaping land use policy. These include growth factors, business and economic indicators, and government factors. The policy environment can intervene in the policy process by effecting the potential use of influence associated by key actors, altering the selection of land use policy.

Growth profile

The general population indicators of the city comprise the total growth profile. The growth profile reflects the degree of freedom which is available to the decision makers. A homogeneous or heterogeneous socio-economic profile indicates the potential level of conflict in the community and thus the constraints on decision making. The rate of overall growth is considered to be the indicator of the potential for policy change. It is supplemented by land usage figures--residential, commercial, and undeveloped. This measure of population diversity may be significant to

the specialized land use policy area. In addition, regions of the state may make a difference as to the tolerance for growth and the types of policies that are politically acceptable.²

Several variables represent the population characteristics of the community. GRW is the population growth rate in the city or county from 1940 to 1960. POP40/POP60 (1940, 1960) represents the actual population for the city or county respectively for 1940 or 1960. PER (TRANC, TRANC60) is the percentage of the total city or county land area that is designated residential (only 14 of 24 cities and 17 of 18 counties have this data available).

Economic profile

The economic conditions which affect business operations often affect the political involvement of business interests in the land use policy area and affect their attempts to gain and use political power. A number of indicators are available which indicate business growth potential and growth in the different sectors of the economy. These indicators, however, can be affected by many other factors and indicate a number of dimensions, but the specific indicators that are likely to affect the economic interests in the land use process are not indicators of business, but indicators for business.

Indicators of the economic profile used are MFG, actual housing values and PERS per capita income. These

variables are available at the city level only. They represent the value of the housing market and the economic situation of residents in that community.

Government profile

Finally, government finances, specifically revenues and expenditure sources, indicate the contributors on which government must depend for fiscal stability, whether a benefits received or ability to pay principle is in use, the size of government, and whether it can act as an independent or dependent participant in the land use policy making process. A government's dependence on property taxes or charges for services, and the level of capital outlay (as a crude indicator of commitment to capital projects and growth) may reflect a fiscal bias. This is a bias that can affect the selection of land use policies. Combined with the individual or ideology, government variables may be an important indicator of policy preferences.

The government profile variables are **THSRP**, the proportion of total city revenues which are derived from user fees, **PTSR**, the proportion of total city revenues which are derived from property taxes; and **CAPEX**, the proportion of total city expenditures which are allocated for capital outlay. Proportion of revenue was selected instead of a per capita formula because proportion of the budget allocated or relied on provides a measure of government autonomy or dependence; this is the focus of

proposition three. The degree of government autonomy or dependence on any funding source can affect the ability of participants to use political influence in the policy process. The greater the dependence on property taxes, the greater the influence of homeowner interests. The greater the dependence on user fees, the greater the autonomy from business interests.

These profiles, like the participant factors, contribute to the overall policy approach to growth and land use in cities. Lucareo (1979, p. 132) suggests that the first stage in land use planning is where "market forces predominate." This potential for "unconstrained growth" gives way in the next stage which requires a more constrained "modified growth plan." An "iterative procedure" would produce the best possible growth management plan out of compromise between "public and private goals." This process suggests that a city may experience stages of growth policies.

Cities may experience different stages in addressing growth issues depending upon whether they are beginning to experience growth, feeling growth's full impact, reaching and reducing dysfunctions of growth, and attempting to slow or halt growth.¹ Therefore, we should examine policies as dependent variables which are influenced by both the participant factors and the intervening growth conditions

Dependent Variables--Land Use Policy

The third phase of the model contains the dependent variables, the land use policies. For this study, information about land use policy maps was gathered through the survey instrument in lieu of content analysis of comprehensive plans, development regulations and ordinances of local governments. Only city and county planners were asked questions about policy maps. In addition they were asked to indicate the contribution the policy makes to the achievement of the city's/county's land development goals. Policy values ranged high to low as integral, necessary, no effect, or impediment. This response range is an attempt to understand the relative importance of each policy used by cities/counties. We expect to find that the degree of policy relevance may be a more refined output of citizen participation.

An open ended question could have given planners an opportunity to select their most important or least important policies, but would have relied on their memory and attention at the time of the response. Providing a list of possible policies increases attention. The list was designed to be comprehensive in order to capture the most important policies for each place and generate a pattern of policy use in each city.

For this research seventeen land use policies were selected to represent the various approaches which local

government may take in their comprehensive plans and development regulations. The research by Clement et al., 1978, provided the initial guidelines on selecting a variety of flexible to regulatory policy approaches. Their approach to ranking or grouping policies consisted of the permanence of the policy (how easy is it to change) and the impact or control over the action is determining land usage.

Policies for this survey were selected to represent a continuum of government options for planning and development. Policy characterizations represent regulatory or flexible method of managing land use, effect on land price or supply, using financial incentives, and permanence of the policy components (as outlined by Clement et al., 1978). The classification of policies sixtiesssly may be retained to reflect the acceptance of government intervention such as traditional policies with controlled government involvement to innovative policies with expanded government involvement.

Policies reflect the various impacts as outlined above, but vary with their different levels of private and public tolerance. Policies are not divided in a vacuum, but represent a cumulative acceptance of government involvement in the use of land. There may be a tendency to prefer a regulatory or flexible approach, but the existence of policy procedures may be a better indicator of the set of policies which represents a community's approach to land use.

Policy Characteristics

There is a connection between the policy used to implement land use plans and the impact of the policy. This connection is a key criterion for classification of policy--for instance, to achieve the impact of promoting growth, the market approach to land use may be the best method. Stopping or slowing growth may be most effectively pursued through regulatory land use policies.

These classifications also have related to ideology and the role of government: a limited, traditional or advisory role for government, affirming flexibility or predictability of planning approaches may indicate a reliance on the market to determine the best use of land and a short term focus. An increasingly dominant role for government, affirming regulation and comprehensive planning may indicate a reliance on the interest to preserve land as a determinant of the best use of land. Government involvement and perhaps control of the parameters affecting fiscal windfall and wipe-out of land use may indicate an innovative, progressive role for government or at least a directing role. An example is a reliance on a partnership approach or at least a negotiated approach to the use of land (Clavel, 1988).

The policy classification scheme is essentially concerned with the distribution of benefits within the community. To be rational is to select policies based on efficiency criteria. To be political is to select policies

based on the services rendered (benefits received) and by whom or how the cost is paid (Brown et al., 1972, p. 85).

"The political decision-maker in land use is not typically concerned with the efficiency questions of interest to economists, he is, rather, constantly involved in disputes over the distribution of rights and goods." Therefore, first we must understand the characteristics of the policy, then the interests and influence of the expected beneficiaries.

Policy Characteristics

<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Role of Govt.</u>	<u>Policy Method</u>	<u>Impact</u>
Conservative	Facilitator	Flexible	Reactive
Liberal	Activist	Regulatory	General
Progressive	Director/Partner	Coercive	Target

Table 4-2

To keep the discussion of policies in perspective of land situations, traditional to innovative combinations of land use policies may reflect flexibility in regulatory policy characteristics. Traditional policies represent the well-known, manageable, low-risk land use approach. It may also be flexible due to application over time. This type of manipulation produces the climate to adopt additional policies which approach land use in new and innovative ways. These traditional policies may be more regulatory in nature to check the complexities or consequences of the traditional policies as actors learn to use them for their own purposes over time.

Supply, price, and incentive are important characteristics of land use policies, but may have limited practical use in understanding the actual policies in use by communities—their potential impact, however, may help us to understand how policies which are not used now may fare when considered for adoption in the future.

zoning Policies

The literature confirms that zoning and planning policies interact with the demand for land and housing, location, and affect the economic impacts of such (Howell, 1988a; Bartlett, 1989; Farkland, 1989; Johnston, 1989; Qualls, 1989). For instance, land use policies can affect the demand for land by restricting supply or access to land. For example, exclusionary zoning restrictions drive up the price of land, limit the use of the land, and contribute to a phased or slow-growth approach (Qualls, 1989; Johnston, 1989).

These policies can constrain the availability of options for land development and encourage a constrained environment (restricting supply and affecting the ability to meet demand) (Hirtle and Long, 1988). Property owners have a valuable or long-term protection of their property value by land use policies which restrict (regulation method) land use. Examples of growth limiting (by development restrictions) policies are restrictions, minimum lot size, and profit insurance (see Berman, 1979). The availability of

land also can be limited through policies such as zoning, requiring agricultural uses, greenways, and critical environmental areas (Wills and Long, 1980). Also, limiting the transportation of special services across the land reduces the options for land use, such as density of utility placement (Whitlow, 1980).

In this analysis various lot size and zoning reflect traditional policies: greenways, utility placement, permit limits and agriculture uses are more innovative or at least less accepted by communities. The more regulatory, the less politically acceptable in growth situations.

Price Policies

The price of land reflects its value as determined by market forces. Land use policies such as transfers of development rights, planned unit development, flexible zoning, and land use performance standards can facilitate market determined land use. Government can allow market forces to set the price of land as a response to demands for land use without relying on artificial supply restrictions and regulations against certain uses (Wills and Long, 1980). Land use policies that use price oriented rely only on market forces to set the pace of consumption and location. Price rather than supply oriented policies are more adaptable to changes in the marketplace.

The price policies used in this analysis are planned unit development, a traditionally accepted policy and land

and performance standards, an innovative but less accepted policy.

Incentive Policies

Government can impact both the supply of land available for various uses and the social value of land (and demand) by influencing financial options for both entrepreneurs and disinvestors land use. These financial policies allow government to regulate land use, by increasing the cost of land development for the community through regulation and at the same time encourage flexibility through financial incentives to property owners and developers. Policies such as impact fees, enterprise zones, capital improvement budgets, and tax increment financing may support a growth management approach. (This does not promote or restrict growth but gives government an opportunity to be a director and achieve a beneficial position between conservative and liberal ideology.)

The three incentive policies used in this analysis are impact fees and enterprise zones, less acceptable policies and capital improvement budgets, a traditional or highly accepted policy.⁸

Table 8-3 is a list of the policies used in the survey instrument, their method of control, expected impact on the use of land, and the degree of acceptance exhibited by the policy. But as pointed out, the realization of political needs and actual land use governance does not adapt well to these

evolutionary condition. Instead, traditional policies exist in nearly every city regardless of political ideology or participatory power. But a city's decision to add on to that traditional set of policies is an indication of branching out or willing to be innovative until that new set of policies becomes accepted and thus traditional. The more policies used by a city, the more unpredictable its land use process and the more likely it is to be struggling to adapt to various interests. The fewer policies used by a city, the more manageable and predictable is its land use process and the less likely it is to be unstable. The presence of different measures of voter support and various will indicate their power to move the land use process off traditional ground or keep it there as the chosen quo.

A Guttman scale of 41 items was created from the original list of policies. (A full explanation is included in the next chapter.) The scale reflects that the most used policies are somewhat traditional in their characterization. The least used policies are the innovative, restrictive policies. Therefore, the greater the number of policies used by a community, the less traditional and the more unpredictable their process. That is unpredictable from a political standpoint in terms of the process parameters. More predictable is the sense of being more regulatory.

Developers seek a non-changing predictable policy environment that they can count on. Traditional policies

Table 4-1 Land Use Policies

<u>Policy / Method of Control / Impact on Land Use / Instruments</u>			
Land Banking	regulatory	incentive	price
Greenbelt	regulatory	supply	price
Agriculture-Protective Zone	regulatory	supply	price
Critical Area Designation	regulatory	supply	price
Regulating Pollut. Discharge (P)	regulatory	supply	change
Wetlands Land/Use Restrictions	regulatory	supply	order
Restriction on Land Development	regulatory	supply	change
Controlled Building Placement	regulatory	supply	price
Capital Improvement Fee	regulatory	incentive	order
Controlled Mining	regulatory	supply	price
Fee	flexible	price	order
Flexible zoning	flexible	price	order
Land Use Performance Standards	flexible	price	change
Development Transfer Rights	flexible	price	price
Impact Fees	flexible	incentive	change
Enterprise Zones	flexible	incentive	change
Tax Increment Financing	flexible	incentive	change

Note: Formulation adapted from Simmons et al., (1975)

provide that stability. Anti-growth actors may demand new policies added on to the existing traditional list in order to change the process to suit a more regulatory paradigm. The more policies used, the greater the change to the rules of the game. The fewer policies used, the greater the stability to the rules of the game. Who is favored by the rules as they are is yet to be determined. The dependent variable POLICE represents the cumulative score of a community of use of the 13 individual policies that make up the scale.

Conclusion

The null hypothesis is that policies are randomly or arbitrarily adopted and that political influence and power, conflict, and ideology do not affect local governments' selection of land use policies. The next chapter will explore the data through statistical manipulation providing the metrics from which conclusions may be drawn.

The expected differences between groups in their perceptions and as others perceive their activities suggests that there is an order to the influence and dynamics of the land use policy process. Combining these indications with the classification of policies and their swing lands us to suspect that there is a connection between interest group activity and policy outcomes.

Notes

1. See also Fried, 1975 for discussions of survey research methods, theory, and comparative urban research.

2. Some survey questions used in this research were adapted from other survey sources: Southern Survey Research Center, Florida State University - as used by R. W. Connell (1981), "Questionnaire for the Study of City Manager in Florida" University of Florida Institute of Government, Public Administration Program, and Planning Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems, "1980 Permanent Community Sample Survey" by Clark and Ferguson (1981), "Study of Planner's Ethics" University of Florida, Department of Urban and Regional Planning; ALCOCK et al. (1989).

3. This corresponds to Allmonworth (1989) categories of conservative and liberal. Connell (1981) classifications of nonconservative, liberal, and radical. Rich (1980) additional expansion of the liberal, the left, and conservatively (1981), structural, behavioral, and radical. Allmonworth (1989) used the labels liberal and conservative in his analysis of voters in the land use policy process. Liberal were those favoring government regulation and control of land development relying on environmental participation in the land use process. Conservatives were those favoring government in the form of facilitation of land development, public subsidy and flexible land development policies to serve economic interests. These two groups are distinguished by "the degree to which government as opposed to the market is seen as a proper vehicle by which to make land use decisions and to influence development, and the proper role of government in land use decisions or in influencing development." Allmonworth (1989, p. 28). Allmonworth compared the voting record of plan board members to their attitudes and found a relationship between the two.

4. For the purposes of these propositions, a difference is made between cities and counties as local governments. For instance population data was collected on two levels. The first level is city only and the second is the county total. Many cities are "multi-tier" but the urban growth boundary, as long as the county area is definite and willing to increase its population there is less pressure for the city to change its policy selection. If the county is unwilling to increase its population through liberal growth policies, there is more pressure for the city to increase its density and grow. In addition, the bulk of available sociological data is gathered at the city level. More data is available at the county level. City and county are treated equally for the

growth profile. Variations will be considered for the economic profile and only cities will be considered for the government profile.

5. See Nolan and Strvitt (1970) Chapter 24 for a similar discussion of the stages of policy development over time. They suggest concepts, emergent, transitional, maturing, and advanced stages which change over time. The more mature stages are associated with greater urban diversity and spending on amenities and land use policies while the emergent stages focus on traditional user services.

6. Situations unique to Florida may explain why these seemingly innovative policies are accepted by many communities. The comprehensive planning process required by the state has made it possible for many local governments to implement a capital budget. The state also has been aggressive in promoting widespread water interests by state law and capital funds. Other states may have different levels of acceptance of these particular policies.

CHAPTER FIVE

URBAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT

Abstract Group Politics of Land Use

This chapter presents the results of the data analysis which defines the characteristics of the growth coalition actors. The relationships that surface are expected to confirm our expectations that the growth coalition and anti-growth coalition patterns are related to the selection of policies by communities. This pattern will help to explain the nature of urban political economy around this policy issue area.

Actor Participation

Proposition One states that we expect certain conditions present which are evidence of group or individual participation in the policy process. In turn, this participation contributes to actor influence over policy decision making. The final land use policy product is determined, at least in part by the makeup of the participants and the political influence generated by them, conflicts between them, and their attitudes about planning and the role of government. To confirm this proposition we would expect to find that there would be observable and significant differences between the actor groups--

government, business, and citizens--in the areas of their positions towards growth representing conflict, attitudes about planning and the role of government, and influence in the land use planning process. We expect business groups to be more conservative in their expectations of government's role in planning, perceived to be influential in the process, to strongly support growth, and to perceive low levels of conflict in the community. The citizens groups would be expected to have opposite characteristics. These findings would confirm our growth conflict scenario of political conservatism is expected to take an alternate position on its role in planning, perceive a growth sector influence pattern, and have mixed positions on growth and perceptions of conflict. This would contribute to the notion that government is a somewhat independent force in the political arena and represents the progressive alternative.

Position and profile

Positions held by various actors are addressed through survey questions concerning actor groups' standing on conflict as growth issues positions and their participation in the land use process. Respondents represent four private interest groups which are the chamber of commerce, homebuilder association, neighborhood group, and environmentalist group. In addition the planners and administrators, representing the insiders of the land use policy process, are asked their perceptions of which private

interest groups are involved in local use politics and to what degree in the policy process.

First, to identify the different land based interests and the potential for conflict between the various involved, each respondent representing a science interest group was asked to state the importance of the growth issue to their group and all respondents (public and private) were asked to state the importance of the growth issue to their community (city or county). In addition all non-public respondents were asked to state their group's position on the growth issue and in turn all respondents (public and private) were asked to state what they felt was their elected government's position on growth.

Growth is a prominent issue in local communities according to 81% of all the respondents (Table 3-1). There is little significant variation between respondents on this question, although an interesting pattern emerges that is repeated throughout the survey. Citizen group respondents perceive growth to be a greater issue to their community than do business group respondents, and government respondents' scores fall in the middle. Similarly there seems to be great consensus between respondents on their perceptions of their government's position towards growth with 94% assuming that their government supports growth (Table 3-2). But there are slight differences between the scores of the respondents based on their group membership.

Citizen group members perceive their government's support to be more unconditional than do business group members. Government officials's action set is between these two groups of respondents.

Each respondent group recognized, whether business, citizen group or government, may be involved with land use for different reasons. For instance, developers and the chamber of commerce have business interests which make it advantageous for them to participate in this issue area. Citizen groups may find their members individually affected by growth as property owners or have a vicarious interest in issues such as the impact of land use on the environment. Government officials may take an active or passive role in developing policies in the land use arena contributing to an independent or subordinated role to interests and influences in the community. These different interests and the conflicts between them contribute to the growth climate of a community in the policy making process.

Important differences which represent potential conflict, do exist between business and citizen groups on the questions of the importance of growth as an issue to their group and the group's position towards growth (Tables 3-3, 3-4). Business group members representing homebuilders and chambers of commerce had a greater propensity to respond that growth is the number one or primary issue to their organizations. Citizen group members representing

Table 3-1 Perceptions of Growth as a Community Issue (21)

	All	Govt.	Business	Citizens
No. 1 Issue	33%	33	33	49
Priority	60	60	66	51
Same Issue as Priority	5	0	5	5
Minor	17	3	0	0
Not an Issue	0	0	0	0

Table 3-2 Perceptions of Government's Public Works Budget (21)

	All	Govt.	Business	Citizens
Support Unconditional	94	0	0	10
Support Conditional	48	44	44	71
Neutral	1	0	0	0
Oppose Conditional	7	0	10	7
Oppose Unconditional	0	0	0	0

Table 5-3 Perceptions of Growth as Group Name (Q3QF)

	All Groups	Business	Citizens
Good name	33.33	33.3	33.3
Positive	55.6	43.3	55.6
Resistant to Positive	11.1	2.7	11.1
not	mean	3.3	3.3

Table 5-4 Perceptions of Group Position Towards Growth (Q4QF)

	All Groups	Business	Citizens
Support	33.3	33.3	33.3
Mixed	33.3	3.3	33.3
Oppose	3.3	0	3.3
No Position	3.3	0	33.3
not	mean	3.33	3.3

neighborhood and environmentalist groups responded that the growth issue was a priority to their group along with other issues as well.

The greatest distinction between community groups is their position towards growth. Over 70% of the respondents representing business groups felt that their group supports growth while only 19% of the citizens group respondents registered that their groups support growth. Almost 85% of the citizens group members reported that their group held a mixed position (support and oppose) towards growth and another 18% registered that their group opposed growth. Only 4% of the business group members reported their group holding a mixed position.

These responses suggest that conflict exists between interest groups over the growth issue. Not only do the group positions conflict, but their perceptions vary about government's position and reaction to growth. We run the risk of statistical fallacy, that what the individuals think can be considered to represent group perceptions, the responses do not seem to pattern according to respondent group membership. These responses represent a significant potential conflict over land use policy.¹

Two additional questions, Q112 and Q113 are asked as measures of respondents' perceptions of the position held by various groups on the issue of growth. Each respondent is asked to evaluate the position of various community groups

towards growth. RCH1 represent the cumulative scores of responses about the position of chambers of commerce and business leaders. CHB2 represents the scores of responses about the position held by neighborhood and environmentalist groups. Higher scores represent a perception that the groups support growth and lower scores represent a perceptions that the groups oppose growth. These scores are used as another independent predictor of policy adoption in the policy adoption analysis (Appendix A1).

Position and stability

Perceptions about the stability of the overall land use policy process may provide some additional indications about the potential for conflict at the local level. Questions were asked about the level of stability which respondents perceived within their local land use policy adoption process. A second series of questions was asked about the level of conflict perceived around specific land related issues.

Overall 54% of the respondents felt that the policies of specific land use policy adoption in their community is stable, having few controversies which divide the community over the issue. A quarter of all respondents felt that the stability of the land use process is vulnerable the control exercised by influential groups over government changes (Table 2-6). The smallest between respondent groups show that government leaders perceived the land use process to be

were stable than did the non-government sectors. Of non-government sectors, business group members tended to be closer to agreement with government experts while citizens group members perceived a process affected by changes in leaders and groups, reflecting perhaps a more open, pluralistic process.

Descriptions of political stability in the land use process reflect the perceived opportunities for change. It is not surprising that that citizens group respondents perceive more pluralistic opportunities in the process since they disagree with the government and business group members over the issue of growth, business and government, representing a potential coalition in support of growth, perceive this scene of politics as being more stable. This is the growth seeking politics scenario, expected to dominate and stabilize the land process. The challenge is expected to come from the anti-growth interests who are trying to open up the process to political change (Ketchik, 1994). The process stability results suggest that the growth seeking political pattern is a possibility.

Scenario conflict is perceived on specific land use issues. For six out of the seven issues listed--intergovernmental relations, environmental protection, education, urban (suburbanized) sprawl, green space preservation, and impact fees--all respondents agreed that conflict surrounding these issues was significant or

moderate (Tables 1-4). The greatest conflict was perceived to be on the issue of intergovernmental relations with 75.5% of all respondents indicating the presence of significant and moderate conflicts.

Significant disagreement about conflict levels on issues polarized across interest groups. The largest consensus between government actors on issue conflict was achieved as 73% "strongly agree" and "agree" that conflict exists on the issues of environmental protection and forest fees. Non-government group members agreed by margins of 73% and 71% that conflict exists on these issues. Overall, government actors again perceived less conflict than their non-government actor counterparts across these specific issues. A 50% consensus of agreement that conflict was present was recorded by government actors on only three (3) issues. Non-government group respondents agreed that conflict existed by the same minimum margin of 50% on six (6) issues. Forest fees, agriculture, and the environment are the issues about which private interest group members perceive the most conflict to exist.

The variable *CONFL* combines the issues of environmental protection, urban sprawl, green space, and agricultural land preservation into a usable scale of land use issue conflict. Higher scores represent stronger agreement that conflict exists on these issues in the community and lower scores

Table 3-3 Land Use Process Conflict (1994)

	All	Govt.	Business	Citizen
Very Stable	10%	17	6	6
Stable	48	56	43	36
Change with Group	38	17	36	41
Change with Policy	13	8	11	16
n=147 mean	2.54	2.53	2.37	2.63

Table 3-4 Specific Land Use Issues--Conflicts Perceived as Significant and Resolving

	All	Govt.	Business	Citizen
Intergovernmental Relations	344	75	56	75
Review, Protection	66	66	66	66
Mobile Home Location	43	46	33	66
Rezoning	78	49	66	75
Urban Sprawl	62	56	61	71
Green Space Preserves	51	43	66	71
Big Land Preserves	48	35	28	66
Export Fees & Charges	66	66	78	78

represent divergent disagreement exists on these issues in the community.

As expected, there are differences in the responses of the non-government respondents representing business and citizen groups. Overall, the mean score for citizen group members was 12.75 (high score = 18). This group had a greater perception of conflict in issues than did business respondents who had a mean score of 12. Government actors had a mean score of 8.4. These results coincide with the stability of the land use process responses and suggest that citizen group members have a perception that there is greater conflict in the land use process than do government or business interest respondents. This may indicate that citizen groups are challengers to the political status quo. Business and government do not perceive the level of conflict to be as great.

Position and influence

Understanding the influence and activity levels of the actors in the policy process will help to put perspective on the perceptions of conflict in the community. To strengthen or to ease the political situation it is necessary to know not only the issue position of actors (conflict or agreement on growth) but also their ability to influence the outcomes of the policy process.

Actors are motivated to exercise their influence if they think that a net gain in their position will occur

(Sperheimer, 1975). their influence is a concern that they can assert in the policy process. Policy may be selected based on "the amount of influence exerted on its behalf" by selected actors (Goodfield, 1981, p. 511).

To gather information on the influence of the various actors within the land use process, each non-public interest group respondent was asked to rate their own group's level of activity in the land use process and level of success in influencing that process in the community. In this public sector respondents were asked to give their perceptions about the activity and success and those interest groups in the community. Finally, all respondents were asked a question concerning their perceptions of overall community power. This larger question about influence provides insights to the broader policy process. These results can be compared to specific investments of influence represented by socio-economic data.

Government actors as individuals were asked a series of multiple frequency questions about their perceptions of interest group activities and influence in the land use policy process in their community. Government respondents (planners and administrators) most frequently named owners/developers, chamber of commerce, and individuals as the actors that are most active and successful in the land use policy process. Consistently, more than 50% of the government respondents named these business groups as the

most active participants in the process, those that most frequently contact government to voice opinions, and as the most successful actors in influencing land use policy. Conversely, citizen groups (neighborhood groups and environmentalists) are contacted by only 18% of the government respondents as the groups that are most active, in contact, or successful (Tables 5-3, 5-4).

The groups members were asked to rate their own group's participation. The results confirm the government respondents' perceptions: over 85% of the business group members (representing chambers and homebuilders) labeled their groups' activity level as the land use process as "minimal." They also confirmed their groups' success in influencing the process. Over 70% responded that their business group had "great" and "moderate" levels of success. Citizen group members (representing neighborhood and environmental groups) by 87%, feel that their groups' participation exists at a low level under consideration. Similarly, 85% of them responded that their success in influencing policy was "moderate" and "small" (Tables 5-5, 5-6).

Several variables are derived from these responses to measure the impact of the institutional growth and anti-growth interests in the community. The variables measuring perceptions of success in affecting the land use process has the most variance. We created GROW and ANTI to represent

Table 5-7 Activity Level
Groups in the Land Use Process (1989)

Value	Self-evaluation	All groups	Business	Citizens
3	Consent	45.18	87.4	33.8
2	Very Big Issue	45.1	29.7	48.8
1	Very Big Election	3.4	3.7	2.5
	Mean Score		2.84	2.26

Perceptions of the Public Sector--Groups with High Activity (1989)

Perception Percentage	Groups
54.21	Builder/Developers, Influentials, Chamber of Commerce
31.71	Neighborhood Groups, Environmentalists

Table 5-8 Influence Score
Groups in the Land Use Policy (1989)

Value	Self-evaluation	All groups	Business	Citizens
4	Great	13.9	21.8	4.4
3	Medium	48.5	45.9	35.7
2	Small Amount	48.5	28.7	50.9
1	None	2.5	3	4.4
	Mean Score		2.84	2.42

Perceptions of the Public Sector--Groups with High Influence
Influential Business (1989)

Perception percentage	Groups
67.21	Builder/Developers, Influentials, Chamber of Commerce
32.79	Neighborhood groups, Environmentalists

the nominations given by government respondents to business and citizens groups respectively. Higher scores represent more nominations for the groups represented by the variables based on perceptions of their success in influencing the land use process. Lower scores reflect fewer nominations of these groups by government respondents. These variables are used as an independent predictor in the analysis of policy adoption (Appendix A). The variables can be used simultaneously as they are statistically independent (χ^2 Pearson = significant at $p < .0001$).

Perceptions of Community Power

On the broader question of community power, most respondents perceive the political process in their community to be pluralistic. Almost 40% answered that "different groups which can influence policy selection" best describes their overall local political process. Another 30.1% responded that elected officials and/or planners and administrators have the greatest influence in policy adoption. Only 14% responded that businessmen have the greatest influence and that their support is necessary for policy adoption (Table 5-8).

Once again, there are significant differences of opinions between respondents representing interest groups on this question: over half (57%) of the government respondents perceive community power to be in the hands of many different groups and 30% perceive power to be in their own

(public sector) lands. Business group respondents are divided on the question of growth. About 44% perceive the government sector to be the most influential policy process group and 44% perceive a pluralistic character. Citizens group members are divided as well. Over half perceives a pluralistic group influence to prevail, but over 44% perceives business to be the dominant policy actor.

A lack of appropriate resources on the power question leaves us to believe that pluralism may be perceived as the dominant community power profile. This result actually may reflect disagreement in perceptions between respondent groups (Table 1-10). The interest group respondents each tend to perceive a more structured influence pattern of government. The impact of these differences on the narrowest land use policy process may be that business will attempt to negotiate with government actors and citizens will attempt to approach government about the policy influence of a non-governmental actor--business.

These different perceptions and the implications for interest group approaches to the policy process are especially significant in light of the differences between groups on issue position and group influence. For example, business groups support growth, theirs is the most influential interest group in the land use process, and they perceive the public sector to be the source of community power in affecting the policy process. Thus evaluation

Table 5-8 Community Power (a12)

	All	Govt.	Business	Citizens
Public Sector	34.74	34.3	51.3	4.7
Business	14.4	5.7	16.4	32.4
Groups	45.8	54.3	32.4	46.3
	n=232	n=78	n=27	n=43

could have an substantial effect on the land use policy adoption process. But we know that the growth machine economic does not always prevail; we suggest that it is the role of government that plays a large part in intervening in interest group tensions and providing an alternative policy choice. When professional actors were asked which groups were the most successful in influencing the land use process, 88% nominated city and county government. This is not an overestimating show of faith in their own ability to affect policy outcomes. But it does represent that government actors feel they can make an impact, even if they are not the "most influential" actor in the land use process. An examination of how respondents perceive the role of government will provide additional insights.

ideology and the Role of Government

The final participant characteristic measured is the Ideologies of the land use process actors. Two series of attitude questions are designed to identify individual

orientations about the use of land and government's role in that process.

Respondent attitudes about planning and the role of government in the process are probed in two Likert response series of questions which have already been identified as the variables L16, Q100V, and P100B (see questions 16 and 27 in the planners' questionnaire). The questions that make up these scale variations portray scenarios of planner and developer attitudes and motivations. Respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that these scenarios represent how the land use process operates.

The first series of ideology questions (L16 and Q100V) addresses perceptions about the motivations of land use participants, how land ought to be used and controlled, and perceptions of the economic, political, and developmental impacts on land use. (These variables are appropriate for use since they are not assuming the same characteristics their Pearson χ correlations to $\pm .6898$ significant at $\alpha .05$.) The second series (P100B) is more specific and asks whether certain approaches to the control and development of land ought to be used. The two sets of questions probe the respondents' attitudes about the appropriate role for government as well as the motivation of interest groups and how to concede or promote these interests through government action.

in the first series, four questions represent a liberal ideology towards planning actions. The variable L18 represents the cumulative score of each respondent to this series of questions. In a high score ("strongly agree" and "agree") represents a belief that the desirability of private gain is promote the public good, e.g., protecting the environment, development activities, preserving agricultural lands are acceptable land use approaches. Planners and citizens group respondents are expected to answer these questions affirmatively. This expectation is confirmed

In three out of the four liberal ideology questions the responses of citizens group members and government respondents are very similar and the majority agree with the question statements. The mean score on the scale of citizens group members is 12 (maximum scale score is 16). Business group members, on the other hand, disagree with these three questions. Their mean score on the scale is 3-4. The results of these questions demonstrate that there is an observable difference between groups in support of the liberal ideology responses. Again, individual respondents may not represent all members of the citizens interest group, but the results do suggest a picture of beliefs (Table 5-10).

There are several variations from the predicted response pattern, however, which deserve attention. The first unexpected response concerns a statement about protecting the environment at the risk of slowing economic development.

Table 5-18 Liberal Ideology--Percentage Strongly Agree and Agree

Question	All	Business	Citizen	Govt.
18-3	91%	79	100	99
18-6	79	18	81	84
18-8	28	8	89	28
18-9	48	19	71	78

Resp. response scores on constructed scale 018 (Alpha=.9788)

Citizen group respondents 12.82 *

Business group respondents 1.49 *

Government respondents 28.9 *

* significant < .0001

Table 5-21 Conservative Ideology--Percentage Strongly Agree and Agree

Question	All	Business	Citizen	Govt.
18-3	87%	79	93	93
18-4	58	93	38	50
18-5	82	88	38	88

Resp. response scores on constructed scale 0082 (Alpha=.7482)

Citizen group respondents 8.26 *

Business group respondents 9.83 *

Government respondents 2.47 *

* significant < .0001

Citizen group respondents and government respondents strongly supported the scenario (expected) as did business groups (unexpected). We might explain the business response by suggesting that it is easier for business respondents to agree with this concept on the abstract than if agreement meant a direct loss to them.

The second deviation from expected responses is between government and citizen group respondents. They significantly disagreed on the question of the intentions of developers. Citizen group members were more likely to agree that developers were not concerned about the public good (expected) while government respondents disagreed strongly with that evaluation (unexpected). Government respondents agreed with three of the four liberal scale questions. Their mean scale score is 18.8. The question they disagreed with is one which directly attacks developers' credibility. This is another indication that government respondents may take a significant alternative position on land use issues, a position that deviates on the weak scale.

In the second set of measures, three questions represent a scale of conservative ideology on planning issues. The variable COMCV is constructed and measured in the same way as CTR. Higher scores on COMCV reflect a positive, supportive attitude (measured by agreement) toward the role of developers in the land use process. The findings suggest that in their interviews developers are

responding to legitimate societal demands, that they have a legitimate complaint against some increasing regulations on development activity, and that planners' environmental concerns sometimes conflict with other legitimate objectives that should take priority. These questions suggest that developer interests should not be ignored and that their interests are a legitimate response to public demand. Business groups are expected to "agree" or "strongly agree" with these conservative ideology questions.

The results of this series of questions is not as clear cut as those constituting the liberal ideology (Table 3-11). First, as expected the business group members strongly agreed with all these assertions. Their mean score on this scale is 3.6 out of a possible score of 12. For the next part, as expected, the citizens group members issued toward disagreement, though the results are not as discrepant as they were on the liberal series. Their mean score on the CONSER scale is 4.26.

Government respondents, however, did not follow the citizens response. Instead they issued toward agreement with the assertions that represent the direct actions or interests of developers. Their mean score is 7.87, again placing them in the middle of the two interest groups. Overall, then, government consistently agreed with questions that are more abstract about positions where the winners and losers are nebulous. Planners and administrators are in a position

where they must be able to communicate with groups which take different viewpoints. They may agree with the liberal ideology in principle, but are forced by the reality of politics to defend or support those who abide by the conservative ideology.

The ideology scale score results represent the possibility of another position besides a growth or anti-growth position. The government responses along with the tentative coalition group responses on conservative ideology questions suggests the potential for a third position. These results help to cross the previous contention that Robinson (1976) makes and contribute to our proposition that a separate government position exists.

Tates (1977) suggests that government has difficulty directing policy responses and instead is forced to react in a piecemeal fashion. An alternative position for government in the land use policy arena may be to find a means of stability by pursuing a growth management course of policies, and assuming a more directive role. These policies do not necessarily have support for or opposition to development, but will allow government to provide some parameters for land use in a more obvious sense while leaving a realistic way out when implementing the policies. This course, representing a progressive ideology, would be consistent with government responses to the liberal and conservative ideology questions.

The third set of ideology related questions addresses ideologies as strategies. We expect government to support policies that use available land efficiently, e.g., maintain densities. This policy course will permit development but in an environment controlled by government. A growth management course also promotes a progressive ideology that uses management incentives. We also would expect neighborhood and environmentalist groups to support a progressive ideology.

This final series of ideology questions represents the compromise orientation. These policies do not limit growth, only direct its location. These are growth management strategies that either those who want to control or promote growth may support. Government as a divider can use these policies to get politicians on growth--a progressive ideology, or to find a compromise position that satisfies the liberal ideology and the conservative reality.³

The variable PBOB is a scale made up of three policy approaches to growth management (Table 8-12). The mean scale scores reveal a slightly different pattern of interest group member responses from the other two ideology scales. As expected, planners support all four policy alternatives. They have the most supportive mean score of the three response groups. Citizens group members agree with three of the four questions while business group respondents strongly disagree with three of four. The citizens group respondents had a mean scale score that is .15 different from government scores. The

Table 5-12 Comprehensive Ideology—Percentage Strongly Agree and Agree

Question 17	All	Business	Citizen	Govt.
Limit Prilege Gov...	84%	51	79	86
Willingly Placement	54	5	34	71
Infidel	51	25	51	77

Note: Responses scored on oriented scale PROCB (Kliphan, 7418)

Citizen group respondents 5.14 *

Business group respondents 5.24 *

Government respondents 5.24 *

* significant $p < .0005$

Note: scores on this scale reflect the following scoring code—strongly agree = 2, strongly disagree = 5,

business members' area scale score is the least supportive, a full 3 points from citizen group respondents.² The progressive position may represent an alternative position to the growth anti-growth continuum.

Stages of Growth Politics

A contribution to this discussion on the nature of regional variations in the policy process is that there is no single process but a number of stages to the process that evolve over time. We have already suggested that there are various stages of growth politics--conservative, liberal and progressive. Schmitter (1981b) suggests that a city goes through various stages of policy interests which reflect the demands of a changing population. The process goes through transitions which are modeled after Hallinan's (1971) conceptions of community change and government roles which are univocal, univocal, growth, and arbitral. The explanation of these city stages along with an examination of regional differences may help to exemplify the stages of growth politics already defined.

Transitions of city stages can account for the changing nature of interest group demands. The five transition stages are identified as 1) city as caretaker to growth/private city, 2) unity crisis and the poor who challenge growth, 3) city as arbiter of conflicts, and either the final stage as 4) bureaucracy/policy city or 5) return to the private development city. By combining the interest group demands as

the motivation for the process with the economic underpinnings of the quest for political power. Schmitter's hypothesis facilitates the use of political economy in analyzing the policy process.

The regional variations captured in the data between respondent groups may suggest that the intensity of support for laissez or positions taken may be linked to past experiences. The rapid rate of growth in the southern half of the state is now replaced with high population levels and the emerging and enduring problems associated with that growth pattern. This experience may increase citizen opposition to growth and allow government to be more aggressive in pursuing regulatory policies. The central and northeast regions are experiencing those changes now. The responses of participants in these areas may reflect expectations of greater government regulation and less need for citizen opposition or not enough exposure to the dark side of growth. The panhandle region, however, is currently experiencing high growth rates, but retains a low overall population. They retain a conservative approach and probably do not see themselves in the same situation as the southern half of the state. Indeed, they may never experience a population explosion, but the dysfunctions of growth could affect them and require closer government attention.

The greater opposition to growth and more liberal educated citizen groups may deteriorate in other parts of

the state as these regions begin to experience the symptoms of rapid growth, the less conservative nature of the business community in the southeast and central regions, however, may suggest that they are poised for government intervention in the land use process. The combination of the south Florida experience and the aggressive state policy towards planning may reduce the conflicts before they ever materialize.

Regional Differences

State policies and growth patterns have some similar characteristics that suggest regional differences in Florida growth policies. The northern half of the state is characterized as holding very conservative political attitudes and operating within a traditional southern political style. It has extensive rural and agricultural areas and many areas have not experienced the rapid growth demands in the southern half of the state. The southeast and southwest areas of the state are more metropolitan in character and perhaps more progressive in their political style. Rapid growth and denser populations are more common than in northern states. The central area is a combination of fast growth in major urban areas (Orlando and Miami) elsewhere.

The location of the state's population has been "filling up" the state. The southeast and southwest were the first to experience rapid growth and the problems associated

with their phenomenon. The settled and now the northwest area are the latest areas to experience the growth boom. Even the piedmont area is beginning to grow in selected cities. The expansion of population to other parts of the state represents the change in growth policies over time as population growth and size changes. An examination of some of the early trouble by Taylor may help us to understand the complexities of growth policies in this state.

Growth is an important issue statewide, but only in the southeast and northwest regions of the state do respondents significantly promise government to oppose growth. This may reflect some restrictive efforts to curb growth in these areas. Only in the southeast region do more than 10% of the respondents promise government to support growth unconditionally. This may be an indication that the southeast region is the least restrictive, most facilitative to land use in the state.

Regional variations suggest that the growth issue is important to both business and citizen group members in the southeast and northwest where growth is greatest. In these areas group members responded that their groups oppose growth and have less mixed support than do the other areas. The greatest citizen opposition response is in the southeast region (Table 5-12).

Other results confirm regional variations where they are expected, especially on the ideology questions (Table 5-13).

Table 3-12 Regional Variations

Group Position on Growth (GDP)

	All	SE	Region			
			F	C	SW	NE
Business	2.8	2.8	4.0	4.8	4.8	4.8
Citizen	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.4

Note: Strongly agree, Disagree, Indisagree, Strongly disagree

Liberal Ideology Scale

	All	SE	Region			
			F	C	SW	NE
Business	7.0	6.4	7.5	6.8	7.1	7.8
Citizen	13.0	13.5	18.3	24.8	23.4	22.4
Government	9.8	11.1	18.4	20.8	21.1	20.7

Note: Strongly agree, Disagree, Indisagree, Strongly disagree

Conservative Ideology Scale

	All	SE	Region			
			F	C	SW	NE
Business	9.5	8.8	10.1	9.2	8.8	9.1
Citizen	8.1	8.8	8.4	6.8	7.8	8.3
Government	7.8	8.5	8.9	7.8	7.3	7.3

Note: variables coded as Strongly agree, Disagree, Indisagree, Strongly disagree

Legend: Northeast, P-pennsylv, C-central, M-midwest, S-southwest

The areas with greater growth, the southern and central regions, have higher liberal scores by ethnic group respondents than do the northern regions. The business group and government respondents do not indicate clear patterns in each region, but maintain across regions their comparative position on that issue.

Business group members did not score as high as expected on the conservative questions in the northern regions where a conservative philosophy towards the role of government was high. High conservative scores were observed in the government (expected) but not in the business (unexpected). The scores in the central and southern regions were higher than the northwest, perhaps due to business compliance of a greater presence of government in land use practices in the southeast. Again the intergroup patterns of scores on these issues varied across all regions.

Conclusions

We begin this chapter trying to understand if there is an urban political economy as expressed by the relationships between interest groups and government. Michael (1978) suggests a bi-polar interest group politics where the relationship of government is hostile or growth or stabilizer of tensions between the two fundamental land based interest groups. The survey data presented in this chapter presents a possible alternative view of growth politics providing government with a more prominent, active role.

Benjamin (1985) suggests that government is a filter through which the interests in growth policies must pass. Perhaps this is the closest description of the patterns of results from this data. Government is not just leading one way or the other. The responses suggest a separate position. The mid-range ideology scores and the underlying responses to abstract and concrete questions provide evidence of this position; the perception of stability, community power and conflict also must be considered as an alternative pattern. Finally, the agreement with the scale of progressive planning activities is encouraging for this compromise position. Propositions 12, 13, and 14 suggest that such a position might stand as a compromise or alternative to the pro-growth anti-growth tensions.

The data provides the beginnings of a pattern of corroborations that there is a political economy agenda present in urban areas in Florida. The next chapter presents the results of the land use policy adoption analysis. Here we will attempt to link these various land based interests to the various characteristics provided by the independent variables, with groups of land use policies that have political interest overtones. The results may be supportive of a political economy explanation of land use policy adoption.

Notes

1. As with all the survey questions, multiple measures of concepts were included as well as careful placement of questions within the survey instrument. For instance, questions about perceptions of groups' position on growth are separated from the question on government's position on growth. Similarly, questions on labor conflict are separated from the question on stability of land use conflict. While the correlations between similar questions are not high, the results within groups generate similar results, thus reducing our concern over reliability of question equivalence and consequent validation. (Asher, 1986)

2. Administrators were not asked the progressive ideology version of questions. Subsequently, this variable is not part of the dependent variable analysis.

3. The Public and Social Science are coded opposite of the other two ideology scales. A lower score represents liberal opinion and a higher score represents conservative opinion. Their mean scores are government - 3.76, Civilian groups - 3.24, and Business groups - 3.18.

CHAPTER SIX

POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES

Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Building Environment

Communities have many options available to regulate the use of land within their jurisdictions. The individual policies may not be as important to the growth of a community as are the patterns or combinations of policy adoptions; the overall policy approach in a community sets the tone for degree of flexibility or restraint towards development. Policies are not adopted in isolation of policies already in use. Therefore, it is necessary to examine groups of policies and the community characteristics associated with that group in order to understand the implications of land use policy making. The land based activities in the community and government will influence the adoption and pattern of land use policies. This chapter describes the land use policies used in this research and the analysis of their adoption.

Land Use Policies--Dependent Variables

The land use policies used in this analysis are represented by the dependent variable POLICY. Eleven land use policies are combined based on a Urban schismogram of the survey data (McINTOSH and CHAMBERLAIN, 1960; Weisberg, 1964b).

scores reflect whether or not the policy was used or not used by the community based on the survey responses from each city's planner respondent. The responses from planners were recorded from a full range of values and use to a dichotomous response of use (1) or no-use (0) of each policy.³ The scale reflects a ranking of the virtues and cautions by the number of policies that they use. Communities with the highest score use the most number of policies (maximum 12) and the lowest scores reflect that few policies are used (Table 8-2). The policy use scale represents the willingness of a community to adopt policies that are outside the realm of being traditional and politically safe. Communities based on the traditional end of the scale reflect use of just a few, well-tested policies while the innovative end of the scale reflects greater reliance on policies, especially those that are more politically risky.

The first group of policies are traditional and are used most often by communities. These policies are capital improvement plans, conventional zoning, minimum lot size restrictions, planned unit developments, utility placement, and impact fees. These are the most accepted policies, established in the largest number of places, and represent those policies that generally are politically acceptable to the land use process. They also represent a predictable land

see regulation policies that is pessimistic towards development and understandable to the development actors.

The second group of policies represents the balance of policy use across the policies in this group are enterprise zones, land use performance standards, land banking, agricultural zones, and regulating the number of development permits; this set of the tools represents more innovative, politically risky policies that are more regulatory in nature. They are used to restrict growth and may be an indicator that is less predictable for developers and more restrictive towards growth. We would expect that where the growth machine (business) characterisation dominates, that the more traditional policies of group one would be used. Where the urban groups and less support for unconditional growth is found, there would be greater use of the innovative, restriction policies of group two.

A second binary categorisation was constructed based on the value ratings that planners gave to the policies, from high to low. A higher score means that the policy was perceived to be of greater value in achieving the community's land use goals. Again the planners' responses were recorded from a range of values to a dichotomous response. Responses that the policy was "integral" or "necessary" imply that they are valued (1) and responses of "no effect," "impediment," and "not used" imply that the policy is not positively valued (0). The resulting scale is the same pattern of policy

Table 4-1. Urban Scale Sources of Land Use Policies
Land Use Policies Used by Cities and Counties

Policy Communities	Proportion of	
	Using Policy	Valuing
Minimum Lot Size	.876	.838
Concentrated Zoning	.827	.828
Planned Unit Development	.983	.983
Capital Improvement Plan	.983	.983
Utility Placement	.788	.787
Impact Fees	.788	.788
Enterprise Zones	.884	.828
Land Use Performance Standards	.884	.837
Agricultural Zoning	.318	.343
Land Banking	.317	.368
Formal Insurance Limits	.375	.888
Coefficient of Reproducibility =	.818	.923

scope and order of policies, the results of the two systems were that the policies most frequently used were also the most valued and the policies that are used the least are the least valuable in obtaining land use goals according to the responses received from planners (Table 4-11).

Collaborative Data Analysis

We want to determine what if any relationship exists between the selection and use of land use policies and the independent variables of community participants and environment. Proposition one suggests that policies are dependent on actor characteristics and participation in the process. Propositions two and three suggest that policy adoption is dependent on ecological factors present in the community—we expect to find that both sets of independent variables will contribute to the selection of land use policies.

We chose to use discriminant analysis as the method to explore the independent--dependent variable relationships. Because of the known properties of the variables in the land use policies, traditional parametric measures were unavailable. In addition, several of the variables are dichotomous or nominal in character. Regression analysis would be unavailable for much of the data set.

Discriminant analysis is a method which allows independent variables to be arrayed along the dimensions of

the dependent variable values (Spector, 1980; Weisberg, 1985a). It is a method similar to linear regression that allows us to determine which independent variables are the best predictors of survey scores which will be assigned to each policy group. The interpretation of the data allows us to understand which independent variables have what strength relationship with each group of the dependent variable; we expect that the business oriented, pro-growth independent variables would predict the group one policies representing individualist, permissive land use. We expect that the citizen oriented, anti-growth independent variables would be associated with the group two policies representing the more restrictive and politically risky land use approach.

On this case, the dependent variable groups are 1) the most used policies and 2) the balance of the policies--The analysis provides an indication of the distance between the means of the two dependent variable groups. In addition it indicates the strength of the independent variables' ability to predict which of the individual cases (with their local community's policies assigned to them) belong to each dependent group. From the results of the discriminant analysis we can put together a picture of the type of community and political characteristics which are most strongly associated with each of various land use policies. Since we know from the analogies which policies are most often used and which are least often used, we know which

politics are most likely represented by the discrimination groups.

Again, the first dependent variable (POLACT) group represents scores of one to six, representing communities using only one to six of the available policies. The second group represents scores of seven to eleven, where the most policies are used. The data presented here reflects group one--the most used policies one through six--and group two--the remainder of the policies used.

City and County Policy Data

To test both the influence of actor participation and the community level ecological propositions, a series of independent variables are used in the discrimination analysis. First, survey dependent variables are used alone. Second, a combination of both sets of variables are used.

The first set of variables used included perceptions of group success in influencing the land use process, perceptions of group position toward growth, conflict levels on land use issues, ideologies, and community power.

Variables H94 and C194 are the cumulative nominations made by government respondents about business and citizens groups's success in influencing the land use process. Each public official was asked to nominate all the groups in their community that they felt had achieved the "greatest level of success in influencing the development of land use policies." It was a multiple response question. H94 and

CI901 represent the number of associations received by business groups and citizen groups respectively.

Variables W001 and C001 are the scores which reflect the perceptions of each respondent of the position of combination of business and community groups towards growth in their community. Each respondent was asked to provide their opinion of the position held by relevant groups in their community. The values range from support, mixed, neutral, to oppose. The higher the score, the greater the perception that the group supports growth. The variables W002 and C002 represent the combined scores of the relevant business and citizen groups respectively.

Other variables were C0007 and L001 the conservative and liberal ideology scores of each respondent. Responses range from a high of "strongly agree" to a low of "strongly disagree." The variables C0001 and R001 represent the combined scores of respondent perceptions of conflict on the issue conflict exists and specifically their perceptions of conflict on the issue of airport fees. Again the highest score represent "strongly agree" that conflict encompasses this issue in their community and low scores reflect "strongly disagree" that conflict encompasses the issues.

The second set of variables represent the growth, economic and government profiles of the community. For the city and county combined analysis, only the population variables were used which are 1981 population and the 1988

to 1975 growth rate. City and county respondents were each assigned city or county population figures and not both. For the city analysis a full range of variables was available and used. Variables included the city population and growth rate (GROW), percentage of land designated residential (RES), housing value (HVAL), per capita income (PCINC), proportion of the budget revenues coming from property taxes (PTPR), fees and fees (FEEFEE), and expenditure proportion going to capital outlays (CAPPR) a nominal level variable. dependent region of the state (REG) was also included designating the five coded regions--northwest, southwest, central, southcentral, and southeast. They are coded from lowest to highest representing the northern regions to the southern regions.

Two discriminant analysis were computed for both city and county cases. One used only survey participant variables, the other used sociological variables in the analysis. The first analysis reveals some significant differences from the combined second analysis. When using only survey variables, business group success and union conflict are positively associated to the long-run discriminant function--group 4 the most used, traditional policies (Table 4-1). The structure coefficients can be interpreted similarly to a Pearson r correlation. Union ideology, business group success, and business support of growth all are negatively correlated to the discriminant

Table 8-2 Discriminant Analysis
Variables // Structure Coefficients

AGE1	.83	AGE1	.58
CITEL	-.35	CITEL	-.48
AGE2	-.58	AGE2	-.818
CITEL2	-.23	CITEL2	-.35
COMP1	.68	COMP1	.844
AGE	-.594	AGE	-.516
COMP2	-.58	COMP2	-.25
LTA	-.48	LTA	-.548
POWER1	.44	POWER1	.54
POWER2	.587		
AGE	.54		
AGE2	.87		
Group Centroids		Group Centroids	
Group 1	.84	Group 1	.58
Group 2	-.54	Group 2	-.38
Canonical Correlation	.181	Canonical Correlation	.323
Number of cases	131	Number of cases	131

function of group 1, adding ecological variables slightly improves the canonical correlation of the function from .424 to .481 and reduces the coefficient strength of the survey variables.

One strong function was derived from the analysis on the land use variable POLICE for cities and counties using both participant and ecological variables to predict policy use scores. The coefficient of the variable business group success drops slightly and the variable conflict drops significantly to a point where it is contributing only slightly (positively) to the function. Liberal ideology, citizens group success, and citizens group support of growth coefficients across drop slightly but are still useful. Growth rate is positively correlated to the group one discriminant function almost as significantly as business group success. Adding the ecological variables also slightly improves the distance between the two dependent variable groups increasing our ability to distinguish between them.⁸

The contributions of the independent variables to the discriminant function of the dependent variable tend to confirm propositions one through the policy impact of participation of identifiable interests. The results suggest that the land use policy group which represents lower use areas is associated with greater scores of business success, higher growth rates, lower scores on liberalism

ideology, lower scores of citizen awareness, and less citizen support for growth.

These results suggest that the growth machine political pattern of business interests and less influence of traditional anti-growth interests is a good predictor of lower policy use scores. The growth machine has a relationship with the adoption and use of acceptance, traditional land use policies. This contributes to our expectation that pro-growth interests want to have a predictable policy environment.

The significant ecological variable, higher growth rates, also is associated with lower policy use scores. Higher growth rate communities are prevalent in the central and peripheral regions for cities and central and southeast for counties. It is difficult to interpret this variable in the multilevel analysis. We expect that high growth rates would yield high levels of conflict and there would be associated with more policies not laws. Traditional policies are predicted by business interests (expected) and high growth and conflict (unexpected).

THIS POLICY USE

Two multinomial analysis were performed, one using the ecological variables only and the second using both survey and ecological variables. The ecological variables used, representing growth, economic, and government indicators,

were much stronger predictors of the discrimination dependent variable groups than were the survey variables.

The ecological discrimination function derived from the analysis on the land use variable POLICY CONDITIONS propositioned two that the economic, growth, and government profiles are significantly related to the adoption of policies. The results suggest that the fewer the policies that are used by a community, the greater the importance of housing values and growth rates which both loaded positively on the function (table 4-3). Both per capita income and proportion of revenues derived from property taxes loaded negatively on the function. Higher housing values are used in this analysis as a reflection of economic potential for the business community. Higher house values represent high demand and growth. The highest housing prices are in the southern areas of the state where growth rates are leveling off but the population is large. High house prices reflect the interests of developers. If prices are high, they will press for a less restrictive growth climate. Growth may in fact increase the house value figure due to the demand in the market.

Reliance on property taxes is a citizen related interest variable and it is expected to load negatively with group one as it does. Property tax proportion of the budget is an attempt to measure the influence of citizen interests in the community. Peterson (1981) suggests that in cities

Table 8-3 Hierarchical Analysis—City Only

Variable // Structure Coefficients

CRSPR1	-.13	CRSPR1	.13
AGE	-.349	AGE	-.379
QWQW	.45	QWQW	.479
WYWA	1.75	WYWA	1.487
PCINC	-.409	PCINC	-.48
QWQPR	.129	QWQPR	.13
PTSPR	-.77	PTSPR	-.75
WYD	.179		
QWQ1	-.807		
WYD	.247		
QWQ2	-.509		
QWQ3	.399		
PL	.129		
QWQV	.13		
LSB	-.137		
Group centroids		Group centroids	
Group 1	1.35	Group 1	1.35
Group 2	-.25	Group 2	-.25
Canonical correlation	.97	Canonical correlation	.96
Number of cases	106	Number of cases	106

where homeowners are indifferent, property taxes will be kept low in form of a greater reliance on user fees.

The second analysis is as statistically strong as the ecological variable function and both are stronger than the combined city and county analysis functions, but the survey variables for the city only analysis are weaker than in the combined analysis. In the city only function the ecological variables lead almost exactly the same as in the first function.

The participant variables as predictors of policy scores support only those very weak coefficients. Again, business group support has some ability to predict the low policy use scores group, but very weakly. Conflicts on the issue of impact fees also leads very weakly. Likened ideology leads negatively, as expected, but again very weakly.

The city only analysis is overshadowed by the powerful ecological variables which dominate the prediction of lower land use policy use scores. Ecological variables have the ability to determine cities especially on the basis of size. This lends support to the second and third propositions that suggest that remaining residents will reflect the political characteristics. There are significant differences between voter indifference and prohibitions. Considering that, we would expect that ecological indicators would be important

contributions to understanding the differences in the use of land use policies.

We should consider too that in the order of the urban nodes, cities had higher policy use scores than the equities, but there are cities at the low end of the scale. This also in the data may reflect why survey predictions are so weak: There is less to predict than in the combined analysis.

Another important positively correlated variable on the city only function is the region of the respondents. The region coefficient loaded positively, ahead of growth rate on this function. This adds to our contention that there are political differences around the state and that different stages of growth may be identified in these regions. Highest city growth rates are in the central and panhandle regions followed by the southeast.

Again, however, the positive correlation of growth rate is troublesome. The southeast and the panhandle regions have some similar attributes such as growth rate. But the two are very different in terms of their ideologies and politics. The two may have similar conditions but be experiencing different stages of growth. The growth rate variable may be less indicative of policy and more of conflict present. As it is related to the traditional policies, we may find that these policies are found in mature growth communities which have rejected the private city and its new growth.

communities which are beginning to reflect growth machine policies.

Discussion

The data results are indications that participant incidence is related to the adoption of land use policies. It is difficult to measure and statistically prove influence and causality power, but the results do contribute to our contention that policy is related to an community agenda framed by interests of urban political economy. We have presented data which suggests relationships between a political ideology and evaluation of policy and the participation of political actors in the process. This is more than just a pattern of influence, it is an interrelationship. The separate position taken by government on the ideology and conflict questions suggests more than a mere-sum game.

The environment variables contribute to the silence of participation by certain groups. While this lends support to the theories of economic determinism, they also reveal a pattern that follows the political participant data pattern. The importance of regional differences should not be overlooked. This suggests that there are stages to growth that have ecological and political characteristics. Government can intervene in the economic trends.

Use by Region

We examine the use of these land use policies by region in add to the plots of different stages of growth policies; An examination of the use of policies by region for cities and counties suggests that there is less variation within group one and more variation by region within group two (Table 4-6). The more risky land use policies do not seem to be as acceptable throughout all regions of the state. This is as expected if we are to believe that the regions reflect the different stages of growth experiences.

For cities and counties, the Piedmont region seems to exhibit lower mean use scores than the other regions in both group one and two. Consistent in this region may not only be government intervention in land use in the communities in the other regions. In this region local governments may be the most flexible and supportive of growth simply because they have not experienced extensive growth and do not expect to experience it in the near future. Other regions with greater experience with rapid growth may require a different explanation for low use scores (Table 4-6).

There is little variation of scores between regions in the city subset. The generally lower scores in the Piedmont region aside, the Southeast region exhibits slightly lower scores on some policies especially on anticipation scores. Land

Table 4-4 Policy Use by Region
City and County Subarea

Cities by Region

Overlaid/overlaid

Policy Group 1

	SE	F	C	SW	NE
SEWER	5.00	4.00	4.00	4.10	4.10
NEW LOT SEWER	4.00	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00
CIP	4.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	4.00
FED	5.00	5.00	4.00	4.00	3.00
UTILITY FLOW	4.00	5.00	4.00	4.00	3.00
IMPACT FEE	4.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	3.00

Overlaid/overlaid

Policy Group 2

ENTERIC BORE	4.00	5.00	3.75	3.00	3.00
CIP	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
AD BORE	4.00	5.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
ABSOLUTE PERMIT	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
LAND BARE	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00

Cities by Region

Overlaid/overlaid

Policy Group 1

	SE	F	C	SW	NE
SEWER	4.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	5.00
NEW LOT SEWER	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
FED	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
CIP	5.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
UTILITY FLOW	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	4.00
IMPACT FEE	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.0	4.00

Overlaid/overlaid

Policy Group 1

ENTERIC BORE	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
CIP	1.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	3.00
AD BORE	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
ABS PERMIT	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
LAND BARE	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00

Note: none code 1-not used 0-integrated

Legend: Overlaid/overlaid Regional/Overlaid/Overlaid
SE-overlaid

Table 3-3 Population Growth Rate by Region 1980-85

	City	County	County-
State mean	9.83	14.54	12.84
Region B	1.3	16.44	18.37
Region DE	9.18	16.80	16.24
Region SE	7.14	17.41	12.71
Region C	12.34	19.94	14.8
Region F	17.2	17.61	12.08

Legend: SE-southeast F-piedmont DE-central DE-southwest
 DE-southwest

use performance standards, utility placement, and impact fees. This may be due to a long-standing tradition of political support and encouragement of growth by governments in this region. Governments in this region may be more selective in the policies they are willing to use, choosing those that are more politically acceptable (uzediniashvi). The southeast region is also highly dependent on county activities in land use. For instance, Howard County has review and approval authority for local comprehensive plans. Anne-Arundel county has authority to oversee land use activities in cities. Anne is the county subject reflect a strong presence of government in the southeast region, helping to explain the lower than expected scores for that region in the city subject.

The other region scores in the county subject reflect the same pattern as the city subject. There is little variation in use scores between regions except as noted in

the ranklands generally the Southeast and Southwest regions are slightly higher in scores than the Central and Northwest, perhaps reflecting more experience with coping with growth.

The Northwest region has higher than expected scores in both the city and county subests. The Northwest traditionally has been a politically conservative area where we would expect low government presence and intervention in land use. The high use scores may reflect a preventative approach to potential growth problems. For instance, while growth is steady and predictable in Jacksonvill, at least having those policies on the books and at government's disposal may be a ready solution to dysfunctions of growth that get out of control.

Caution must be used in interpreting these policy value scores because they reflect the planners' perceived value of those policies, and do not necessarily reflect the intensity of use in the community. It may be misleading to suggest that a higher use score based on the full range of values is indicative of greater government intervention effort. The score represents value, perhaps potentially and not necessarily the reliance on those policies. Higher use use scores as presented in these city and county subests are not as reliable as the use/use-use scores in the former scales.

conclusion

This research has attempted to discover why land use policies differ from community to community. We have offered a framework identifying the differences in policy and the variables contributing to the adoptions of these policies. The result is that we have made a contribution to the understanding of urban political economy as an explanation for urban policy making in a developed policy area.

The identification of the business and community interest groups represents a characterization of the urban land use conflict. The planning process is the distribution of resources according to the dimensions of interest group politics in the community. We identified differences in position on the growth issue, perception of stability and conflict, ideology on the role of government, and influence. These variables shape the land use policy game and the conflict that is inherent.

One of the steps needed to identify positive urban theory is to "identify the determinants of variations in urban policies" (Fried, 1978). The degree of urban influence and the role of government in the land use process are the key factors affecting adoption of land use policies and distinguish growth policies from other local policies. The significant differences between the business and citizen group interests verify the growth machine scenario as an explanation of why land use policies are adopted.

We contend that the role of government is key in the variation in land use policy adoption. Not all cities will react in the exact same manner to growth. Government can take conservative, liberal, or proposition roles. The role of government is affected by the conflict or tension level in the community manifested through interest group influence and participation. The more demands placed on government, the greater the tension with which government must contend. Government's approach to these tensions results in policy.

The participation, ideology, and role of government variables establish the framework which shapes government action and policy outputs. In chapter one we set out four propositions. Only three have been significantly addressed so far. The fourth set of propositions (4a, 4b, 4c) suggest that the degree of consensus or conflict in the community will have a direct bearing on the policy development and adoption. This is a community level proposition that is not easily addressed by the data. Figure 3-3, however, portrays the expected outcomes of these propositions. Figure 3-4 portrays the outcomes in terms of policy adoption. Proposition 4a is represented by the consensus cell where tension is low, decision making is long term, and fewer policies are adopted. This cell, represents government as facilitator and would include cities scoring low on the policy use scale suggesting conservative growth policies. Proposition 4b is represented by the conflict cell. Says

Conflict

Time Press

	LOW TIME	HIGH TIME
LOW TENSION	Consensus -conservative growth policies -few policies, flexible	Compromise -progressive growth policies -fewer policies, flexible
High Tension	Cooperation -populist growth policies -many policies, regulatory	Conflict -liberal growth policies -many policies, regulatory

Land Use Policy Process Outcomes
Figure 4-1

tenacity is high and the time frame is short and stable policies are adopted. Cities represented in this cell have government in the role mediator and portray liberal growth policies. Proposition 13 is the compromise cell where tenacity may run high or low and the time frame may vary as well. The distinguishing characteristic here is the dominance of government as a power in the community and the ability of government to assume a manager/director role. In the situations where compromise exists with high tenacity, the number of policies would be high--a regulatory, populist environment. In the cell where compromise exists with low tenacity, the number of policies would be fewer--a more flexible, progressive environment.

The larger context of community power provides an additional dimension to predict policy responses. The different perceptions of community power structure by the different respondent groups signals the difficulty in establishing the power structure of a community. But we suggest that the pattern of policy adoption and the character of those policies has a relationship to the type of political climate and influence structure that exists, including perceptions of community power. Business perceives greater stability and less conflict as well as a pluralistic or government dominated process. That represents a space somewhere between consensus and incremental compromise. Citizen groups perceive greater conflict and less stability

as well as a placidistic or business dominated process. They may be placed between conflict and rational compromise. Government actors perceive a suitable/suitable conflict/oa conflict process dominated by placidism that represent either of the two compromise positions.

The net result of this speculation and oval placement is that government has many roles to play depending on the array of interest group influences and positions. Government is more than a reactor, however, because it can have its own interest to serve as well. The unique ideological position of government suggests the independent role is one of autonomy. This goes together with the intent of policies to promote, control, or manage growth. Gover policies promote growth, some policies control or manage growth. These are components that we can measure empirically and linkages that we can make theoretically.

Urban Political Economy

Another step in positive theory development is to "formulate the logical (deductive) basis for the empirical relations identified or which might be identified" (Fried, 1979). The political economy of place is Roitach's (1976) explanation for growth machine policies. He identified the interrelationships between economic and political actors in the three roles of the land use game. Those roles are that government promotes affect political influence, economic affects political influence, and economic and political

influence affect policy outputs. The parameters of the state comprehensive planning organizations affect the local political arena by enabling various policy responses. The economic interests that are tied to the land, both in the form of developers and residents, participate in the policy process through the political influence that they can wield. Government also acts as a potent political force. Policy is then dependent on the role government takes or is compromised into taking by political forces.

The political economy approach must recognize the interests and influences of interest groups and government to make sense. The political economy of place defines the policy incentives from which local policies emerge. The role of government may be a changing one in which it acts to mediate the tensions between groups. Lindblom (1977) refers to the privileged position and the role of pluralism in policy making. Government, however, is the agent which sets the parameters on that scene. It can be a wide parameter such as a facilitator role or a narrow parameter such as a managed state. But the political economy of urban places does exist in the political policy making process and land use policy is a useful example.

First of Seven Policies

The final step in developing a positive urban theory is to "identify and analyze those determinants and consequences of policy diversity which are subject to stabilization.

and/or deliberate change." There is evidence that suggests that growth politics is not zero-sum nor is it a few disconnected political agenda. There are points on a policy continuum that support an evolving approach to growth. Developmental growth politics is not as simple as pro-growth versus urban growth and anti-growth versus no growth. The regional experiences in this state suggest that local government in Florida may be altering its policy agenda as a preliminary strategy is now used to prepare for the dysfunction of growth at least in terms of land use policy. Again, it is the crucial role of government interacting with the political influence in the community, the political economy relationship, which establishes the policy environment for growth.

Behrman (1985) suggests the stages of growth politics to be growth city facilitator, watchdog mediator, government as manager or, last to facilitator and/or back to police city. These stages may reflect the level of conflict and the policy approach taken by the community to the growth issue. The data presented contributes to the idea that there are patterns of behavior that represent stages of growth politics.

The Florida experience with growth is a complex political dynamic. The community by community work on the land use policy use model suggests that Florida communities are experiencing these growth stages. The area number of

policies used by region (as ranked on the future policy use scale) are as follows:

Southwest	3.48	Pennsylv	4.48
Central	3.15	West	4.17
	Southeast	3.12	

The pennsylv confirms our expectation that a conservative growth policies with few policies is occurring. This confirms to the ideology question results in that region. Likewise the southeast is using few although many more than the pennsylv policies and is experimenting a conservative growth policies with few policies. This result appears contradictory in light of the other data, but represents a good example of same conditions at different stages of growth. Large population and high growth rate should yield conflict and greater policy diversity. The southeast, despite these trends, uses few policies and a fairly flexible approach to land use. Apparently the growth machine politics controls conditions there without government intervention. They seem to exhibit the characteristics of stage four—growth and back to the private city. The pennsylv exhibits qualities of the initial stages of growth in a stabilizer city.

The other three regions seem to conform to the normal transitions of growth. The southwest especially seems to have taken a progressive approach in using many policies, exhibiting a regulatory approach as a response to high population and growth rates. The central and southeast

regions follow accordingly as they are beginning to experience massive growth. We would expect their policy can move to improve in the future.

Wrap up--Have We Made Any Progress?

In the past the dominant theory concerning city growth was economic determinism. Economists contend that growth policies was forced in contrast with the structural economic growth in an urban area and that it cannot be stopped because of the laws of economics are at work. Economists might also presume that as the economy grows stronger, business legislators will dominate the city government that is only a reactor to forces it cannot hold back.

This is an oversimplification of growth policies in urban places. There is some evidence that communities experience various stages of growth and that the role of government is important in how the political and economic interactions will occur. For example, the city of Ft. Lauderdale had no trouble saying no to a multi-million dollar tourist industry--spring-breaker for college students. Many small beach hotels have gone bankrupt, beach businesses are failing. The city has rebuffed and run the college crowd out of town, instead focusing on the yuppie upscale family market. The city and county, however, have had economic difficulties saying no to developers. A strong group of big developers have blocked restrictive land development measures that nearby counties and states have instituted.

When Moscow courts finally took a stand to restrict growth where services were lacking, the losses were already out of the barn. Nevertheless in this sector area are not deterred by such regulatory behavior. The compensation plan and zoning already favor more development and the developers know it.

Another southeast region example of the inability of economic decentralization to stop government facilitation of growth is in Perm Krai county. The city of Perm Krai County negotiated with a developer to completely overhaul their downtown area. The developers' plans conflict with a proposed east-west expressway route which has been at least two years in the making. The highway will ease overcrowded roads and provide a vital economic transportation link within the county. The expressway authority balked when county officials hesitated on the proposal and suggested it be shelved. Only when confronted with criticism as an official body did the expressway authority drop the idea of the east-west route. This area has a high score on the business policy use scale. That pattern may be characterized as reluctant.

Even the most innovative and regulatory of cities may not be able to say no to developers. Urban states reflect the changing government attitudes as power and influence shift and the policy consequences. St. Petersburg is in the highly regulatory business regime. Their use score is moderately high, but their position defines a progressive in

conservative approach--They say to experimenting the limit to the private city stage after restricting growth for some time. The dominant center urban political coalition has been ousted from the city council. A new group of younger business oriented politicians have been elected. Their agenda is to redevelop the downtown, stimulate the economy, and facilitate growth. There appears to be a great deal of conflict in the city over the future course of action. This city may be a case where strong land use controls cannot head off more development in the downtown area. Downtown development is a land use area which may need to be researched separately from the overall land use policies in the community.

Cities around the country are experiencing growth problems and trying to remedy them by traditional interest group competition methods. The political question should not be what should we do about growth--should we allow it or not. The appropriate political question should be what are the interests in this community and how can government reflect those interests? Does growth fill like those interests are or is the future? Can we be flexible enough to adapt to the changes brought by economic or personal. Interested perhaps the results of this research will help to direct these policy questions by shedding some light on the complex land use process that are framed by the agenda of urban political economy.

Notes

1. The land use policy data was gathered from city and county planner survey responses. Policies were designated by planners as not used in the community or used according to the values they are perceived to have in attaining the community's land use goals.

2. The variable RER--percentage of land use for residential purposes in the community--was dropped from the analysis because not all cities and counties had this information available. A significant number of cases were eliminated from the analysis when using this variable. It loaded slightly negatively on the discriminant function whose group assignment used policies--see the strongest. This is consistent with the final results that citizens interest variables load negatively with group one policies.

APPENDIX A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Earning Variables

earn1

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
1	28	48%
2	24	40
3	11	18
number	63	100

earn2

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
1	31	100
2	10	32
number	41	100

Note: Value is the cumulative score of each government independent's classification of business groups - chambers, developers, influential individuals or citizen groups - neighborhood and environmental organizations - as their having the greatest degree of success in influencing the land use policy process. Score of 1 earn1 = all three business groups were considered as successful by that respondent. A score of 1 earn2 = both citizen groups were considered.

earn3

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
0	1	.7%
1	1	.7
2	1	.7
3	1	1.0
4	3	3.0
5	5	5.0
6	10	10.0
7	18	17.3
Missing	2	
number	48	100

C1982

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
2	10	20.4%
3	13	27.1%
4	20	41.3%
5	3	6.2%
6	10	20.8%
7	1	2.1%
8	1	2.1%
Missing	0	
Total	78	100

Note: Value is the cumulative score of each respondent's perception of the nation's overall growth taken by combinations of business and citizen groups in their communities. Higher scores reflect support or mixed positions, while lower scores reflect demand for opposing positions.

C1983

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
1	1	2.1%
4	7	14.3%
5	4	8.2%
6	6	12.5%
7	6	12.5%
8	10	20.8%
9	10	20.8%
10	10	20.8%
11	20	41.3%
12	10	20.8%
13	10	20.8%
14	10	20.8%
15	5	10.4%
16	1	2.1%
Missing	0	
Total	78	100

C1984

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
1	7	14.3%
2	20	41.3%
3	20	41.3%
4	10	20.8%
Missing	1	
Total	78	100

Note: Value of COSPL is the cumulative score of perceived conflict on a scale of four issues related to land use - environmental protection, urban sprawl, green space preservation, and agricultural land preservation. The higher the score the greater the conflict perceived in the community. 700 represents the perceived conflict on one specified issue - forest loss. Higher scores represent more conflict.

00000

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
1	1	1.0%
2	2	2.0%
3	11	11.1%
4	20	20.0%
5	20	20.0%
6	20	20.0%
7	20	20.0%
8	20	20.0%
9	20	20.0%
10	10	10.0%
11	4	4.0%
12	1	1.0%
Missing	1	1.0%
Number	100	100

110

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
1	1	1.0%
2	1	1.0%
3	5	5.0%
4	11	11.0%
5	20	20.0%
6	20	20.0%
7	20	20.0%
8	20	20.0%
9	20	20.0%
10	20	20.0%
11	20	20.0%
12	20	20.0%
13	10	10.0%
14	10	10.0%
15	1	1.0%
16	1	1.0%
Missing	1	1.0%
Number	100	100

Note: These two variables represent the cumulative scores of each respondent on a scale of four questions representing a liberal approach to land use and a scale of three questions representing a conservative approach to land use. A high liberal score reflects an agreement with a regulatory, heightened role for government in affecting land use, while

a high conservative score reflects an agreement with a flexible, minimal role for government and a reliance on market forces to effect land use.

FORES

Value	Frequency	Valid Percent
Public Sector	47	33.8%
Business Sector	29	19.8
Mixed Groups	70	50.4
Missing	54	
Total	200	100

Note: Community power is a nominal variable. Each respondent selected the representation of decision making power that best reflected their community - either many groups, businesses, or elected / administrative government officials

Ecological Variables

POP2 City or county population 1981 estimates from the University of Florida Bureau of Business and Economic Research.

GROW City or county population growth rate 1960 to 1980.

TRNS City level - percentage of land used for residential purposes. Census of Governments 1980

URBL City level - 1981 median value of total unimproved building units. City - County Data Book 1983.

PCINC City level - 1981 per capita personal income. City - County Data Book 1983.

UNEXP **PRPS** City level - Fiscal year 1983-84 proportion of city government revenues derived from user fees and property taxes. Florida Local Governments Financial Report 1983-84.

CHRS City level - Fiscal year 1983-84 proportion of city government expenditures in category non-current capital outlay. Florida Local Governments Financial Report 1983-84.

APPENDIX B

AVAILABLE OPERATIONALIZED VARIABLES

Proposition 1A

The greater the presence in a city of conditions generating growth machine participation, the stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that zoned land use guidance will be flexible and accommodating to growth and development.

1. growth machine Appropriate Data

Economic Investment

- Increasing dollar level of business activity in city over time (Malachuk, 1978) Retail and wholesale sales and volume, amount and percentage change over time.
- Business climate and attractiveness (Malachuk, 1978; Toques, 1978b; Malachuk and Toques, 1984) Bond rating, business rating (Alexander and Grant, 1981)

Government

- low business taxes, development tax breaks (Malachuk, 1983) Property taxes, tangible property tax; enterprise zones, tax increment financing districts.
- government expenditures on developmental policies

(Peterson, 1978,1983) needs, infrastructure, bonded debt for capital projects

-public financing of increased utility and government costs (Molotch,1974; Peterson,1981) more free access property taxes

-local government expenditures on economic development activities (Judd,1984; Judd et al.,1985) downtown development, economic development councils

-less city government fewer employees,less expenditures (Mollenkopf,1983) number of employees/population, expenditures per capita

-reform government (Mollenkopf,1983) form of government

History

-presence of developers, planners, middle class (H) (Mollenkopf, 1981)

- support system (Hiken and Alford,1979), downtown association (Mollenkopf,1981)

Surrounding Molotch,1984, Putnam and Salidarsky,1983; Toland, 1975)

- change in population number

-change in incorporated and unincorporated population levels

Early 1980s

recognition of process and measurement of presence of groups in the policy process

2. adopted policies (Harris et al., 1977; Gucklenich, 1982; Goodman and Reed, 1984)

- goals in original comprehensive plan
- implementation tools in plan and ordinance

Survey Data

from planners- policies used, values to the land use goals

3. flexible and accommodating

flexible implementation tools - Glavin et al., 1975 ch. 9; Burrows, 1978; Green and Green, 1977; Dougherty et al., 1978; Smith, 1978;

high growth goals - survey and content analysis

5. policies - (Kleinovitch, Goodman)

- goals -- comprehensive plan policies
- implementation techniques -- plan policies, development regulations, ordinances

Propositions

The greater the presence in a city of conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation, the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coalition in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be adopted

1. anti-growth coalition Appropriate Data

Economic

- non-locally controlled employment base (Dolich, 1978)
- unemployment ratio (Dowell, 1980; Baum-Ackerman, 1981)

Actions

- economically advantaged population (Kerin et.al.,1987; Rich, 1989; Howell,1988; Kolchak, 1979)
 - middle class income levels
 - better educated, fewer minorities
- active neighborhood groups (Kolchak,1978; Kerin et.al.,1987)

Environment (Quality of life ratings)

- decrease in pollution, congestion, environmental problems (Kolchak,1978)
 - decrease in population growth rate (Friedson and Goldmann, 1981)

Government

- increase in funds from various taxes (Feinstein,1979; Kolchak, 1978)

Living Style

verify presence of anti-growth coalition and measure presence

1. Legislative, regulatory

implementation tools and comprehensive plan goals (same as 1a)

Klein,1978; Johnson,1980; Logan,1976a; Kolchak,1978; Williams, 1980; Thrall,1980; Smith,1979;

Proposition 1a

The greater the grassroots which the growth machine has in the community the more proactivity they have in participating

In the policy making process, and the more likely it is that land use policies will reflect existing needs.

1. Investment of growth resources

Suburban Growth

- proportion of commercial/business land to residentially used land; area, value
- local versus mobile wealth as proportion of economic base (Kulrich and Logan, 1984; Rosenbloom, 1988)

Development

- use property tax revenues
- growth in commercial space allocated in the comprehensive plan versus growth in residential space
- change in housing stock type, value (Howell, 1984; Mills, 1977; Sallendropf, 1981; Forcrist, 1984; Linschey, 1984)

2. market effects - how regulatory land use policy (Beushty et al., 1978; Sallendropf, 1983; Gleson et al., 1979)

Proposition 20

The greater the investment which the anti-growth forces have in the community the more probability they have to participate in the policy making process, and the more likely it is that government will curtail land use and adopt policies which

reinforce market forces and benefit existing community residents

1. Investment of land-growth position

Elements

- mobile versus land wealth
- classification of land amount available, change
- change in property value (investment value) residential
- tax rate, property value (capitalization)
- availability, attractiveness of neighboring locations
- (Gibson, 1994) comparison of property taxes and values

2. government regulation

- more regulatory land use policies (Dougherty et al., 1979; Denson et al., 1979)
- more government protection of existing land use (Mills, 1977; Davis et al., 1977)
- more government insurance to protect existing land use
- greenbelt (Thorsli, 1993; Gaudson and Freund, 1998)

Conclusion 3

The greater the availability of alternative regulatory power and property taxation, the less dependent local government is on local revenue contributions and the more autonomous local government is, allowing government to be a partner or director in the local growth process.

1. only on property tax

Experiments

- increase in property tax (Mills, 1977)
- per capita property tax (Hesseli, 1993)
- residential, non-residential property tax

- property tax as percent of total government revenues
- local property tax rate compared to rates in nearby areas

2. alternative revenue sources

General

- enterprise revenues (Japan, 1976)
- long term bond debt (Sweden, 1980)
- increase in revenues/increase in taxes.
- user fees (Peterson, 1979 - flood zoning)

Safety Data

Administrators' role in the development of land use policy

Proposition 4a - 4c

retinal, incremental process

continuous (daily), combini (placable), compression (extra directed)

single, many interests; short, long term

Formulations of these concepts will have to be done by survey instruments.

- more changes allowed in plan, more incremental (Nash, 1972, Davis et al., 1973)
- more difficult change process in policy, less reaction by incremental change (Nash, 1972)

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS AND LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION

LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT
POLICY AND POLITICS
- QUESTIONNAIRE -



A Study of Local Gov Policies and Plans
in Florida Cities and Counties

Sponsored by
Bureau of Public Institute of Government
Department of Political Science

CITY PLANNER

1962 STATE GOVERNMENT POLICE AND JUDICIAL

A-1

Has experience of growth as an (have never been able to city) in your opinion
has experience as (have never been able to city) in your opinion (have never been able to city)

1. If at the present time (have never been able to city)
2. If at the present time (have never been able to city)
3. If at the present time (have never been able to city)
4. If at the present time (have never been able to city)
5. If at the present time (have never been able to city)
6. If at the present time (have never been able to city)
7. If at the present time (have never been able to city)

B-1

Does indicate your perception of the relationship between the following
variables and growth as experienced by one of the (have never been able to city)

Does indicate your perception of the relationship between the following
variables and growth as experienced by one of the (have never been able to city)
Does indicate your perception of the relationship between the following
variables and growth as experienced by one of the (have never been able to city)
Does indicate your perception of the relationship between the following
variables and growth as experienced by one of the (have never been able to city)

	Relationship				
	strongly negative	negative	neutral	positive	strongly positive
Police Service	1	2	3	4	5
Fire Service	1	2	3	4	5
Public Services	1	2	3	4	5
Property Tax Increase	1	2	3	4	5
Local Housing Development Service	1	2	3	4	5
Construction of Commercial Services	1	2	3	4	5
Urban Services	1	2	3	4	5
Construction of Public Areas	1	2	3	4	5
Increasing Housing Costs	1	2	3	4	5
Cost for Construction	1	2	3	4	5

There are eight items to ask you about groups in your community and their involvement in local and national and global development.

Q-1

In your opinion, towards what direction is one of the following aspects of the community that you report on the future development of local and global in your area? (circle just one)

Strongly agree completely support towards growth

Agree, more completely support but no preference on growth

Disagree more completely support towards growth

Q-20 Strongly agree completely support growth and more options (2)

NO MORE, THANKS

	Involvement in Growth				
	Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Strongly	DK
1. Influential Individuals	1	2	3	4	5
2. Chamber of Commerce	1	2	3	4	5
3. Business/Nonprofits	1	2	3	4	5
4. Non-profits/charities	1	2	3	4	5
5. Neighborhood Groups	1	2	3	4	5
6. State Organizations	1	2	3	4	5
7. Minority Groups	1	2	3	4	5
8. OTHER (specify) _____	1	2	3	4	5

Q-11

Please list (any of) organizations provided, please select those groups about are active in the work of local and/or global development and growth.
Circle the numbers of all that apply

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Influential Individuals | 6. State Organizations |
| 2. Chamber of Commerce | 7. County Officials |
| 3. Business/Nonprofits | 8. City Officials |
| 4. Non-profits/charities | 9. Minority Groups |
| 5. Neighborhood Groups | 10. OTHER (specify) _____ |

Q-5

For each of the groups listed, to your judgment, what have been the greatest level of involvement in facilitating the development of local and global in your area?

Circle the numbers of all that apply

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Influential Individuals | 6. State Organizations |
| 2. Chamber of Commerce | 7. County Officials |
| 3. Business/Nonprofits | 8. City Officials |
| 4. Non-profits/charities | 9. Minority Groups |
| 5. Neighborhood Groups | 10. OTHER (specify) _____ |

2.2

In your judgment, to which of the groups listed has the city government most frequently responded favorably to its group's requests on land use policy questions? Just one policy question or issue?
(Circle the number of all that apply.)

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Influential Individuals | 6. State Representative |
| 2. Chamber of Commerce | 7. County Officials |
| 3. Builders/Developers | 8. City Officials |
| 4. Business/Industry | 9. Minority Groups |
| 5. Neighborhood Groups | 10. Other (specify) _____ |

2.3

Of those listed, which groups do their representatives most frequently contact your department to an official capacity to express the group's preference regarding city land use decisions?
(Circle the number of all that apply.)

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Influential Individuals | 6. State Representative |
| 2. Chamber of Commerce | 7. County Officials |
| 3. Builders/Developers | 8. City Officials |
| 4. Business/Industry | 9. Minority Groups |
| 5. Neighborhood Groups | 10. Other (specify) _____ |

2.4

Which groups do you or your department most frequently contact in order to learn about land use policy questions or obtain information about a project? (Circle the number of all that apply.)

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Influential Individuals | 6. State Representative |
| 2. Chamber of Commerce | 7. County Officials |
| 3. Builders/Developers | 8. City Officials |
| 4. Business/Industry | 9. Minority Groups |
| 5. Neighborhood Groups | 10. Other (specify) _____ |

2.5

For which two each of the groups listed have the most participants in the development of future land use policy in your city?
(Circle your answer.)

Participation in Land Use Policy Development

	Number of Participants		Number of Officials	
	1	2	3	4
1. Influential Individuals				
2. Chamber of Commerce				
3. Builders/Developers				
4. Business/Industry				
5. Neighborhood Groups				
6. State Representative				
7. County Officials				
8. City Officials				
9. Minority Groups				
10. Other (specify)				

5-10

How any portion of your future land use should be land
development? (circle how developed to most about 1970 (circle number))

- 1 100%
- 2 50%
- 3 less than

If you, do want the following to occur _____

5-11

Do you think you can locate the 1970-1975 land use plan city's
comprehensive plan has provided to be needed? _____

5-12

Do you think the land use pattern for maintaining your future land use
should plan? (circle growing slowly, city growth rapidly, urban housing)

5-13

What the position which best reflects your opinion of the
relationship between the goals of your city's future land use should be
growth or expansion to your city? (circle number)

- 1 slow growth, urban areas
- 2 slow growth, urban areas
- 3 slow growth and urban areas
- 4 slow growth, urban areas
- 5 slow growth, urban areas
- 6 no development
- 7 less than

5-14

What the position which best reflects your opinion of the overall
relationship between the land use development pattern which is required your
city's future land use should be growth or expansion to your city?
(circle number)

- 1 no growth, urban areas
- 2 no growth, urban areas
- 3 no growth, urban areas
- 4 no growth, urban areas
- 5 no growth, urban areas
- 6 no development
- 7 less than

Q.10

On any of the following statements about planning and development (please indicate your opinion - Circle your answer)

	strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree strongly	no opinion
1. Preserving green belts and water courses should be high priority before you try to speed land use/development in the country say for a town 1	1	2	3	4	5
2. Planning to preserve a particular landscape 2	1	2	3	4	5
3. Residents opposed to certain development plans are often getting people who live near 3	1	2	3	4	5
4. Residents have a right to be consulted against planning 4	1	2	3	4	5
5. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 5	1	2	3	4	5
6. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 6	1	2	3	4	5
7. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 7	1	2	3	4	5
8. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 8	1	2	3	4	5
9. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 9	1	2	3	4	5
10. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 10	1	2	3	4	5
11. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 11	1	2	3	4	5
12. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 12	1	2	3	4	5
13. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 13	1	2	3	4	5
14. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 14	1	2	3	4	5
15. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 15	1	2	3	4	5
16. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 16	1	2	3	4	5
17. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 17	1	2	3	4	5
18. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 18	1	2	3	4	5
19. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 19	1	2	3	4	5
20. Residents should have the right to be consulted before planning 20	1	2	3	4	5

11

B-17

Most of the following items can be used by local governments to implement their Policy Unit as shown. For each one please indicate your opinion. (circle your answer)

	STRONGLY AGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		BT
1. Obtain full-time employment for single family residential subdivisions in the urban fringe areas	1	2	3	4	5
2. Land management negotiations with State (urban residential and commercial development in the urban fringe)	1	2	3	4	5
3. Accelerate the expansion of low density (e.g. town and country) in the non development areas near the urban fringe	1	2	3	4	5
4. Develop joint central city policies that relate more to expansion in the unincorporated fringe areas	1	2	3	4	5

B-18

What changes have occurred since adoption of your Policy Unit are shown? In the case of "not used better in the following category" (circle answer)

	Change			
1 Increased/Not Single Family	DECREASED	DECREASED	DECREASED	BT
2 Increased/Not Single	DECREASED	DECREASED	DECREASED	BT
3 Increased/Decreased	DECREASED	DECREASED	DECREASED	BT
4 Agreed/Not	DECREASED	DECREASED	DECREASED	BT

Next, could you please provide us your perceptions of how we utilized in your community.

B-19

Are your responses that the adopted Policy Unit are shown have no other policy changes that have in transportation, urban, suburban, rural? In your city? (circle answer)

1. OTHER CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE AND SHOWN IN THE ABOVE LIST
2. OTHER CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE AND SHOWN IN THE ABOVE LIST
3. NO CHANGES
4. NOT KNOWN

Q-20

Has there (efficiency in your opinion) the single important capital requirement element to look at other public facilities (water, sewer or transportation, police, fire, schools) in your city? (circle number)

1. almost completely other public utility will be covered in the capital requirement element
2. somewhat covered - some public utility will be covered in the capital requirement element
3. not covered
4. don't know

Please indicate the level of conflict which accompanied the adoption of your city's policy (not yet adopted and the police/fire/transportation need in your city is important. 1-3=low/no conflict)

Q-21

Where last five years?

1. about 50% of total cost
2. less than 50%
3. all covered
4. don't know

Q-22

Last five Police/Fire/Transportation

1. about 50% of total cost
2. less than 50%
3. all covered
4. don't know

Q-23

Has the attention of any one participating local law enforcement/land development to a significant extent of conflict? (circle number)

1. yes
2. no
3. don't know

If yes, please specify which one: _____

Q-24

Please select the positive title and closely reflects your perception of the position is given last to you about city government. (circle number)

1. almost totally representative
2. somewhat reflects city government
3. neither, does not reflect or totally does
4. almost totally does not represent city government
5. almost totally unrepresentative
6. don't know

B-10

Please evaluate the level of conflict for the following issue areas as experienced by your city. (circle number)

	No/1-2 Level				
	NO/NO/NO	1	2	3	4
Unemployment Assistance and Equity	1	2	3	4	5
Business Assistance	1	2	3	4	5
Location of New or Major Investments	1	2	3	4	5
Location	1	2	3	4	5
Urban Space in the Metropolitan Area	1	2	3	4	5
Urban Space Preservation	1	2	3	4	5
Specialized Land Management in the Metropolitan Area	1	2	3	4	5
Urban Form or Image	1	2	3	4	5
Metropolitan Area Changes	1	2	3	4	5

B-11

Please summarize the degree of total city policies in your city as best as described on (circle number)

1. YES (CITY, OR METROPOLITAN OR POLICE DISTRICT AREA HAS POLICIES IN THIS AREA)
2. PARTIAL (CITY, OR METROPOLITAN AREA HAS POLICIES)
3. LIMITED OR LIMITED-TO SOME EXTENT (CITY HAS LIMITED POLICIES OR NO POLICIES IN THIS AREA)
4. LIMITED TO SOME-TO POLICE DISTRICTS AREA (CITY HAS LIMITED POLICIES)
5. YES (CITY)

9-27

In your judgment, which of the following describes the political process the greatest? Is your choice (circle number)

1. It is the elected officials who determine the political action process, and citizens merely react to the process (1).
2. Citizens have the greatest influence in determining political action, and officials are only political, reacting to what citizens is determined the policy direction.
3. The individual, interest groups, government organizations, and citizens all play a role in determining the political action, and the government organizations determine the political action process.
4. Government organizations are determined by what citizens think is right, and in turn, laws, policies, and programs are created, and then the elected officials react to the laws and policies.

9-28

Are any professional groups are in your city's planning department?

9-29

Are there any religious, labor, neighborhood, social organizations, or voluntary business groups in your city that are well organized and work to the development of land use political? Please list the names and if possible a contact person.

Thank you for your participation.

There is much like to ask you about groups in your community and their involvement in local development and policy development.

4.1

In your opinion, describe their position in each of the following aspects of the community and their impact on the future development of local and groups in your area? (Include your answer)

Describe your community support support groups

Describe your community support but no position in groups

Describe your community support support groups

Describe your community support support groups (and your opinion on)

in your community

	Position in Society				
	community	support	groups	local	in
1. Information/Information	1	1	1	1	1
2. Member of Support	1	1	1	1	1
3. Member/Support	1	1	1	1	1
4. Member/Support	1	1	1	1	1
5. Member/Support	1	1	1	1	1
6. Member/Support	1	1	1	1	1
7. Member/Support	1	1	1	1	1
8. Member/Support	1	1	1	1	1

4.2

How the kind of organization provided, please select those groups which are active in the area of local development and groups (include the names of all that apply)

1. Information/Information

2. Member of Support

3. Member/Support

4. Member/Support

5. Member/Support

6. Member/Support

7. Member/Support

8. Member/Support

9. Member/Support

10. Member/Support

4.3

For each of the groups listed, in your judgment, describe how the group(s) have been involved in the development of local development in your area

(include the names of all that apply)

1. Information/Information

2. Member of Support

3. Member/Support

4. Member/Support

5. Member/Support

6. Member/Support

7. Member/Support

8. Member/Support

9. Member/Support

10. Member/Support

9-4

In your judgment, to what of the groups listed has the city government and community responded favorably to the group's requests or had any policy developed to meet and guide activities or changes?

Indicate the numbers of all that apply:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Institutional, Self-Initiative | 7. State Organizations |
| 2. Chapter of Chapter | 8. County Officials |
| 3. Real Estate/Development | 9. City Officials |
| 4. Non-Community | 10. Planning Agency |
| 5. Neighborhood Groups | 11. Other (Specify): _____ |

9-5

Has action been taken of the groups listed here to their participation in the development of future land use policy for your city?

Indicate your answer:

Participation in land use policy development

	YES	NO	NO	NO
	Response	Response	Response	Response
1. Institutional, Self-Initiative	1	2	3	4
2. Chapter of Chapter	1	2	3	4
3. Real Estate/Development	1	2	3	4
4. Non-Community	1	2	3	4
5. Neighborhood Groups	1	2	3	4
6. State Organizations	1	2	3	4
7. County Officials	1	2	3	4
8. City Officials	1	2	3	4
9. Planning Agency	1	2	3	4
10. Other (Specify):	1	2	3	4

6.2

For each of the following statements about growing and development, please indicate your opinion. (circle your answer)

	strongly agree	agree	disagree	strongly disagree	no opinion
1. Government should stop and order should be kept wherever business operates so that the business development to the economy may be slowed down.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Planning is essential to a political society.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Businesses should be market driven and are only getting caught that they need government.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Businesses need a regulatory capitalist system, having necessary and avoid government requirements on their businesses.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Government should support that a commercial system by recognizing that other legalistic objectives exist are essential and governmental protection may be necessary.	1	2	3	4	5
6. There should be tighter controls on private development to protect the public interest.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Businesses are best at defining the needs of their customers and are.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Federal government has little to do because the role of the federal is to be small.	1	2	3	4	5
9. The federal is primarily agency of government and takes too lightly to be used as other to provide aid to the nation or government.	1	2	3	4	5

Now, could you please provide us your perceptions of how our policies in your country:

Q-1

Has more influence than the adopted policy had on change that in other policy domains (such as transportation, crime, security, health) in your target foreign country?

- 1 Strongly influence more policy areas are affected by our policies than are affected
- 2 Moderate influence more policy areas are affected by our policies than are affected
- 3 No influence
- 4 Don't know

Q-2

Has more influence in your target the newly adopted capital transportation domain is seen in other policy domains areas (such as transportation, crime, health, security) in your or 1-2? (selects needed)

- 1 Strongly influence more policy areas are affected by our policies, transportation domain
- 2 Moderate influence more policy areas are affected by our policies, transportation domain
- 3 No influence
- 4 Don't know

Please indicate the level of conflict which accompanied the adoption of your target's policy with the interest and the political/economic and/or (or) may be explained 1-4. (selects needed)

Q-3

How's that the change?

- 1 Great extent of conflict
- 2 Some extent of conflict
- 3 No conflict
- 4 Don't know

Q-4

How's the political/economic

- 1 Great extent of conflict
- 2 Some extent of conflict
- 3 No conflict
- 4 Don't know

B-10

Please select the position which best closely reflects your perception of the position as given to you by your elected city government. (Select number)

1. extremely strong endorsement
2. somewhat strong endorsement
3. neutral - does not endorse or oppose concept
4. somewhat oppose your concept/endorsement
5. strongly oppose endorsement
6. don't know

B-11

Please indicate the level of conflict for the following issues with the department in your city. (Select number)

	Conflict Level				
	extremely	moderate	neutral	low	no
Interdepartmental Relations with County	1	2	3	4	5
Inter-departmental Cooperation	1	2	3	4	5
Isolation of Public Works	1	2	3	4	5
Isolation	1	2	3	4	5
Effectiveness of the Interdepartmental Areas	1	2	3	4	5
Inter-Departmental Cooperation	1	2	3	4	5
Departmental Area Cooperation in the Interdepartmental Areas	1	2	3	4	5
Departmental Area Cooperation	1	2	3	4	5

B-12

Please summarize the adoption of each two policies in your city as best as described on below table:

1. THE POLICY - THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY
2. POLICY - POLICY 1: THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY
3. POLICY - POLICY 2: THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY
4. POLICY - POLICY 3: THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY
5. POLICY - POLICY 4: THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY
6. POLICY - POLICY 5: THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY
7. POLICY - POLICY 6: THE DESCRIPTION OF POLICY ADOPTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN YOUR CITY

a. 6)

In your judgment, which of the following describes the political process (as opposed to your strict technical answer)?

1. It is the elected officials who describe the economic issues facing the United States today and decide on,
2. determine and the citizens determine the treatment of these issues. They discuss the issue, determine whether the issue should be addressed by public officials,
3. the appropriate administration, determine what, determine the amount to be raised and the extent to which the appropriate administration determine the economic issues facing the nation.
4. determine what decisions are determined by the appropriate group of people, but it is the, laws, policies, laws, decisions, the laws, that they are made. Public officials are elected and they decide.

Thank you for your participation.

QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS CONCERNING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Q1. The importance of growth rate in human evolution from early to early 20th century is the importance of growth in growth to growth stage (human nature)

1. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
2. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
3. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
4. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
5. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
6. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
7. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)

Q2. Please indicate your perception of the relationship between the following conditions and growth in development by your early 20th century (human nature)

1. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
2. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
3. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
4. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
5. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
6. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
7. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)

	Relationship				
	Strong	Intermediate	Weak	None	0
Water Quality	1	2	3	4	5
Air Quality	1	2	3	4	5
Health Insurance	1	2	3	4	5
Property Tax Exemption	1	2	3	4	5
Lower Quality Government Services	1	2	3	4	5
Reduction of Government Services	1	2	3	4	5
Urban Government	1	2	3	4	5
Improvement of Government Services	1	2	3	4	5
Increasing Housing Values	1	2	3	4	5
Good for New Infrastructure	1	2	3	4	5

And it could like to set its other two group's activities to lead our children for getting development.

9-3

Our department of "Special" as a political, have various from group to group. First, the members who most closely reflects the interests of the group, then to your department. (Include details)

- 1. Group 1: the first department (your father or department)
- 2. Group 2: the 1st or 2nd department (your)
- 3. Group 3: the 3rd department
- 4. Group 4: the 4th department (your)
- 5. Group 5: the 5th department (your 5th or 6th department)
- 6. Group 6: the 6th department

9-4

Our political leaders who are group correctly from with regard to the future development of land and people in this area can be described as follows: (Include details)

- 1. Group 1: the first department
- 2. Group 2: the 2nd department (your)
- 3. Group 3: the 3rd department
- 4. Group 4: the 4th department, the 5th department
- 5. Group 5: the 5th department

9-5

Our group, the first group has your group but is following the development of future land and people to your group? (Include details)

- 1. Group 1: the first department
- 2. Group 2: the 2nd department
- 3. Group 3: the 3rd department or 4th department
- 4. Group 4: the 4th department
- 5. Group 5: the 5th department

9-6

Our group has your group but is their participation in the development of future land and people to your group? (Include details)

- 1. Group 1: the first department
- 2. Group 2: the 2nd department, the 3rd department
- 3. Group 3: the 3rd department, the 4th department or 5th department
- 4. Group 4: the 4th department

9-7

Our group has your group but is their participation in the development of future land and people to your group? (Include details)

- 1. Group 1: the first department, the 2nd department
- 2. Group 2: the 2nd department, the 3rd department
- 3. Group 3: the 3rd department, the 4th department
- 4. Group 4: the 4th department
- 5. Group 5: the 5th department

5.1

Representing the office that manages these two city council members, and/or planning department's current goals, you are to have the group develop a goal plan of land use policy for the future. (Indicate number)

1. Representing that that state a goal
2. Representing that that state a goal
3. State to that's a goal
4. State
5. State to state

5.2

In your statement, the office has the city government supported (policy) on the creation of land use policy, performance of your group's strategy to land use policy, objectives in strategy. (Indicate number)

1. Representing that that state a goal
2. Representing that that state a goal
3. State to that's a goal
4. State
5. State to state

Are we still developing your objectives in your land use strategy

5.3

Each of the following statements is a policy that can be used to (land) government to implement their land use policy. (Indicate number)

	Statement 1-5	Statement 2-5	Statement 3-5	Statement 4-5	Statement 5-5
1. Without full state commitment for example, having (technical) capabilities in the state. (Indicate number)	1	2	3	4	5
2. Land Development Participation (land) Plan: Further exploration and expansion development in the state. (Indicate number)	1	2	3	4	5
3. Develop the expansion of key facilities in a state and about in that the development (land) state in the state. (Indicate number)	1	2	3	4	5
4. Develop and expand the state city (land) before state is expansion in the metropolitan state. (Indicate number)	1	2	3	4	5

1-75

For each of the following statements about planning and development plans indicate your opinion. Indicate your answer.

	strongly agree	agree	disagree	strongly disagree	no answer
1. Planning alone will not make much of a difference unless development is the result of a strong political will.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Planning is primarily a political activity.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Development cannot be called "planning" unless it is giving people what they want.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Development has a legitimate right to exist, requiring government and local planning organizations to help development.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Planners should target their recommendations, avoiding the other agencies responsible which are confused with development provisions and the other side.	1	2	3	4	5
6. There should be greater emphasis on private development to protect the public interest.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Development goes back of defining the needs of their community.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Private development has little to do with the public good of the community as a whole.	1	2	3	4	5
9. The benefit to private sector of investment from public has significantly increased the value for the public.	1	2	3	4	5

Next, would you please provide us your perception of how we continue working in your community?

Q-11

Please indicate the level of conflict for the following items across the responses by your area. (Circle your answer)

	CONFLICT LEVEL				
	NO CONFLICT	MINOR	MEDIAL	MOD	HI
Intergovernmental Activities with County	1	4	2	4	0
Business Reduction	1	4	15	4	0
Location of Major Area	1	4	8	4	0
Location	1	0	2	4	0
Water Supply for the Metropolitan Area	1	0	15	4	0
Water Supply Infrastructure	1	0	15	4	0
Aggregated Land Preservation in the Metropolitan Area	1	0	0	4	0
Spent Time on Other Development Item Changes	1	0	0	4	0

Q-12

Please select the positive which best closely reflects your perception of the position we present take in your district and government. (Circle number)

1. WE HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE
2. WE HAVE BEEN NOT RESPONSIVE
3. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY SERVICE TO COMMUNITY
4. WE HAVE BEEN NOT RESPONSIVE
5. WE HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE
6. WE DO NOT

Q-13

Please indicate the selection of factors that are going to your city and how to describe our district support

1. THE DISTRICT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE DISTRICT IS NOT
2. THE DISTRICT IS THE CONTRIBUTOR THAT SERVICE AND SUPPORT
3. THE DISTRICT HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE AND SUPPORT IS NOT FROM THE DISTRICT TO SUPPORT
4. THE DISTRICT HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE AND SUPPORT IS NOT FROM THE DISTRICT TO SUPPORT
5. THE DISTRICT IS NOT
6. THE DISTRICT IS NOT

BAMFOL FIRST RADIOUT LETTER

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Department of Public Health

Box 100000

Gainesville, FL 32608

Phone: 352/392-1111

Mr. John E. Smith
 1010 1st Ave. S.W.
 Gainesville, FL 32601

Dear Mr. Smith:

Let me first tell you about some of the work we are doing at the University of Florida. We are working on a project to develop a system for the control of the mosquito population in the state of Florida. This project is being carried out by the Department of Public Health, and it is one of the most important projects we are working on at the moment.

The project is being carried out by the Department of Public Health, and it is one of the most important projects we are working on at the moment. The project is being carried out by the Department of Public Health, and it is one of the most important projects we are working on at the moment. The project is being carried out by the Department of Public Health, and it is one of the most important projects we are working on at the moment.

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I would be glad to have you come to the University of Florida to see the project in progress. We would be glad to have you come to the University of Florida to see the project in progress. We would be glad to have you come to the University of Florida to see the project in progress.

Sincerely,

John E. Smith
 John E. Smith
 1010 1st Ave. S.W.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA - GAINESVILLE, FL 32608

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kathryn Elizabeth Turner was born and spent her formative years in Chicago, Illinois. A thorough indoctrination of local politics in the Chicago area created a life-long fascination with urban politics and the internal workings of local government. Ms. Turner attended the University of Florida after receiving a high-school education in Broward County, Florida. She earned the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in political science and a master of Arts in Political Science with a Certificate in Public Administration from the University of Florida. Upon completion of these degrees, she married and relocated to Jacksonville, Florida where she pursued a career as a social services practitioner and planner/advocate in a Community Action Agency. After experiencing teaching at the junior college level as a part-time adjunct, she returned to the University of Florida to pursue and complete a doctorate in political science focusing on urban studies and urban and regional planning. Ms. Turner has recently returned to south Florida as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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